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Abstract
This thesis is a reading and interpretation of Giambattista Vico's model of the human 
mind in the New Science. It focuses on the mind because understanding Vico's account of 
its origin and development is the key to assessing his overall claim of having discovered 
a new science of humanity. I contend that when the following three broad questions 
have been addressed the New Science will reveal a deeper and more complete dimen­
sion. The first is how Vico arrives at his thesis that the mind's development is a product 
of natural, social, and linguistic elements, rather than the emergence of innate faculties.
Is this formulation coherent, and are there elements whose functions are not explained? 
The second is how he believed that a science of humanity was possible. Vico thought that 
true knowledge, or science, consisted in a synthesis of the esoteric and the practical. Was 
it realistic for him to suppose that these very different paradigms could coalesce and 
provide a backbone for scientific research? The third question is w hether the accounts 
he gives of sacred and profane history are consistent and do not compromise his main 
thesis that history is human directed. Was Vico's explanation of the identity of the mind 
compatible with both narratives? It is intended that the development of the answers to 
these three questions will yield a new interpretation of the way Vico's account of the 
mind is understood.
The originality of this thesis lies in two main points. The first is that it proceeds 
with a description, in toto, of the phenomenon of mind that follows the unfolding of the 
phases of the ideal eternal history. Previous studies have treated the characteristics of
mind in separate phases, but none to my knowledge takes the present approach of view­
ing the mind in its entirety as it persists throughout universal history. The second is that 
it explains that Vico's position throughout the New Science was that the persistence of 
mind is due to somatically-based activity. I point out that Vico was establishing a new 
paradigm for the mind in which meaning is created through connectedness to social and 
physical activity. This position is in stark contrast to computationist and rationalist 
theories of mind in which, theoretically, rational consciousness could exist apart from a 
physical platform.
I have made use of many references to historical and contemporary sources 
about the mind and cognition in general. The purpose of these are, firstly, to provide an 
orientation to where Vico's ideas belong in the history of philosophy and, secondly, to 
indicate where those ideas may be situated or find resonance in contemporary theories 
of mind.
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1Introduction
Purpose o f the thesis
This work is a study of the human mind in Vico's New Science.1 It is a detailed 
reading of that aspect of the work, rather than a full treatm ent of the work as a whole. 
The methodology used to study what Vico intended by 'the mind’ in the New Science will 
be based on an analysis of the text and a positioning of it within the history of philoso­
phy. Links between Vico's theory and modern scholarship on the mind will be pointed 
out where I think it will be helpful to clarify certain arcane passages and concepts. The 
main purpose of this thesis is to ask what Vico means by the mind and w hether he has a 
coherent account of what that is and how it developed. I am also interested, secondarily, 
in examining how science or understanding can be advanced by studying Vico's theory 
of mind.
Certain contemporary theories of the mind which share issues that are congenial 
to Vico's thinking are referred to in this study. They can provide fresh perspectives on 
some of Vico's conjectures and intuitions, and Vico's insights into the mind might also
1 In this study this means the Second New Science. References to Vico's New Science are to Fausto Nicolini's 
paragraph enumeration common to the Italian and English editions. The titles Scienza nuova or New Sci­
ence denote the Scienza nuova seconda, the title Vico used for the second edition of 1730 and used since 
Nicolini to refer to this and the final edition of 1744. The New Science (after NS) appeared altogether in 
three editions -  1725,1730, and an expanded version in 1744. All references in this study refer to the final 
edition cited here: Giambattista Vico, The New Science, translated by Thomas Bergin & Max Fisch (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1984).
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possibly have relevance for them. But this is primarily a work of the history of philoso­
phy, not a work of cognitive science, and my main concern is with contributing to the 
discussion of Vico's theory of mind, and it is on that basis I will proceed.2 The founda­
tional importance that Vico places on study of the mind as the key to understanding uni­
versal history is succinctly stated here:
Our Science therefore comes to describe at the same time an ideal eternal history trav­
ersed in time by the history of every nation in its rise, development, maturity, decline, and fall. In­
deed, we make bold to affirm that he who meditates this Science narrates to himself this ideal 
eternal history so far as he himself makes it for himself by that proof "it had, has, and will have to 
be" (idovette, deve, dovra). For the first indubitable principle posited above is that this world o f na­
tions has certainly been made by men, and its guise (guisa) must therefore be found within the modi­
fications of our own human mind (my italics).3
The modern method of inquiry into nature by mathematical modelling was in as­
cendancy during Vico's lifetime. For Vico, this method was flawed in its premise that 
man was capable of having perfect knowledge (scienza) of that which he had not made. 
Nothing was more obvious to him than that full knowledge of something can only take 
place when one is physically and mentally involved in its making. Vico believed that na­
ture was a domain which humans could only have partial knowledge (certezza) of be­
2 What comes to mind is a statement by Croce in the Conclusion to The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico 
[1913], translated by R.G. Collingwood, (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ, 2002): "It is never­
theless a fact that no one has written on Vico without feeling a need of casting his eyes over later years 
and noting the resemblances and analogies between the Neapolitan philosopher's doctrines and those of 
fifty or a hundred years after". 237.
3 NS 349.
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cause they were not its creators. This is one of the chief discoveries of the New Science, 
the 'verum-factum' principle.4
There are many ways to approach the New Science, and detailed attention has 
been paid to his ideas on history, rhetoric, epistemology and metaphysics, to cite only a 
few areas of rich Vichian scholarship. But the subject of mind has been treated in a frag­
mentary way, perhaps because it is the prism through which the meaning of all other 
elements of the New Science must pass and its own meaning has been taken for granted 
in the process. This is surprising because Vico himself says that the key to human history 
(the world of nations) is to be found in understanding how the mind developed in time. 
One of the reasons why this is so is because if Vico is taken verbatim in his professed or­
thodox Catholicism many of the key terms of his philosophy, like mind and providence, 
do not make sense within that tradition. The fact is he never speaks of a perm anent hu­
man identity in his own philosophy. The closest thing that Vico suggests to an essential 
human identity with persistence in time, even though it undergoes im portant transfor­
mations, is the mind. Nor is providence, the explanans of the 'ideal eternal history', his 
name for the pattern that all nations and peoples traverse in the course of their exis­
tence, for Vico the traditional Christian divine order that culminates in human and uni­
versal redemption, rather it is an abstract universal governing principle in which relig­
ion is less the conduit of revealed truth than a foundational social structure that makes 
possible legal and civic institutions. It is hard to see what psychological comfort, Vico's 
concept of religion offers, although he makes it very clear that he thinks it has great 
value as a socialising mechanism. But one will not find in it a normative ethics, nor even
4 Verum esse ipsum factum  ("the true is itself the made"). Another version of the same principle is verum et 
factum convertuntur ("the true and the made are convertible"). Vico's idea first appears in the DeAntiquis- 
sima, although it is first applied to developing the human sciences in the New Science.
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the certitude of mechanistic explanation, and nowhere any reference to salvation. All of 
this is curious in light of his professed Catholicism. How can this be explained? The ab­
sence of traditional religious reference can possibly be interpreted as an attem pt by Vico 
to let the New Science stand alone as science without the buttress of doctrine.
These considerations have led me to pose three questions. The first is to ask 
what is the substance or content of mind in Vico: does he think there is an essential na­
ture to mind or is it entirely a product of historical contingency? The second is to ask 
what role mind plays in the ideal eternal history: to what extent is history a product of 
mind, and how much of it is caused by Vico's providence? Thirdly and finally, I ask what 
the logical status is of the mind's judgements with respect to the objectivity and relativ­
ity of truth: is it considered a reliable and accurate instrument, or are its measurements 
approximative and subjective? These questions are interdependent, and it might be 
profitable at times to compare central notions of Vico's with other theories of the mind, 
but the primary task is to determine if Vico had developed a theory of mind that is co­
herent and does not contradict his other claims in the New Science. Here is the order and 
summary of the chapters:
Chapter 1: Introduction: Presented here: 1) the aim of the thesis; 2) Vico's science 
of the mind; 3] some problems of interpretation.
Chapter 2: Literature review: The main themes of Vichian scholarship that are re­
viewed here are grouped into three divisions: 1) the historical, 2) the rhetorical, and 3] 
the epistemological. The principal criterion for inclusion, other than certain classical 
works that no thesis can afford to ignore for their general content, has been the rele­
vance of these studies for a reading of Vico's philosophy of mind.
Chapter 3: The beast that became human. Here, I describe Vico's first type of mind 
that is characterized as the 'barbarism of sensation', a sense-dominated awareness of 
brute reality that is lacking in self-awareness. I ask how Vico relates this to the concept 
of conatus, which he says contains the seeds of innate mindedness in man.
Chapter 4: The giant that opened the mind o f man. In this chapter, I trea t Vico's 
account of how language, thought, and emotions share the same origins and develop 
concurrently. At this stage, imaginative thinking, which he calls the 'poetic mind', begins 
to give representation to emotional states. I show here how the creative process in cog­
nition is fundamentally related to utility.
Chapter 5: The children o f the human race. At this time, patterns of behaviour and 
imagination are codified into a system of archetypes which Vico calls the 'imaginative 
universals'. This represents a major transition in cognitive development from instinctive 
awareness to the formation of conceptual thinking. I adopt the point of view that the 
'imaginative universals' are part of a process of causal relationship whereby emotional 
states become imaginative concepts which in turn lead to the creation of social struc­
tures that then require new emotional states in order to flourish.
Chapter 6: The architects o f reason. Vico introduces the explanatory concept of 
the 'intelligible universals' as the collection of abstract ideas that furnish the theoretical 
structure for the formation of institutions in civic societies. The nature of thought in this 
phase is more analogous and allegorical than the previous phase that was metaphorical 
and heterologous. I make the case here that rationality, as Vico conceived it, is an act of 
reflection based on the 'intelligible universals' which permit the physical detachm ent 
necessary for the adjudication of choices.
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Chapter 7: The world o f nations. I discuss here Vico's conception of fully devel­
oped humanity, tutta spiegata, which is a synthesis of rational and non-rational elements 
of man's being. I attem pt to clarify his position as regards the limits of rationality and the 
function of language in shaping our understanding of reality. Vico's philosophic wisdom, 
which he calls “the true and proper nature of man", is a pragmatic response to affairs of 
utility in civil society, and not an esoteric exercise in reasoning. For this he is sometimes 
considered a relativist, nevertheless he firmly grounds the non-quantifiable in a univer­
sal standard of reason.
Chapter 8: A deep solitude o f spirit and will. The final phase of Vico's life cycle of 
the mind is characterized by what he calls the 'barbarism of reflection', that is, a state in 
which language loses its imaginative power and meaning is reduced to material literal­
ness. This development is pernicious to society, as it leads to solipsism and a loss of 
common will. My main interest here is to show how important Vico believed it was to 
maintain "imaginative fictions" for the health of a society, and to explore the epistemo- 
logical implications of this position.
Chapter 9: The meaning o f return: Providence and the model o f mind. This chapter 
focuses on the importance of the concept of providence as it relates to the development 
of the human mind. The main difficulty with Vico's claim that providence directs the 
ideal eternal history is that it seems to contradict his account of history as a product of 
the human mind, which has developed without the aid of direct divine intervention.
Chapter 10: Conclusion. In this chapter I state my reasons for believing that Vico's 
human mind is a product of continuous development that represents the synthesis of 
natural, social and linguistic elements. Although the phases that it undergoes in its trans­
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formation are decidedly different from one another, their ontological homogeneity is 
guaranteed by their connection to their common physicality and antecedent states. This 
is not to say that Vico was making the case for an essential human nature; rather, I con­
clude that he is saying the human mind is a product of historical processes, and not di­
vine or innate factors. But in spite of the natural and social explanations Vico gives, the 
metaphysical principle of the ideal eternal history assures the continuity of the states of 
mind. I discuss how Vico meant by this concept a universal structure that is the result of 
human activity.
Vico's science o f the mind
The New Science is the study of man in nature, more properly human institutions 
in the world of nature. Its method of research is to integrate philology and philosophy, 
with the aim of giving a rational interpretation of that record without subjective preju­
dice. It claims to have universal truth, although the focus of its inquiry, the ontology of 
human institutions, is contingent in a way that natural phenomena are not:
Vico finally came to perceive that there was not yet in the world of letters a system so de­
vised as to bring the best philosophy, that of Plato made subordinate to the Christian faith, into 
harmony with a philology exhibiting scientific necessity in both its branches, that is in the two his­
tories, that of languages and that of things; to give certainty to the history of languages by refer­
ence to the history of things; and to bring into accord the maxims of the academic sages and the 
practices of the political sages.5
The germ of Vico's epistemology based on philological principles can be summed 
up in this way - whatever man has done in the past, and what he is doing in the present,
5 Giambattista Vico, The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico [1728], translated by Max Harold Fisch & 
Thomas Goddard Bergin [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975]. Throughout the Autobiography Vico re­
fers to himself in the third-person. 155.
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will be the basis of what he will do and know about himself in the future. His premise is 
that there are universal cultural institutions and modes of thought, and this belief in 
their non-relativity is what gives him the assurance that his investigations of mind and 
society can be pursued free from ideological prejudices and dogmatisms. His methodol­
ogy was inspired by a desire to found knowledge on the evidence of things themselves, 
and he accorded truth value to the theoretical musings of the ancients in so far as they 
contributed to our reconstruction of the historical phases of mankind.
Vico was not the first thinker to see the stages of world history as a three-part 
structure, but his model was unique because, for him, history is a product of the human 
mind, and not a divinely ordained sequence of events or a determined course of material 
necessity.6 As such, for Vico, our knowledge of human affairs can be complete in a way 
that our knowledge of the natural world cannot be, because man is the cause and maker 
of history. This model is not without its complications however, for while it seems to 
proclaim human freedom from historical and material necessity on one hand, on the 
other there is interwoven in the human-made scenario the web of divine providence, 
whose presence in the affairs of men is never adequately explained by Vico. To question 
the depth or nature of Vico's religious references should be a primary consideration of 
any study of the New Science because they do affect the interpretation of many of his
6 See John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005}: "A 
different [from the philosophers (NS 23, 27-31} and the philologists (NS 3-4,32-9} heretofore] starting 
point was needed, one provided by sacred history. Vico identified it, not in the Fall, but in the aftermath of 
the great Flood. After the Flood the posterity of Noah had been reduced to the level of beasts, wandering 
over the waterlogged, forest-covered earth. In that savage state men abandoned their women and mothers 
their children; the language of Adam was forgotten; the need to satisfy hunger, thirst, and lust suppressed 
any sense of humanity. Yet just then, 'in that long, dense night of darkness’, a single light shone out, which 
provided the first truth of Vico’s science: that the world of the Gentile nations was certainly made by men. 
The principles of his science were to be found, therefore, in the nature of the human mind itself. What was 
needed was a metaphysics which would study that mind, not in the individual, to lead him back to God 
(the province of divine philosophy}, but in that common sense which is the mind of nations, in order to 
connect it with God as eternal providence". 230.
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claims, for example, his account of the universal archetypes and their human or divine 
source. There are also sections of the New Science regarding political legitimacy whose 
meaning will change depending on whether Vico's statements on the divine are under­
stood sola Scriptura.7 There seems to be a prima facie paradox in Vico between God the 
Creator and Architect and Man the Maker of Universal History. Penelope Corfield neatly 
summarises the movement of history in the New Science:
He borrowed the traditional imagery of historical 'ages' but yoked them into a dynamic 
model. Each great era of history, he believed, represented a significant organizing principle, which 
expresses a stage in human development. Initially, there was an ancient Age of the Gods. Life was 
simple, if sometimes violent, and people were ruled by kings. Then followed the Age of Heroes, 
when a feudal aristocracy prevailed by might, while, lastly, there prevails the Age of Men, in which 
people develop reason and laws but also risk becoming slothful and over-civilised. This model 
was underpinned, for Vico, by divine providence but was detached from a Christian commentary. 
It was intended as a global scenario, applicable to all societies. Furthermore, Vico warned that the 
Age of Men will not automatically last for ever, if people lose too much of their primitive simplic­
ity. In that case, the sequence will revert to its origins and recommence, making a cyclical or 
slowly spiralling history.8
These various stages of history (the Ages of Gods, Heroes, and Men) had their 
corresponding types of mind. The first is poetic and imaginative, the second is probable 
and speculative, and the third is rational and reductive:
His fundamental idea was that the explanation of the history of societies is to be found in 
the human mind. The world at first is felt rather than thought; this is the condition of savages in 
the state of nature, who have no political organization. The second mental state is imaginative 
knowledge, "poetical wisdom"; to this corresponds the higher barbarism of the heroic age. Finally,
7 See Jurgen Trabant,'Thunder; Girls and Sheep, and Other Origins of Language', March 1995, Discussion 
Papers No. 15, Collegium Budapest/Institute for Advanced Study, for an extended discussion of these theo­
logical and political implications.
8 Penelope J. Corfield, Time and the Shape of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007] 169.
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comes conceptual knowledge, and with it the age of civilization. These are the three stages 
through which every society passes, and each of these types determines law, institutions, lan­
guages, literature, and the characters of men.9
Vico is usually very thorough in describing how these modes of thinking corre­
spond to specific historical phases, for there he explains their necessity in terms of util­
ity and it is hard to find much that is objectionable (apart from certain examples of mis­
matched recondite knowledge) about that premise because it does not require a m eta­
physical explanation.10 But that transparency begins to cloud when he attributes teleol­
ogy to mind that is separate from strictly pragmatic purposes and it assumes the charac­
ter of a sort of final cause that directs humanity throughout history:
It is true that men have themselves made this world of nations (and we took this as the 
first incontestable principle of our Science, since we despaired of finding it from the philosophers 
and philologists, but this world without doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite 
contrary, and always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves; which 
narrow ends, made means to serve wider ends, it has always employed to preserve the human 
race upon this earth.11
9 J.B. Bury, The Idea o f Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth [1920] (New York: Dover Books, 
1987} 268.
10 Nevertheless, there are places where Vico is vague and imprecise in his historical chronology, and the 
heroic age has perhaps the most difficult boundaries to define. See Leon Pompa, Human Nature and His­
torical Knowledge: Hume, Hegel and Vico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990}: "It is difficult to 
put exact limits up on the notion of the heroic age, a difficulty which arises from the fact that Vico himself 
seemed to change his mind over the boundary which distinguished it from the poetic age. Its central fea­
tures are, however, clear enough. It arises in a period when, according to Vico, after the poetic and theo­
logical form of life has arisen, and its benefits have become apparent, strangers from outside appeal for 
asylum to the communities, or 'families', which have grown up around the theological world view, and are 
taken in on the basis of something akin to a very low feudal arrangement". 145
11 NS 1108.
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Two problems o f interpretation
Although it is not uncommon for the reader coming to the New Science for the 
first time to feel a certain delight at the extraordinary trove of topics under his eye, the 
spontaneity of that reaction is not infrequently followed by a sense of puzzlement as to 
where it will all ultimately lead. Notwithstanding his attempt to make his work explicit 
by adopting an articulate form of elements and principles in a sort of axiomatic method, 
the content remains often bewildering. The difficulty one has of determining the mean­
ing of obscure historical references, which are obviously important to Vico, is com­
pounded by his periodic entanglements of theoretical guesswork based on vague his­
torical claims. A frustrated reader may be forgiven for thinking that Vico might never 
have read the work that he wrote, or for thinking that he simply assumed the average 
reader could fill in the leaps and gaps between practical observation and metaphysical 
conjecture. An example of this is how when Vico sets his philosophical plough to work 
the earth of Scriptural exegesis his findings are often quite unlike anything one would 
expect from a Catholic philosopher: the New Science is not a work of religious persua­
sion, nevertheless the concept of providence carries it from beginning to end. Either we 
must accept the term at its face value, as a Christian concept of divine order and fulfill­
ment, and then are not able to make any sense of his main thesis that humans make their 
own history, or we follow our intuition that not all the confusion between terms 
throughout the New Science are simply due to carelessness, but that some of them are 
systematic and deliberate attempts to avoid the censor and philosophical attack. And 
when Vico uses different words for the same concept then confusions do arise and his 
meaning becomes inaccessible. An example of this occurs when he distinguishes the gi- 
ganti (giants) from the bestioni (beasts), which represent a transform ation of the pri­
16
marily animal into a primitive human. But in the use of these terms, unfortunately, Vico 
is sometimes inconsistent. In some places he does not distinguish between the beasts 
and the giants when meaning the original gentiles as opposed to the Hebrews, and else­
where he means by giants a later stage in the development of the general race of beasts. 
And in this study, the most important term is, naturally, mind, and it also belongs to that 
category of terms that require careful analysis.
The essence o f mind and human nature
Isaiah Berlin succinctly expressed the critical difficulty in coming to grips with 
the term 'mind' in Vico:
Mente (mind) is not a clear concept in the New Science: it is most often the mind of indi­
viduals, but sometimes seems to be a collective entity, not unlike the similarly ambiguous Geist in 
German Idealist thought. This, as might be expected, has generated conflicting interpretations of 
Vico’s metaphysical views -  Hegelian, Catholic, Marxist, existentialist, empiricist, and combina­
tions of these; nor is the end in sight.12
For Vico, all of our concepts come from sensible things: there are no a priori ideas 
which are scaffolding for our abstract concepts. Thought, for him, has a somatic origin, 
and when the connection with the body is severed through over-intellectualisation, in 
what Vico calls the barbarism o f reflection,13 the species regresses to a new form of b ru t­
ishness. Vico's ideas about the importance of society to cognition have in common with 
the social constructivists a rejection of a computationalist model that sees man as a ra­
tional cognitive power that can be stripped of its emotional and environmental connec­
tions. He, on the other hand, explains mind in the context of natural and social history; it
12 Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000) 87.
13NS1106.
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cannot be understood apart from the environmental and social factors which shape it. 
The steps or process of the mind's acquisition of rationality, starting from a kinesic or­
gan which is primarily emotional and non-rational, provides the fundamental focus of 
this research.
Is mind an essential "thing" for Vico or a collection of contingent properties that 
are characteristic of the kind of creature that possesses it? If it is a thing that has an on­
tology all its own, the question of how Vico explains its persistence through time be­
comes central to his thesis of how the ideal eternal history interacts with mankind in 
time; if it is the latter, how do we come to identify it by certain characteristics and not 
others? Rationality has long been associated as one of the most important, and some­
times the defining, trait of humanness in Western thinking, but in Vico's corso the begin­
ning and end of history is marked by a type of mind that would not qualify, in the usual 
sense, as rational.14 Is there a conclusion to be drawn from this that in the periods of ab­
sence and atrophy of human thought humanity, properly speaking, does not exist? If this 
is the case, it might be that Vico was, uncommonly for his age, although not entirely 
alone, suggesting more an evolutionary model of human development than he was ex­
pounding a definition of human nature that is based on rational characteristics.15 How 
does Vico define mankind's shared global identity when the identifiable aspects of it 
range from beastliness to hyper-refined sensitivity? In other words, if man is a 'unit' 
what is it about that unit that does not change over time?
14 Although his reference was to individuals and not Homo sapiens, Montaigne's comment that "The end 
and the beginning of knowledge are equal in stupidity” contains a certain aptness to Vico's model of hu­
man development, for both imagine the life cycle of the individual to be reflected in that of the species. 
Montaigne, ‘Apology for Raymond Sebond’.
15 Pico della Mirandola in On the Dignity of Man and On Being and the One points out that man has no "hu­
man nature". This thesis will show that Vico shares this conclusion.
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Vico wanted to put his philosophy on the secure path of science, and to do that it 
would not serve his purpose to ignore the contribution of nature to mind. The challenge 
he set before himself was to correlate the apparently intrinsic differences between the 
three types of minds he describes - sensory-driven, imagination-centred, and rational - 
with the corsi of history in the world of nature. Contained in his premise that throughout 
the phases there is continuity is the assumption that the essential nature of change is 
associated with gradual transitions (guise, modificazioni) between states, and not radical 
transformations in which past characteristics are cancelled with every step forward.
Vico does not seem to advocate in the New Science that there is an original immutable 
nature of mind that persists in time; rather, his position seems to be that there is conti­
nuity of them between the corsi.
The transitions o f mind
How is this continuity achieved? The transitions between phases, the corsi, of 
mind are vital to understanding the mechanism of movement in Vico's ideal eternal his­
tory, for their nature determines its direction, and that is why I divide this study along 
the lines of the different phases as they occur in history. For this reason, I will concen­
trate on the nature of the corsi, what they are and how they came to be, as well as the 
mechanisms of social constructions, Vico's cose or institutions.
Vico claims that the New Science reveals the essential connection between the 
transcendent reality of an ideal eternal history that contains universal forms and the 
world of material particulars. The three natures of mind that he describes provide the 
efficient cause for this progression and their transitions affect the sequential pattern 
that history follows, and the problem of individuation for the three kinds of mind re-
19
quires particular consideration. But it is also a difficult question whether Vico meant 
they are metaphysically inevitable or evolutionary natural processes that do not have to 
follow a certain pattern. It is far from clear how the global identity of mind is maintained 
throughout all three of the corsi. Are the transitions identical, and are the agents of 
change between corsi the same or do they differ fundamentally from one another in the 
same way that a difference exists between a physical and a chemical change? And what 
is it that actually changes? Is it the form or the substance of the mind that undergoes 
change? Are they definable states in themselves, or 'marginal zones' in which aspects of 
both before and after states co-exist? This raises interesting metaphysical questions of 
identity and logical necessity, for if we cannot say with any degree of certainty when 
they begin and end, have we not make a distinction without adequate discernment?
The question of Vico's vagueness on this point seems to be unresolved. One way 
of reading the transitions is as a reconciliation of opposites, like in a Hegelian synthesis, 
in which the frequency of events become the 'standard' by which the new phase is iden­
tified. The sheer quantity of appearances - attributes and properties - becomes in some 
sense the quality of those phases, but it is not necessarily a question of simple arithmetic 
- greater than one half does not make a new whole - but rather depends, I would suggest, 
in large part on the perspective of the viewer. There is no intrinsic distinction between 
one state and the next: to borrow a metaphor, it is impossible to say where the stream  
ends and the river begins, but that is not to deny that both the stream and the river exist, 
only that where they meet does not exist in a specific location or time.
Just as the life of a person is marked by perceivable but nonetheless vague points
of separation between stages, so too does the human mind in Vico's model pass from its
infancy (poetic mind), to adolescence (heroic mind), to maturity (rational mind), and
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finally to senescence (the hyper-reflective mind, Vico's barbarism o f reflection (barbarie 
della riflessione).16 This metaphor that casts the mind in a human life cycle can present 
problems, the chief one being that it might appear trivial, and it probably would be if he 
did not cast it within the framework of his universal history, in which all nations (which 
Vico points out is etymologically related to a "birth" or a "being born"] and institutions 
are continuous with a cosmic vision.17 But that is also where an interpreter's real work 
must begin.
16 NS 915, 349, & 393.
17 The course of the ideal eternal history runs parallel with the mind’s development, and that term, too, 
must be taken metaphorically. See Amos Funkerstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the 
Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986): "More precisely, 
the "ideal history" does not describe the actual historical course of a definite social entity; rather it meas­
ures the actual history against the (methodological) norm of the regular sequence of the periods of social 
creativity. These periods and their immanent sequence are truly ideal types. They stand for the course of a 
"nation" if imagined in and by itself, isolated from other influences. The "ideal history" is a limiting case or 
a necessary fiction, much like Hobbes's state of nature". 282.
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2Literature review
The position that this thesis defends is that Vico's account of the mind is the key 
to understanding the New Science. Vico's framework for all human history, the ideal 
eternal history, is the movement of providential design in time, and it is through the 
modifications of the mind's development that this movement is realised. For this reason, 
the fundamental premise being followed here is that only by understanding what Vico 
meant by mind [mente], its nature and modality, can an adequate interpretation be made 
of the New Science. What is needed is a thorough enquiry that examines how the mind 
operates in relation to Vico's concepts of sacred and secular time.
The views of Vico scholars on those topics which chiefly influence the coherence 
of Vico's concept of mind are reviewed here; these are history, rhetoric, and epistemol- 
ogy. These topics are directly relevant to the mind for these reasons. In the case of his­
tory, Vico says that its unfolding is reflective of the mind's various stages of develop­
ment: history and mind are conjoined. Rhetoric, for Vico, has its roots in the poetic 
imagination and is a powerful instrum ent for attaining philosophic truth: Vico believes 
that an understanding of rhetoric reveals the processes by which concepts are formed 
and judgments are made. Finally, Vico's epistemology is based on his principle of the
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verum factum, an explanatory concept that ties physical activity to cognitive develop­
ment.
The subject m atter of the New Science reads as a catalogue of the outstanding in­
tellectual concerns of its day: philosophy, rhetoric, philology, history and economic and 
political theory. Peter Burke wrote that the New Science is "a book stuffed so full of ideas 
that it almost bursts at the seams".18 It is not surprising, then, that in a work that is so 
broad in its dimensions Vico scholars have tried many keys to decipher its meanings. 
Sometimes they have taken a single aspect of the work as the key to everything else; this 
has invariably led to over simplification in some cases and outright twisting of the m ean­
ing of the text in others.19 Overall, these efforts have contributed to understanding Vico, 
but even collectively their insights are only partial at best because they do not go deeply 
enough into the one thing that Vico himself took to be the most im portant aspect of the 
New Science, namely the human mind:
For the first indubitable principle posited above is that this world of nations has certainly 
been made by men, and its guise [guisa] must therefore be found within the modifications of our 
own human mind.20
The relative scarcity of scholarship that probes the meaning of mind itself is a 
gap that this study hopes to fill. As was mentioned in the Introduction, the sequence of
18 Peter Burke, Vico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985] 32.
19 D.P. Verene, Vico's Science of Imagination (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981):"Many of Vico's 
most brilliant interpreters hang like albatrosses around his neck, inhibiting open readings of his views.
The practice to which a great number of his commentators have succumbed, and Vico's ship has been 
sailed under many flags - absolute idealism, Catholicism, Marxism, historicism, particular conceptions of 
contemporary epistemology, and the methodologies of various contemporary schools of philosophy. Al­
though Vico’s thought can be found through such approaches, it is soon lost in the security of their shores". 
23.
20 NS 349. Also see NS 331.
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phases that the mind undergoes is the key to the dynamic of the ideal eternal history, and 
an understanding of how the transitions occur explains in large measure how the nature 
of mind is affected by them. It is not enough to consider the mind as it is in each one of 
its separate phases; what is required is to treat it in its entirety throughout history, for 
only in this way can the logic of Vico's historical narrative reveal its coherence. These 
studies include key works by past and contemporary Vico scholars in which the subject 
of mind receives various degrees of attention. The specific purpose o f this review is to in­
dividuate in these studies the areas where greater attention to or a more accurate reading 
o f the mind would have permitted a better understanding o f the New Science.
Giambattista Vico wrote the New Science in Naples in a period of transition be­
tween the end of Renaissance humanism and the ascendancy of scientific rationalism. At 
one end of the intellectual climate in which Vico lived were vestiges of the Middle Ages, 
with its paradigm of a divine cosmos, and on the other the modern age was beginning, 
where religion was increasingly considered unnecessary for the rational explanation of 
nature and man in the world.21 Vico's ideas are, by twists and turns, illuminating and 
murky. Perhaps this chiaroscuro quality of his thinking can be attributed in some way to 
the influence of the Neapolitan Baroque, which was and remains powerfully present all 
over that city, for it is a style that places some things in the dark in order to see more 
clearly what is in front of the eye. The logic of that aesthetic does seem relevant to read­
ing the New Science (and there are several references to the Baroque in this thesis}, for
21 Vico can be seen as a transitional figure between Renaissance Humanism and Historicism, skipping Ra­
tionalism and the Enlightenment. Indeed, Benedetto Croce wrote in History as the Story o f Liberty [La sto- 
ria comepensiero e come azione, 1938] (trans. Sylvia Sprigge) (New York: Meridian Books, 1955): "Vico's 
historical thought... belongs neither to the Protestant Reformation nor the traditions of the Catholic 
Church, but solely to the Renaissance". 135.
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Vico's reasoning often depends as much on the stated as the unspoken, on the seen as 
the hidden, and on the factual as much as the imaginary.22
I
Historical studies
Vico was unique among the thinkers of his age in that he thought the problems to 
human culture and civilisation could best be answered by viewing institutions as organic 
growths rather than as the creations of preeminent individuals or an established divine 
plan. This approach put him squarely at odds with both the social contract theorists and 
those who believed in a deity who was directly involved in forming humanity without 
man's own participation in the creative process. Against these animistic-like solutions, 
Vico envisioned man's social state to be the product of his language, mythology, religion, 
and political institutions, taken as a whole. Although Vico's concept of the role of provi­
dence renders the question of the boundaries between divine and human participation 
in the ideal eternal history controversial, this does not diminish the significance of Vico's 
original contribution to historical analysis, in which the mental development of mankind 
determines the appearance of social structures and the pace of conceptual thinking, a 
holistic position that would only be taken up much later in positivistic thinking.
22 Vico’s own thinking shows, in many respects, the same high degree of reliance on the imagination as 
was common to the arts and sciences of the Baroque age. At that time, as is well known, the imagination 
was the central element in aesthetics, and in conjunction with visual and verbal rhetoric it was employed 
to persuade the intellect and direct the emotions to attain religious understanding. See Giulio Carlo Argan, 
The Europe o f the Capitals: 1600-1700 (Geneva: Albert Skira, 1964): "In order to conceive the universal, 
namely God, imagination suffices (not logic, philosophy or science); but it is necessary at the same time to 
prevent indifference or inertia from checking the flight of the imagination, and to see to it that all the op­
erations of the mind and hand are guided by the imagination, or (what is the same thing) that technique is 
guided by art". 214.
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In his landmark study, The Philosophy o f Giambattista Vico,23 Benedetto Croce 
brought Vico back from the tomb of forgotten philosophers and re-established his repu­
tation in Europe after being mostly ignored outside Italy since the French historian Jules 
Michelet encountered him in 1820 as an "intoxicating revelation".24 Croce's 1913 study 
would retain its position as the most authoritative interpretation for a great many years, 
until the revival of Vico studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Croce was heavily indebted to Vico for much of his own thought, and it is not sur­
prising that Croce's explication of Vico is often closer to his own philosophical position 
than what can be found in Vico himself.25 Nevertheless, in the same spirit that Croce is­
sued his warning not to ignore the discoveries of the New Science, it would be a mistake 
to avoid the author who "singlehandedly... founded modern Vichian scholarship",26 and 
whose study "remains the most important and the most influential contribution to the 
subject".27
For Croce, Vico's verum factum  principle was a foundation stone of nineteenth- 
century German idealism's concern with establishing the domains of the natural and 
human sciences. Croce cast Vico as a precursor to the idealists and practically ignored 
his theological ideas.28 Although Croce acknowledged Vico's religiosity it does not neces­
sarily mean that he gave enough weight to the influence which that belief had in framing
23 Benedetto Croce, The Philosophy o f Giambattista Vico [1913] [New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002).
24 Croce: "Michelet was the first or one of the first to proclaim, in his introduction, that Vico was not un­
derstood in the eighteenth century because he wrote for the nineteenth". 274.
25 Arnaldo Momigliano, 'Reconsidering B. Croce (1 8 6 6 -1 9 5 2 in Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiogra­
phy [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977) 253-276.
26 Robert Caponegri, Time and Idea: The Theory of History in Giambattista Vico [London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1953) 4.
27 Burke 6.
28 In his own defence, in Appendix III of the Philosophy, ‘The Sources of Vico's Theory o f Knowledge', Croce 
responded to his critics who accused him of an exclusively idealistic interpretation of some of Vico's doc­
trines. See pp. 300-301.
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Vico's concept of providence and its implications for Vico's cyclical theory of history.
This is no minor point, for the interpretation of the role of providence is decisive for a 
reading of how mind came to be and the manifestations it assumed. For if Vico's position 
was that mind emerged from nature as a product of purely physical conditions, then that 
account makes it much more difficult to establish how divine providence becomes in­
volved in its development.29 Croce's avoidance of this element leaves many questions 
unanswered, for the ontology of mind has to be seen in relation to Vico's statements 
about the origin of gentile humanity within the context of sacred history, and it is a mis­
take to treat providence merely as a rhetorical addition to placate civil and ecclesiastical 
authority. This subject will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 9, The meaning o f 
return, and the Conclusion.
Robin George Collingwood was also deeply influenced by Vico's analysis of his­
tory. In his The Idea o f History,30 Collingwood advances a thesis for the philosophy of his­
tory in which, firstly, history should be seen as the history of thought and, secondly, that 
history is essentially a re-creation of past thought. Collingwood's interpretation of his­
tory shares the same foundational principle of the New Science, which is that because 
history is "emphatically something made by the human mind, [it] is especially adapted to 
be an object of human knowledge".31 As Vico said, history is a product of the human 
mind, created by man ex nihilo, in the same way as the world is God's creation, and every 
detail of the fabric of human society is a human factum, and as such is possible to be fully 
known by the human mind. Collingwood neatly encapsulates Vico's historical scheme,
29 This subject will be examined in Chapter 9, 'The meaning of return', and the Conclusion.
30 Robin George Collingwood, The Idea of History [1946] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
31 Collingwood 64-65.
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and in particular is not distressed by Vico's solution of "the isolated actions of man and 
the divine plan that holds them together":
Here we reach for the first time a completely modern idea of what the subject-matter of 
history is. There is no antithesis between the isolated actions of man and the divine plan that 
holds them together, as there was for the Middle Ages; and, on the other hand, there is no sugges­
tion that primitive man (in whom Vico was peculiarly interested) foresaw what was going to 
come of the development he was initiating: the plan of history is a wholly human plan, but it does 
not pre-exist in the shape of an unrealized intention to its own gradual realization.32
Collingwood points out that Vico's objection to the Cartesian principle of truth as 
clear and distinct ideas is that it is, itself, a subjective or psychological criterion:
The fact that I think my ideas clear and distinct only proves that I believe them, not that 
they are true. In saying this, Vico is substantially agreeing with Hume, that belief is nothing but 
the vivacity of our perceptions.33
Collingwood compares Vico's method of historical inquiry to Kant's in that, he 
says, both believed:
Mere scholarship will not do it, and mere philosophy will not do it; the two must be com­
bined into a new form of thought owing something to both of them. Similarly, Vico, at the begin­
ning of the century, demanded what he described as a union of philology and philosophy, a schol­
arly attention to detail and a philosophical attention to principles.34
Collingwood says that Vico was the precursor to a new approach that was being 
undertaken by some historians in his own day which repudiated the method of an ear­
lier time which relied on 'authority' and 'source':
32 Collingwood. 65.
33 Ibid. 64.
34 Ibid. 103.
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The first person to make this point was Vico, at the beginning of the eighteenth century... 
Now, anyone who has read Vico, or even a second-hand version of some of his ideas, must have 
known that the important question about any statement contained in a source is not whether it is 
true or false, but what it means.35
The second thesis of Collingwood's idea of history is that he sees it as the re­
enactment of past thought. In this sense Collingwood shares Vico's thesis of the possibil­
ity of knowing history and the modifications of the human mind:
Unlike the natural scientist, the historian is not concerned with events as such at all. He is 
only concerned with those events which are the outwards expressions of thoughts, and is only 
concerned with these in so far as they express thought At bottom, he is concerned with thoughts 
alone.36
Whereas Vico thought that historical reconstruction can yield the general pat­
terns of conceptualisation that belonged to an age, Collingwood goes further by presum ­
ing an almost literal understanding of the thinking of certain historical personages. A 
clear distinction between the two conceptions is gained by studying how Collingwood 
arrived at his conclusion and comparing it to how Vico came to believe that a science of 
history was possible. Their two versions of historical re-enactment are not the same.
Collingwood's influence on Isaiah Berlin was unmistakable.37 Berlin states that 
historical reasoning, unlike that used in the natural sciences, uses a different kind of 
logic, one neither inductive nor deductive, but one that depends on the faculty of judg­
ment to establish its truths. This does not mean that 'judgment' is not present in the
35 Collingwood 259-260.
36 Ibid. 217.
37 Isaiah Berlin first read Collingwood's translation of Croce's The Philosophy o f Giambattista Vico while a 
student of Collingwood's at Oxford; he was later to refer to it as an "eye-opening experience". See Isaiah 
Berlin, The Crooked Timber o f Humanity [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990] 8
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natural sciences, but that contrasted with the objective, detached observational point of 
view of the natural scientist, the historian arms himself with the “knowledge of life", 
which elsewhere he refers to as Verstehen:
The emphasis on this contrast, which runs through all Vico's thought, is, in effect, the 
original formulation of the familiar and much controverted distinction between the methods and 
goals of Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft -  natural science as against humane studies, 
Wissen and Verstehen... Vico plainly regards such cognition [Verstehen] as being superior to any­
thing based on mere observation, since it is knowledge of what we ourselves have in some sense 
created and of which we consequently possess an intimate knowledge per caussas -  'from within'- 
a capacity with which men have been endowed from their earliest beginnings without consciously 
realizing this.38
Berlin thus formulates a sort of 'two truths hypothesis' in which he draws a line 
between strictly scientific observational data on one hand and another mode of knowl­
edge, to which he cites Vico as one of the sources,39 in which the historian projects him­
self imaginatively into the mental activity of the past. In order for this to be philosophi­
cally valuable, he must be ever mindful of the psychic conditioning of his own concepts 
and prejudices. The advantage of this method of history was for Berlin, as it was for Vico, 
that it restores a social and moral dimension to philosophical inquiry, which is not infre­
quently considered superfluous when history is taken to be knowledge of'facts':
This kind of imaginative projection of ourselves into the past, the attempt to capture con­
cepts and categories that differ from those of the investigator by means of concepts and catego­
38 Isaiah Berlin 'Vico and Herder', in Three Critics o f the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976) 44.
39 The others are: Herder, Hegel, Marx, Dilthey, and Weber.
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ries that cannot but be his own, is a task he can never be sure that he is even beginning to achieve, 
yet is not permitted to abjure.40
But Collingwood's ideas diverged sharply from Berlin and Vico's notion of what 
imaginative projection into the past m eant Even though they all shared the belief that 
the historian could know the past by sharing the same concepts as those who preceded 
him, for Collingwood this took the idea that the historian could quite literally "re-enact" 
past thought.41
As for Collingwood, his [Vico's] most gifted English disciple, his fruitful notion of the 'ab­
solute presuppositions’ of every culture, those basic categories and concepts of an age or culture 
which determine the shape of its mental activity and render its problems uniquely different from 
those of all other cultures, that does indeed derive from Vico, and perhaps from him alone. But 
when Collingwood adds to this notion the far more questionable one of a capacity to transport 
ourselves into the minds of persons or periods historically remote from us, a transcendental, 
timeless flight across the barrier of time, culminating in the metaphysical act of penetrating into 
the mind of Julius Caesar, or, let us say, the Puritan movement, or the Gothic Revival, he goes be­
yond his master. Vico speaks of the need to make the appalling effort of trying to adjust one's vi­
sion to the archaic world -  the need to see it through deeply unfamiliar spectacles -  but this is 
very different from the quasi-mystical act of literal self-identification with another mind and age 
of which Collingwood evidently thought himself capable 42
40 Isaiah Berlin,'The Concept of Scientific History', in Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays, (Lon­
don: Hogarth Press, 1978). 135-136.
41 Collingwood: "Thought can never be mere object. To know someone else’s activity of thinking is possi­
ble only on the assumption that this same activity can be re-enacted in one's own mind. In that sense, to 
know 'what someone is thinking’ (or 'has thought’) involves thinking it for oneself. To reject this conclu­
sion means denying that we have any right to speak of acts of thought at all, except such as take place in 
our own minds, and embracing the doctrine that my mind is the only one that exists. Against anyone who 
accepts that form of solipsism I shall not stay to argue. I am considering how history, as the knowledge of 
past thoughts (acts of thought), is possible; and I am only concerned to show that it is impossible except 
on the view that to know another’s act of thought involves repeating it for oneself'. 288.
42 Berlin, Concept, 118-19.
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Berlin's own understanding of the reconstruction or apprehension of ancient 
minds is formed by his reading of paragraph 331 of the New Science:
By 'modifications’ he appears to mean what we should mean by the stages of the growth, 
or of the range or direction, of human thought, imagination, will, feeling, into which any man 
equipped with sufficient fantasia (as well as knowledge acquired by rational methods) can 'enter'. 
Vico nowhere, so far as I know, fully or exactly explains the way in which men understand other 
men -  'know their minds', grasp their goals, outlooks, ways of thinking, feeling, acting. He does not 
account for our knowledge of other selves -  individual or collective, living or dead -  by invoking 
the language of empathy, or analogical reasoning, or intuition, or participation in the unity of the 
World Spirit. That has been left to his interpreters. He rests his case on his conviction that what 
men have made, other men, because their minds are those of men, can always, in principle, ‘enter 
into'.43
For Berlin, the principal idea of the New Science is found in “the unity -  and the 
parallelism -  which obtains between the necessary succession of the phases of a civiliza­
tion and the development of mental attributes and powers in the growing individual -  
Vico's idee maitresse -  the Renaissance notion of the relationship between the macro­
cosm and the microcosm is clearly central".44 This is the paragraph from the New Science 
that Berlin is referring to:
The nature of institutions is nothing but their coming into being [nascimento] at certain 
times and in certain guises. Whenever the time and guise are thus and so, such and not otherwise 
are the institutions that come into being.45
The distinction between natural science and humane studies is a pivotal turn in 
Vico's epistemology, for Berlin it is “the opening shot in a battle which from that moment
43 Berlin 47.
44 Ibid. 35.
45 N S147.
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has never ceased".46 It is the idea that institutions and minds and languages are never 
"wholly translatable without residue into any other, for each categorises reality in dif­
ferent ways",47 that has had the greatest impact on philosophy and history, according to 
Berlin.
In Mythistory: The Making o f Modern Historiography18 Joseph Mali argues that 
Vico was the first thinker to conceive of myth as a source of knowledge for historical, 
linguistic, and epistemological understanding.49 Mali writes:
In the New Science he transposed the notion of verum as factum  from pure conventions 
[such as geometrical figures] to "more real" cultural and social conventions (myths, laws, states, 
and the like]. Not until that last work of his life did he come to realize that practically all our "civil 
institutions" are as artificial and conventional as geometrical forms are and that consequently our 
knowledge of the human world results from what is equally an essentially constructive activity: 
we know this world because, and only to the extent that, we still make or share its constitutive 
ideal fictions, its myths.50
It was implicit in Vico's method that myths were neither entirely theoretical con­
structions nor empirical records. Vico believed that myths are the representation by 
peoples of universal truths, and while their specific content may be unique to each soci­
ety or civilisation, their underlying forms and essential properties remain unchanged 
and shared by all. It is this discovery, that there is a fundamental unity in the diversity of 
human change, which Vico considered to be his outstanding achievement, the "master-
46 Berlin 31.
47 Ibid. 167.
48 Joseph Mali, Mythistory: The Making of Modern Historiography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003].
49 Fully half of the New Science, Books Two and Three, 'Poetic Wisdom' and 'Discovery of the True Homer’ 
respectively, are concerned with establishing Vico's thesis that true understanding of past states of mind 
was possible through reading myths as records of universal thought patterns.
50 Mali. 65.
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key" of his science. The implications of this discovery for his conception of mind are that 
it allows him to speak of a 'common mental dictionary' that all peoples share, and the 
origins and meanings of ideas contained in this lexicon could be deciphered through a 
process of philological and historical reconstruction. Vico complained that both Plato 
and Bacon, two of his four acknowledged "major thinkers",51 had missed the true mean­
ing of myth; Plato because he failed to see the historical and political lesson encrypted in 
the Prometheus myth, which is that divine and later human authority should be re­
spected; and in Bacon because of his attem pt to rationalize and purify the barbaric and 
primitive elements of myth through an anachronistic reading, thus failing to understand 
the nature of the society in question and the moral function the myth served in that soci­
ety's state of development:
What Vico perceived in and through ancient mythology was, then, a new materialistic, but 
not a deterministic, theory of social life and history. Vico acknowledged the primacy of material 
necessities over spiritual aspirations, but he did not reduce these latter creations of the imagina­
tion to conditions of production, as his later, more vulgar, Marxist admirers have all too easily 
done.52
Many of Vico's interpretations of specific myths are now known to be imprecise, 
but Mali points out that his method was fundamentally sound:
Vico's 'discovery' of the deep historicity of language is akin to what modern cultural theo­
rists have eventually come to proclaim as their own discovery; to use Wittgenstein’s words, 'a 
whole mythology is deposited in our language'".53
51 The other two are Tacitus and Grotius.
52 Mali 80.
53 Ibid. 76.
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But just as Vico warned against anachronistic interpretations of ancient narra­
tives (he called this the conceit o f scholars), he also made distinctions between the truths 
in ethics and politics and those that can be discovered in nature. Mali gives an example 
of this:
For what is really novel and important in his notion of the "principles of humanity" is the 
hermeneutical, not the empirical, claim, namely his assertion that if any cross-cultural under­
standing is possible at all, it must assume and pursue certain absolute norms or, to use a modern 
phrase, "limiting notions," of morality, which determine the range within which various forms of 
life can be exercised and can be recognized as human.... The truth about truth is that ultimately all 
our moral and social theories are (or at least should be rendered) mythological: they grow out of 
and express "the public grounds of truth" of specific historical communities and civilizations.54
Vico accepted the independent reality of both types of truth in the same way that 
Aristotle understood different subject matters require different treatm ent.55 Mali's study 
brings to the fore the foundational ideas behind the 'limiting notions' and the 'public 
grounds of truth ' which are not infrequently lost sight of when so many unfamiliar facts 
are jumbled together one after the other.
Paolo Rossi's The Dark Abyss o f Time: The History o f the Earth and the History o f  
Nations from Hooke to Vico56 also explores the question of meaning behind sacred and 
profane myth and history in the New Science. The work's focus is Vico's treatm ent of two 
divergent accounts of human history. Much of Vico's conception of mind as the maker of
54 Mali 82-83.
55Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books, 1976). In Book Six, 
v., Aristotle contrasts phronesis, prudence or practical wisdom, with science and art. Phronesis is "not sci­
ence because what can be done is a variable, and not art because action and production are generically 
different... What remains, then, is that it is a true state (developed in accordance with a true theory or 
principal), reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man". The man 
who practices such wisdom is known as the phronimos, the 'practically wise man'.
56 Paolo Rossi, The Dark Abyss of Time: The History o f the Earth and the History o f Nations from Hooke to 
Vico, translated by Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
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history and the nature of knowledge depends on their reading, and as the direction of 
history is largely determined by the 'modifications of the mind', ultimately the m eta­
physics of the New Science is affected by it:
There is little point, for example, in stating that [1) in the Scienza Nuova the two parallel 
histories never seem to meet; (2] in the Scienza Nuova we can find more a faith in Providence in 
general than in Christian Providence; (3) Vico's meditations are much more concerned with the 
world of the nations than with sacred history and, consequently, the biblical datum is often given 
parenthetically; [4) as soon as it is possible to "delineate a human history with documents and 
references to events of the history of nations, sacred history passes to the background.57
Vico believed that the history of the Hebrew people was the most ancient and 
that it could provide the keystone to the structure of his own account of history. For 
Vico, sacred history served as a bridge between the ahistorical dark ages that preceded 
the Western tradition and the beginnings of profane history in ancient Greece. Rossi 
quotes from Vico's Universal Law on the importance of sacred history for establishing a 
sure origin and course of profane history:
If Sacred History shows us the events that occurred while the obscure and fabulous age 
was taking place in profane history, we are in possession of an intermediary by means of which 
the history of the obscure and fabulous age can come to touch the history of real time. For this 
reason, what has thus far been said, with truth, about the dimensions of the terrestrial world, that 
is, that they draw their certainty from the certain measures of the heavens, should also be said 
concerning the truth of the civil world: the truth of profane events should be demanded of Sacred 
History alone.58
The biblical account of mankind contained in Genesis gives Vico a touchstone 
from which to measure the distance gentile humanity had strayed from the Hebrew
57 Rossi 176.
58 G.B. Vico, On Universal Law [1720].
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ideal of rationality. As Rossi says, Vico "forcefully rejected any attempt to 'illustrate' sa­
cred history by means of profane history".59 On the contrary, he says, Vico aimed to clar­
ify the origins of the history of the gentile peoples by showing how it was related to sa­
cred history "by means of the start of Greek history, the source of all we possess about 
profane antiquity".60 Just as the natural scientist benefits from the "certain measures of 
the heavens" to establish his reckonings in this world, so too, in the civil world, the phi­
losopher's quest to find a point of origin from which to calculate the movement of hu­
man society can be found in revealed sacred history. Rossi writes:
For Vico there were only two hypotheses that could explain the origin of the pagan na­
tions: either they were born of the conscious reflection of learned men, or else from human in­
stinct buried in some beastlike men.61
In the first case, that is clearly impossible, because for Vico pagan history begins 
after the Great Flood with bestial men, the bestioni, who since becoming separated from 
their Hebrew roots have lost reflective reasoning that would enable them to plan the 
founding of social institutions. But in the second case, the 'buried' human instinct, which 
is a remnant of Hebrew ante-diluvium man, would account for the common nature of 
civil institutions spread across the unfolding of universal history, and whose principles 
are revealed in sacred history:
Vico’s achievement -  and all of his interpreters are in agreement on this -  consisted in 
having made his way through that world of the fabulous and that obscure age in which it was dif­
ficult even to penetrate. Anyone who discusses that world has to refuse to project into it the cate­
gories of reason and must realize that that humanity was different from our own, that those
59 Rossi 176.
60 Ibid. 180.
61187.
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minds were 'not in the least abstract, refined, or spiritualized/ but were instead 'entirely im­
mersed in the senses, buffeted by the passions, buried in the body/62
Rossi provides well-argued interpretations of many of Vico's positions vis-a-vis 
sacred narrative, and these go a long way in elucidating many questions the New Science 
raises about innate or a priori mental faculties that are inherent in any argument that 
involves evidence from the Bible for a common human nature.
In this work63 Leon Pompa's position is that Vico fails to convincingly demon­
strate that history in the New Science follows the pattern of the ideal eternal history:
No matter how attractive his general theory of emergent rationality may be, he can nei­
ther establish the necessity for the determinate sequence involved in the 'ideal eternal history' 
nor show that it is necessary that any nation should have such a nature. In other words, he cannot 
show that there is a necessary sequence in the history of any nation, let alone that of all nations.64
The reason Pompa says this is insufficient is that Vico's historical claims depend 
on the concept of providence, which he takes to be unscientific. In Vico's ideal eternal 
history human and divine mind co-operate to achieve a common end in full-blown ra­
tionality. In response to a passage from the New Science65 in which Vico says that human 
history is a product of both human mind and providential design, Pompa writes:
Here there is a strange mixture of claims. We are told simultaneously both that the world 
is a product of man and that it is the product of a supermind, which uses man's particular ends to 
secure its own wider ends, including the preservation of man.... Thus, on the one hand, we are 
told that the world is not a product of man, on the grounds that through the unintended conse­
62 Rossi 180.
63 Leon Pompa, Human Nature and Historical Knowledge: Hume, Hegel and Vico (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).
64 Pompa 189.
65 NS1108
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quences of his actions new institutions arise. And on the other hand, we are told that it is a prod­
uct of mind because men create it by intelligence, by choice, and by making uniform intelligent 
choices on the same occasions... Faced with these apparently different claims, it is not surprising 
that there exists a wide range of interpretations of Vico's concept of providence.66
However, the notion of man and God as co-workers in fulfilling divine purpose 
was not Vico's invention; it is, afterall, the basis of Talmudic Judaism and is not unknown 
to other religions. What Pompa proposes, instead, is a reading that makes the distinction 
between the occasion and the cause of historical change:
The occasion was the aims of individuals in their various social capacities -  the fathers, 
for example, abusing their legitimate paternal power over their clients -  but the cause was a 
wider conception, the rational force of which was felt by all concerned.... The cause is the new  
conception which arises from progressively more rational reflection upon faults in the principle 
revealed by the breakdown which occasions the reflection. 'Providence' thus becomes the name 
for a higher wisdom, and understanding of more adequate concepts, which develops in nations in 
the course of their historical experience.67
Pompa appears to explain "the rational force of which was felt by all concerned" 
as a sort of innate principle of justice and equity, and by that to obviate the necessity for 
providence as the causal agent in history. This is somewhat ironic, for Vico says that con­
tained within the power of conatus, which is bestowed by providence on man, is the 
drive to achieve universal justice.68 If this reading is accurate, then Pompa seems to have 
merely substituted one of Vico’s own explanatory principles for another.
66 Pompa 161.
67 Ibid. 163.
68 NS 340: "But these first men, who later became the princes of the gentile nations, must have done their 
thinking under the strong impulsion of violent passions, as beasts do... [but] From this thought [of a fright­
ful divinity] must have sprung the conatus proper to the human will, to hold in check the motions im­
pressed on the mind by the body, so as either to quiet them altogether, as becomes the wise man, or at 
least to direct them to better use, as becomes the civil man. This control over the motion of their bodies is
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II
Rhetorical and philological studies
Vico's aim in the New Science was to integrate philosophy and philology in order 
to achieve a comprehensive understanding of how the human mind operates in univer­
sal history. For him, rhetoric had epistemological value and needed to be brought back 
to the position it once held in the pursuit of rational argumentation, before it became 
superfluous to philosophical enquiry. Vico believed that the clear exposition of ideas re­
quired continual formation, incorporation, and reformation into a communal body of 
knowledge, and for him rhetoric was the best instrum ent for establishing what Pascal 
called the "esprit de flnessen, a humanistic form of ratiocination that includes what we 
would call today both objective and subjective elements for consideration. This form of 
thinking is contrasted with the "esprit de geometrie” which Pascal, and Vico, associated 
with a mechanical frame of mind in which "calculation", rather than "reflection", be­
comes the primary mode of thought. Vico was not unaware of the ancient complaint 
against rhetoric that it was dangerous because it tried to convince through subtle plays 
on the emotions rather than forthrightly basing a case on reason alone.69 But the whole 
point Vico was making in his epistemological theory was that it is unrealistic to expect 
any other kind of reasoning that does not involve the emotions; the extent and the 
method by which emotion needed to be included was the question, not w hether it 
should be involved at all.
certainly an effect of the freedom of human choice, and thus of free will, which is the home and seat of all 
the virtues, and among the others of justice".
69 Vico's position on rhetoric and knowledge is most strongly argued in On the Study Methods o f Our Time 
[1709] (De Nostri Temporis Studiorum Rationae) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
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In his Truth and Method, 70 Hans-Georg Gadamer firmly places Vico within a hu­
manistic tradition and casts him as one of the founders of modern hermeneutic inquiry, 
someone who clearly grasped the distinction between the ancient Greek concepts of 
sophia (wisdom) and phronesis (common-sense) and their relevance to knowledge. 
Gadamer says that Vico was not denying the validity of mathematical methodology, as 
found in rationalist inquiry, as much as he was delineating the limits of modern critical 
science. He believed that in order to understand those boundaries we still need the an­
cient concepts of common-sense and eloquence as guides to ensure that knowledge re­
mains meaningful to the community at large. Gadamer points out that Vico's concept of 
common-sense "is the sense of what is right and of the common good that is to be found 
in all men; moreover, it is a sense that is acquired through living in the community and is 
determined by its structures and aims".71 Gadamer traces back to the Roman Stoic doc­
trine of sensus communis Vico's concern with the ethical dimension of knowledge.
Gadamer thought it an impressive achievement that Vico could retain and pro­
mote the concept of common sense, given the prevailing "intellectualization of the con­
cept of community".72 He offers an example of the distinctly new meaning that the term 
had acquired by the late eighteenth century:
By contrast, Kant's version of this idea in his Critique of Judgment has quite a different 
emphasis. There is no longer any systematic place for the concept’s basic moral sense. As we 
know, he developed his moral philosophy in explicit opposition to the doctrine of "moral feeling"
70 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode) [1960]2nd edition, translated by Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall [New York: Continuum, 2000).
71 Gadamer 22.
72 Ibid. 32.
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that had been worked out in English philosophy. Thus he totally excluded the concept of sensus 
communis from moral philosophy.73
Gadamer thinks that Vico deserves attention not just for bringing forward into 
the modern age the wealth of ancient tradition in humanistic studies, but also for show­
ing the way toward the possibility of a new type of historical knowledge, one that estab­
lished "the homogeneity of subject and object".74 Gadamer brings out Vico's pioneering 
role in integrating the means of discourse with the subject of discourse. This turn is de­
cisive in Vico's epistemology and his theory of historical understanding, for Vico's basic 
premise in both is that thinking is as much a product of the concepts formed through 
rhetorical tropes as it is of the percepts that are observed.75
In Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition76 Ernesto Grassi studies the 
roots of the Italian Humanistic tradition and its ideas of rhetoric. He draws the conclu­
sion that the subject of topics, or the finding of arguments, is basic to philosophy, and 
that rhetoric is prior to literal speech. The concept of verisimile, which Vico develops in 
On the Study Methods o f Our Time [1709] and in On the Ancient Wisdom o f the Italians 
[1710], is examined:
[T]he historical aspects of the realization of the mind are never eternally valid, never ab­
solutely "true," because they always emerge within limited situations bound in space and time;
73 Gadamer 32.
74 Ibid. 222.
75 Gadamer: "I would like to see more recognition of the fact that this is the realm hermeneutics shares 
with rhetoric: the realm of arguments that are convincing [which is not the same as logically compelling]. 
It is the realm of practice and humanity in general, and its province is not where the power of "iron-clad 
conclusions" must be accepted without discussion, nor where emancipatory reflection is certain of its 
"contrafactual agreements," but rather where controversial issues are decided by reasonable considera­
tions. The arts of rhetoric and argumentation [and their silent analogue, thoughtful deliberation with one­
self] are at home here. If rhetoric appeals to the feelings, as has long been clear, that in no way means it 
falls outside the realm of the reasonable. Vico rightly assigns it a special value: copia, the abundance of 
viewpoints". 568.
76 Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition [University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1980].
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i.e., they are probable and seem to be true {verisimile}, true only within the confines of "here" and 
"now," in which the needs and problems that confront human beings are m et77
Grassi sets out to reconstruct the historical and philosophical background as a 
way to frame the problem of how to evaluate rhetoric's role in philosophy. He wants to 
show how rhetoric has acquired, since the Enlightenment, the meaning of something 
having "a purely technical, exterior, and practical aim of persuading," as opposed to "an 
essentially philosophical structure and function".78
Although the rationalist preference is to formulate knowledge through apodictic, 
demonstrative language, Grassi is quick to point out that the root meaning of apodictic 
(apodeiknumi -  to prove) "means to show something to be something, on the basis of 
something".79 This type of speech traces the meaning given to phenomena back to their 
foundational principles, or archai. But the archai in any proof cannot be the object of a 
prior apodictic term, for in that case they would not be foundational assertions:
Such speech (indicative or allusive {semainein}) is immediately a "showing"- and for this 
reason "figurative" or "imaginative," and thus in the original sense "theoretical" {theorem -  i.e., to 
see}. It is metaphorical, i.e., it shows something which has a sense, and this means that to the fig­
ure, to that which is shown, the speech transfers {metapherein} a signification; in this way the 
speech which realizes this showing "leads before the eyes" {phainesthai} a significance. This 
speech is and must be in its structure an imaginative language.80
Vico's main protest against critical philosophy was that it excluded whole realms 
(poetry, rhetoric, political education, history) from serious philosophical debate by its 
exclusive demand for apodictic or demonstrative knowledge. He believed that a crite-
77 Grassi 10.
78 Ibid. 19.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid. 20.
43
rion of probability (verisimile) was wholly appropriate when judging things of a contin­
gent nature, like human actions. The exclusion of these “second truths" from founda­
tional principles in rationalist philosophy meant that their role would be limited to com­
parisons between conditional objects, but could not contribute to universal knowledge 
as such.
Like Grassi, Michael Mooney takes the position that the true importance of rheto­
ric is contained in what it reveals about the underlying structures of reasoning, rather 
than simply as a toolbox of linguistic artifice. In Vico in the Tradition o f Rhetoric81 
Mooney states that “among the many truths of the New Science there is one that is deep­
est - it is the truth that language, mind, and society are but three modes of a common re­
ality”.82 Although Mooney places Vico within the tradition of the "public" philosopher83, 
he goes beyond that connection and focuses more on the question of how the mind 
emerges from a state of bodily senses:
What can it mean to think through the body, to reason with a mind that is torn with pas­
sions and immersed in the senses? It means to reason as a rhetor must reason when speaking in­
ter rudes, arguing among the simple who cannot take in a complicated argument.84
81 Michael Mooney, Vico in the Tradition of Rhetoric (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
82 Mooney ix.
83 Ibid. xi: "There is in the West a persistent line of thinking that has flourished from time to time, and nev­
er so brilliantly as among the ancient Romans, which holds that language is primary in culture, metaphors 
a necessity, and jurisprudence our highest achievement. This was the position of the ancient Sophists -  of 
the more thoughtful ones, if not of those who so rightly exercised Socrates. It was the position of the "pru­
dential" Aristotle, the Aristotle of the Ethics and Politics, of the Topics, the Rhetoric, and the Poetics. It was 
consummately the position of the "reformed" school of Roman orators, headed by Cicero, and of the "civic 
humanists" of the early Italian Renaissance, who in their writings and practice gave new meaning and dig­
nity to the vita active. And it was the position of Giambattista Vico, who not only received and cherished 
the tradition, but looked deeply into it, saw what its principles implied, and so made ready for the great 
social theorists of the nineteenth century and our own. That is the thesis of this work".
84 Ibid.
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Vico's first imaginative universal, the founding metaphor of Jove, is produced 
when the mind is awakened by thunder. The first steps in understanding these sensa­
tions are akin to a rhetor's reasoning in images; that is, by taking a global view of an 
event or a thing, then dividing that into its various aspects, establishing a position in re­
lation to them, and finally persuading others of its validity. Mooney's treatm ent of Book 
Two of the New Science, 'Poetic Wisdom', is a clear exposition of that vital section. 'Poetic 
Wisdom' is essentially a history of the mind's development, a record of the growth of 
consciousness.
Ever since the logic of modern science replaced humanistic reasoning as a stan­
dard for rational deliberation, the concept of truth, at least in the West, has been associ­
ated with the 'objective' and 'absolute'; any truth claims falling short of that standard are 
typically qualified as 'fuzzy' or 'vague'. John Schaeffer in Sensus Communis: Vico, Rhetoric, 
and the Limits o f Relativism85 attempts to show that Vico sought to re-establish the rhe­
torical concept of sensus communis as a key component to the epistemological claims 
found in the New Science. Schaeffer reaches back to the Platonic account of the concept 
as doxa, which are the opinions of ordinary men, and deemed mere “hearsay or illusory 
knowledge built upon fleeting sense impressions".86 Schaeffer says that sensus commu­
nis provides a foundation for philosophic reasoning in a society and rhetoric may be said 
to provide the boundaries of social discourse:
Sensus communis becomes for Vico the affective, pre-reflective and somatic quality of lan­
guage, created when both language and human institutions were formed".87
85 John D. Schaeffer, Sensus Communis: Vico, Rhetoric, and the Limits o f Relativism (Durham, NC: Duke Uni­
versity Press, 1990).
86 Schaeffer 2.
87 Ibid. 151.
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This is contrasted with episteme, or "firm knowledge grounded in the forms and 
grasped through dialectical reasoning".88 He then describes how in Aristotle sensus 
communis acquired a more elevated status as a power that could compare and judge the 
acts of the other senses, and was the "frontal root of all the senses".89 For the Romans it 
meant:
[Ajsense of propriety, the shared but unstated mores of the community, the manners by 
which the community acts as a community. In short, the term means a conventional wisdom but 
with a decidedly ethical cast".90
In the complicated political and social environment of Vico's Naples there existed 
a millennia-old tradition of jurisprudence that was heavily dependent on orally- 
established precedents, customs, and usages,91 and Schaeffer thinks this process of legal­
istic reasoning was carried over by Vico in the method he adopted to integrate philology 
and philosophy in the pursuit of historical truth. According to Schaeffer, what Vico did 
was to synthesize the Aristotelian and Roman ideas of sensus communis, and made of it a 
principle upon which the mind could stay connected to the public world and thereby 
remain safe from the alienating scepticism of Cartesian rationalism. Schaeffer focuses on 
sensus communis as "an essentially oral concept that permits Vico to exfoliate the unity 
of rhetoric and ethics that characterized Italian hum anism "92 For Vico and other de­
fenders of Neapolitan legal practice it would not do to merely substitute Cartesian ra ­
tionality for consensus as a basis for legal theory, for rationality does not exhaust the 
question of what is rational or determine who should wield power:
88 Schaeffer 2.
89 Ibid 2.
90 Ibid.
9147.
92 5.
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Vico's concept of sensus communis constitutes the sort of epistemological cum ethical 
sense that challenges modern relativism and for which modern ethicists call. It exists, however, 
not within the tradition of ethics but within the tradition of rhetoric.93
The debate between the Cartesian devaluing of probability, and thus sensus com­
munis, which arises from the perceptions of similitude in the public sphere, and the dis­
missal of common knowledge and accepted opinions that Aristotle says provide a basis 
for probable argument,94 Vico would defend as important as the critical intellect, and far 
from being an instance of vain sprezzatura, it is rather perspicacity that rhetoric engen­
ders, and therein lies its epistemological value.
Another study which sets out to show that Vico believed the road to knowledge 
could not be travelled without the company of the arts is Giuseppe Mazzotta's The New 
Map o f the World: The Poetic Philosophy o f Giambattista Vico.95 Mazzotta's thesis is that 
poetry is the centre of the New Science because for Vico "The key to the unity of all the 
arts and sciences is poetry".96 Poetry is true history, the vera narratio, which allows ac­
cess to "the very foundations of humanity's time-bound existence":97
There is no sustained reading of the New Science, of which I am aware, that is carried out 
from within the essentially literary or poetic viewpoint that Vico claims as the key to his science.98
Mazzotta underscores the fact that, for Vico, the Aristotelian idea of the mean was 
needed to offset the modern idea of, theoretically, boundless liberty which he consid­
ered harmful to the unity of knowledge. In his essay On the Heroic Mind what Vico pro­
93 Schaeffer 160.
94 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1235a.
95 Giuseppe Mazzotta, The New Map of the World: The Poetic Philosophy o f Giambattista Vico (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999).
96 Mazzotta xii.
97 Ibid. 10.
98 xii.
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poses, on the contrary, is a "cultivation of knowledge as a whole",99 in order to achieve a 
"totalizing universe of learning".100 Mazzotta says Vico's age was intolerant of any means 
to knowledge whereby the imagination and the passions could harmoniously operate to 
achieve a wholesome individual. Vico thought that the psychic health of people in society 
depended on a rational balance between the passionate and the intelligible parts and 
would require "a poetic representation of the whole and not an abstract statem ent of 
principle".101 Thus, Mazzotta says the 'new map of the world' that Vico draws is one in 
which all epochs point to the present state of man:
The rejection of rhetoric... is not possible for Vico, who, like the humanists of the Italian 
Renaissance, knows that rhetoric is the act wherein man’s hard choices are debated. Indeed, if the 
elimination of rhetoric were possible, it would not be desirable. Eliminating rhetoric is tanta­
mount to eliminating history.102
In an age of rationalism, characterised by secularized natural law theory, Vico 
turned, instead, to the study of religious practices and divination. And by reviving the 
tradition of the theologia rhetorica, in which poetry, politics, history, philosophy, and 
theology were united in a single vision of man's meaning and purpose, he theologizes 
politics and politicizes theology. Ultimately, the acquisition of wisdom was Vico's aim, 
not mere knowledge,103 and Mazzotta comments:
The epistemological universe of Descartes, rooted as it is in the cogito, assumes that 
thought is an enduring, stable state, whereas for Vico the mind continuously experiences modifi­
cations or what in the Middle Ages were known as alterations. The notion of the indefinite and
99 G.B. Vico, On the Heroic Mind (translated by Elizabeth Sewell and Anthony C. Sirignano), in Vico and Con­
temporary Thought [Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1976) 244.
100 Mazzotta 95.
101 Ibid. 11.
102 g g .
103 NS 364: "True wisdom, then, should teach the knowledge of divine institutions in order to conduct hu­
man institutions to the highest good".
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shifting quality of the mind introduces for Vico the principle of contingency into the assumed sta­
bility of the cogito. The Cartesian formula "cogito, ergo sum" ends up in the configuration of the 
mind as an isolated, nondialectical structure, essentially discontinuous with the constraints of ma­
terial reality. What is more, the provisional certainty which the act of thinking conveys is made to 
appear as an enduring, nontemporal totality.104
Mazzotta's interpretation is that man is both mind and body, and the two are 
joined by language. The Cartesian separation of consciousness and extended m atter is 
bridged by imagination; as Mazzotta writes, "For Vico the real is indistinguishable from 
the simulacra of the imagination and from rational thought processes".105 The ground of 
man's wisdom is, for Vico, never far from myth, poetry, and rhetoric: "These principles of 
metaphysics, logic and morals, issued from the market place of Athens".106 Vico insisted 
throughout his life and writings that public contact is as important for the nourishment 
of the mind as it is for the body. The danger to the body politic of philosophic isolation is 
that it leads to solipsism and ultimately social paralysis, the state Vico referred to as the 
"barbarism of reflection".
Ill
Epistemological studies
Vico's account of the metaphorical construction of concepts (the imaginative and 
intelligible universals) and his views on probability (yerisimile) as a criterion for truth 
have generated interest among historians of philosophy and philosophers of mind alike. 
But perhaps the most important conclusion that can be drawn from Vico's statem ents on
104 Mazzotta 105.
105 Ibid. 163.
106 NS1043.
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language, taken together, is that they form a hypothesis that thought with propositional 
content is a product of language. Vico believes that concepts are first acquired in non- 
rational ways (through physiological stimuli in the imaginative universals) and later by 
learning (through the formation and confirmation of hypotheses in the intellectual uni­
versals). The following studies probe Vico's account of how mental content is acquired 
and the implications of this to the theory of knowledge.
Donald Phillip Verene's most important contribution, among many, in Vico stud­
ies is his extended discussion of the key concept of the imaginative universals, which is 
the subject of his Vico's Science o f Imagination.107 Verene writes that “This conception of 
an original mentality (of mankind) that ordered experience in terms of imaginative uni­
versals is the "master key" of this new science".108 Verene thinks that Vico wanted his 
new science to provide a metaphysical understanding of the human mind. He observes 
that human thinking begins for Vico in the image, not the idea, and in this way his ac­
count differs substantially from certain philosophers, including Descartes, Locke, Kant, 
and Hegel.109
Verene notes that in Descartes the idea ends up becoming as certain of itself as 
the contemplated subject, but for Vico the imaginative universals start with an image 
and become metaphor by the power of the imagination.110 Verene says that metaphors 
are not simply analogies but rather original acts of creation -  "the primary operations of 
the human mind"111 -  that represent the true beginnings of human thought and history.
107 Donald Phillip Verene, Vico's Science o f Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
108 Verene 66
109 Ibid. 80.
110 Paragraphs 428-455 of Book 2, 'Poetic Wisdom', contain Vico's most extended discussion on the origins 
of languages and letters.
111NS 496.
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Thus, according to Verene, for Vico the phenomenal nature of thought is rooted in the 
image and it is there that concepts are formed. The importance of this premise is that it 
implies that all types of thinking, whether metaphorical or rational, have a foundation in 
the image:
For Vico, the beginning point of mind, like the primitive world, is filled with benign and 
malignant forces. In the theory of the universal fantastico Vico makes the question of the given the 
basis of his conception of knowledge. He asks a completely new epistemological question. He does 
not ask how the mind functions in relation to the object to produce knowledge, or even the less 
profitable question of whether the mind has objects actually before it, whether it has an external 
world... Vico asks how the mind comes to have something before it at all. In this way he moves 
behind the given. By asking how there ever comes to be something, rather than nothing, before 
the mind, Vico is able to see knowledge as beginning directly with the image.112
Verene has brought to the forefront the importance of the image in Vico's account 
of the origins of language and thought. He has stridently sought to make the case here 
and in other writings that Vico's organic thesis that thought is always grounded in a so­
matic relationship with the environment deserves further consideration in educational 
theory and cognitive science.
The subject of Hayden White's "The Tropics of History: The Deep Structure of the 
New Science’113 is how the structure and transformations of language affect the forms of 
society. White's thesis is, in nuce, that Vico's position in the New Science was that figures 
of speech reflect the ages of man in which they are associated, and that changes in hu­
man consciousness parallel changes in speech:
112 Verene 81.
113 Hayden White, "The Tropics of History: The Deep Structure of the New Science’, in Giambattista Vico's 
Science o f Humanity, edited by Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene [Baltimore: The Johns Hop­
kins University Press, 1976).
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For at the interior of Vico's thought there resides a principle of interpretation, or to use a 
recently revived term, "hermeneutical principle," of which no other thinker in Europe prior to 
Hegel even glimpsed the possibility. This principle derives from the perception, original with Vico 
in the form that he gave to it, that speech provides the key for interpreting cultural phenomena 
and the categories by which the evolutionary stages of a given culture can be characterized. Here 
the basic distinction is between poetic expression on the one side and discursive prose represen­
tation on the other. The former is conceived to be a creative and active force by which conscious­
ness confiscates its world; the latter a receptive and passive operation in which "things as they 
are" are mirrored. The effect of these two aspects of speech on consciousness sets up a tension, 
within consciousness itself, that generates a tendency of thought to transcend itself and to create 
out of the sensed inadequacy of language to its object the conditions for the exercise of its essen­
tial freedom.114
White focuses on the origins of human knowledge in “the onomathetic powers of 
primitive men, the power of'naming' objects, of distinguishing them from other ob­
jects".115 He investigates the processes by which primitive man gains a degree of control 
over a hostile nature through the imaginative use of speech. His analysis of how this is 
accomplished comprises the mastery of four tropes: metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, 
and irony. Of these, metaphor is, according to Vico “the most luminous and therefore the 
most necessary and frequent”,116 and White says of Vico that his “theory of metaphorical 
transformation serves as the model for a theory of the autotransformation of human 
consciousness in history".117 The other forms, metonymy and synecdoche, continue the 
process of transformation.
114 White 70-71.
115 Ibid. 71.
116 NS 404.
117 White 72.
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White contends that each of Vico's three stages -  the religious, poetic, and prosaic 
- has its own distinctive form of human nature and that there are “generic similarities 
between transitions in societies and the tropological transformations of speech":118
1. The transition from primal metaphorical identifications by naming external reality in terms 
taken from the most particular and most sensible ideas of the parts of the body and the emo­
tional states to metonymic reductions is analogous to the transition in society from the rule of 
the gods to the rule of aristocracies;
2. The transition from metonymic reductions to synecdochic constructions of wholes from 
parts, genera from species, and so on is analogous to the transition from aristocratic rule to 
democratic rule; and
3. The transition from synecdochic constructions to ironic statement is analogous to the transi­
tion from democracies ruled by law to the decadent societies whose members have no re­
spect for the law.119
White's main contribution is in elucidating Vico's position that human conscious­
ness and figures of speech run on parallel tracks. In so far as speech is reflective of the 
particular state of consciousness that characterizes any given stage of development, 
Vico's definition of human nature as “properly only mind, body, and speech"120 gains fur­
ther cogency. What this formulation clearly states is that without language human 
thought, as we know it, would either not exist or be something altogether different. Tak­
ing that as a working premise, Vico showed that with the stultification of language and 
thought, the barbarism o f reflection, which occurs in the later period of the 'age of man', 
social cohesion suffers a degeneration, and this leads to a loss of the acquired traits 
which constitute 'human nature'.
118 White 76.
119 Ibid. 78.
120 NS1045.
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The following three studies are representative of recent literature that draws at­
tention to Vico's connection to epistemological theories of pragmatism, constructivism, 
and pluralism. What these theories have in common is a rejection of a computationalist 
model of mind that views the mind akin to an information processing system and 
thought to a form of computation. L. M. Palmer builds the case in her article121 that many 
of Vico's core ideas are reflected in pragmatist thinking, however widely that term  is de­
fined. Palmer clearly lists the "fundamental and common themes that all pragmatists 
share" and shows how they very closely resemble key Vichian notions of knowledge:
First, all pragmatists reject the foundational metaphor of knowledge. In various ways 
they all reject the notion that knowledge has a fixed foundation...."Second, all pragmatists reject 
Cartesianism.... 772 zrd, all pragmatists with counted exceptions such as Rorty, Habermas and pos­
sibly Lewis, naturalized the mind....Fourth, all accepted as the proper object of inquiry exactly 
what Descartes had considered gibberish: history, rhetoric and literature.122
Palmer says that "the rejection of the myth of the given and the spectator theory 
of knowledge is a constant theme of Vico's writings".123 For Vico, God is the creator of 
nature, but the human mind is a maker: it is the God of art.124 She compares Vico's epis- 
temic principle Verum-Factum convertuntur to William James' statements on beliefs that 
they are useful because true or true because useful:
James seems to identify truth with the function -  usefulness -  of what is done or made, 
while Vico seems to identify truth with the action or making or the product of the action, that is
121 L.M. Palmer, 'Vico and Pragmatism: New Variations on Vichian Themes', Transactions o f the Charles S. 
Peirce Society, Summer, 2002, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3,433-440.
122 Palmer 435-436.
123 Ibid. 436.
124 Vico's first inaugural lecture, 1699: Tandem Deus Naturae 
Artifex: Animus certium fas sit dicere, Deus.
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the artefact. However, for both authors, truth and thus knowing require the participation of the 
ones for whom it is useful or the ones for whom something is done or made.125
Palmer points out that it has been said that “Vico's constructive theory of knowl­
edge commits him to conventionalist, intuitionist, or formalist positions",126 but these 
are the same problems that beset Peirce, James, and Dewey in trying to make a princi­
pled distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. This is the issue that occupies 
the next author.
The social psychiatrist Arnold Modell notes in this study127 that “the construction 
of meaning requires the use of emotions and feelings as markers of value".128 Modell 
categorically rejects the correspondence theory of truth and says:
There is... a growing literature within neurobiology and cognitive science that refutes the 
concept of representation, and I would venture that the lifespan of the concept of representation 
is limited. The mind/brain does not represent or mirror reality; it constructs a virtual reality of its 
own".129
He finds in Vico the first instance of a philosopher who advocated an epistemo- 
logical pluralism that made the distinction between knowledge of the natural world and 
man-made social institutions, that which Dilthey, a century later, would call the differ­
ence between Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft:
What Descartes would completely deny and what Vico was the first to discover is that 
meaning is embodied in our total affective interest in the world... Vico further stated, "Meaning is 
constructed through imaginatively entering into the minds o f others." Vico did not share Descartes’
125 Palmer 437.
126 Ibid. 438.
127 Arnold H. Modell, Imagination and the Meaningful Brain (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003).
128 Modell xiii.
129 Ibid. 13.
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quest for certainty but, in a more pluralistic tradition, accepted what was only probable. Further, 
Vico proposed what we would now describe as an evolutionary concept of mind.... Vico proposed 
that in the course of cultural evolution, the human mind evolved linguistically, which resulted in 
historically different stages of consciousness and different constructions of reality.130
Modell points out that, for Vico, the acquisition of metaphor allowed man to in­
terpret the world in a way “in which the structure of mind was projected outwards as a 
metaphor derived from bodily experience. In fact, metaphor was understood not as a 
figure of speech, a trope, but as a vital means of understanding the world".131 Modell at­
tempts to advance the thesis that what may appear to be a purely subjective interpreta­
tion of experience by metaphor is actually a confirmation of universal patterns of 
thought that are, nevertheless, dependent on the linguistic development at a given stage. 
Modell sees this model as pointing towards a pluralistic epistemology and considers 
Vico a forerunner of it:
The really important distinction is not between the mental and the physical, mind and 
body, but between those real features of the world that exist independently of observers -  such as 
force, mass and gravitational attraction -  and those features that are dependent upon observers -  
such as money, property, marriage and governm ent... I will reiterate: when investigating a biol­
ogy of meaning, we need to accept a pluralistic epistemology that combines a first- and second- 
person (intersubjective) perspective with the traditional third-person perspective of neuroscience.132
Modell considers essential the intersubjective perspective when thought is 
brought to bear on observer-dependent phenomena. If that is the case, then Vico's insis­
tence on rhetoric's role in shaping knowledge gains new currency because it assumes 
that not only the finesse of a description of a phenomenon but also its modality, or trope,
130 Modell 15.
131 Ibid. 15-16. To support this thought, Modell quotes from Ralph Waldo Emerson: "The world is em­
blematic. Parts of speech are metaphors, because the whole of nature is a metaphor of the human mind".
13216-17.
56
will influence any perception of it and the meaning it imparts. The integration of a sub­
jective perspective in the compositionality of knowledge places this model at odds with 
computationism, the concern of the next author.
The cognitive scientist Marcel Danesi states unequivocally that:
Vico's experientialist blueprint for the study of the mind, as he laid it out in his New Sci­
ence, provides a viable alternative to "computationism," for I cannot but agree with the psycholo­
gist Robert Haskell (1987,1989) in calling Vico as the first true "cognitive scientist".133
What Danesi calls the computational fallacy is the belief that the human mind is a 
machine programmed to receive and produce information in biologically determined 
ways. He argues against this view in favour of the experientialist perspective in which 
'meaning' is a derivative of individual experience. He says that a significant number, 
though not all, of cognitive scientists have "fallen into a metaphorical trap",134 which is 
symptomatic of the entire cognitive science enterprise, when they "claim that all human 
activities, including emotions and social behaviour, are not only representable in the 
form of computer programs, but that machines themselves can be built to think, feel, and 
socialize".135 The sources of this thinking are not new, he argues, citing Thomas Hobbes' 
definition of ratiocination as arithmetical computation, and thinking as essentially a 
rule-governed mechanical process that could be reproduced in machines.
Danesi says that we must never lose sight of the fundamental difference between 
biological and mechanical systems, at the peril of making a category mistake: "little work 
-  computationist or non-computationist -  is conducted today in cognitive science w ith­
133 Marcel Danesi, ‘Vico and Cognitive Science', in The Imaginative Basis of Thought and Culture: Contempo­
rary Perspectives on Giambattista Vico, edited by Marcel Danesi and Frank Nuessel (Toronto: Canadian 
Scholars Press, 1994).
134 Danesi 2.
135 Ibid. 3.
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out reference to computational theories".136 Against these theories, Danesi finds in Vico 
the traces of a model of the mind which accords a place of centrality to the imagination 
that "allows us literally to imagine stimuli that are no longer present for the sensory sys­
tem to react to in its biologically programmed way".137 He describes the Vichian con­
cepts offantasia, ingegno, and memoria and traces the separation of the image (eikon) 
from the idea (eidos), imagery versus language, back to Plato and on through to Des­
cartes who "reinforced this notion by claiming that non-verbal forms of thought proceed 
without logic, and so cannot be studied scientifically":138
The key to modelling the mind in a Vichian way is to separate it into two level or layers -  
a deep and a surface one. The deep level is where the sense impressions that the brain converts 
into images are subsequently transformed into iconic signs and mnemonically usable percepts by 
the imagination. These are then organized into perceptual models by the ingegno. Percepts regis­
ter our physiological and affective responses to the signals and stimuli present in the environ­
ment; perceptual models give form and meaning to these responses.... It is at this deep level that 
one can talk of "imaginative universals" (Verene 1981, pp. 65-95, Mooney 1985, pp. 227-230). 
When these iconic transformations of our bodily experiences are connected to each other through 
the medium of metaphor, a surface form of cognition crystallizes. The particular characteristics of 
this metaphorically fabricated mental universe constitute the source of differences among per­
sons and cultures.139
Danesi suggests that a Vichian-type research agenda for cognitive scientists 
should build on the following premises: 1) that the essence of mental activity is the 
imagination {fantasia); 2) that metaphor provides the key to the nature of concept for­
mation, and 3) that rational thought itself is a derivative of metaphor. He believes the
136 Danesi 9.
137 Ibid. 14.
138 Ibid.
13913.
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computationalist paradigm of mind as machine is seriously inadequate, if not flawed, be­
cause it fails to explain how the mind can generate “outputs" of mental states from “in­
puts" from the natural world by following a step by step algorithm. Instead, he sees in 
Vico's concept of the imagination the necessary component of mental activity that forms 
representations of external stimuli. Without this uniquely human faculty, Danese be­
lieves that we would still be able to perceive the world but not to recognise ourselves in 
it. These are the general outlines of his theory, and empirical research in the processes 
of concept formation may eventually confirm some or all of it, but imprecise descrip­
tions of these processes such as that found above, “a surface form of cognition crystal­
lizes", do not effectively advance his thesis beyond substituting a naturalist metaphor in 
place of a mechanical or computationalist one.
IV 
Summing-up
The intention of this review was stated at the beginning: The specific purpose o f
this review is to individuate in these studies the areas where greater attention to or a more
accurate reading o f the mind would have permitted a better understanding o f the New
Science. Most of the arguments raised in these studies appear in this thesis. It has
probably become apparent to the reader that the subject m atters do not separate neatly
into single themes. For example, historical questions relate to chronological sequences
as much as they do the parameters of discourse permitted by rhetoric, and these m atters
in turn become the subject of epistemological value and judgment. It is also clear that
not every author who has made a lasting contribution to Vico scholarship figures here;
rather, they have been included whose work focuses on key elements that affect an un-
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derstanding of Vico's concept of mind. Undoubtedly, much more exists that could excite 
our interest, but the works that have been reviewed already provide an excellent start­
ing point for further study, and on the basis of their findings these brief conclusions can 
be drawn.
Historical studies. Perhaps most crucial to all aspects of Vico's account of history 
is the question of the relationship of sacred to secular history and their interaction. 
There is no Christian plan for salvation, yet the role of providence is integral to the 
metaphysical necessity of Vico's pattern of history. This is one of the most challenging 
concepts in the New Science, for while Vico never abandons the idea of the essential sa­
credness of history he also offers no clues how that becomes immanent. However, these 
studies make it clear that any explanation of mind must take into account both sources 
of its ontology.
Rhetorical and philological studies. What immediately comes through in these 
studies is that Vico thought that the means of discourse affect not only the description of 
the world, as if it would exist in the same way regardless if it were talked about or not, 
but that on a deeper level it determines how that reality is perceived by the observer. 
This is not the same as saying that the physical world can not exist for itself w ithout its 
articulation in human mentality, but it does mean that the theoretical concepts which 
explain the world are products of the interaction between the mind of man and nature. 
This position is most clearly at odds with a rationalist point of view which supposes that 
clear and distinct ideas can exist apart from their environment.
Epistemological studies. Vico's thesis that thought is somatically grounded raises 
many questions about the formation of abstract concepts and the extent to which ra­
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tional judgments may be trusted when their connection to that source is lost. If the fig­
ures of speech determine the modes of thought, it follows tha t the quality of thought will 
be reflected in the degree to which they are developed. Because Vico never posits an es­
sential human rationality that underlies all speech acts, it opens the way to an epistemo- 
logical pluralism. And because Vico's thesis of how the imagination creates meaning is 
starkly different from computationalist models of mind, which are not uncommon today, 
his ideas can be illuminating when an alternative to that paradigm is sought.
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3The beast that became human
Introduction
In the New Science Vico says the principles of the world of civil society are to be "found 
within the modifications of our own human mind".140 The subject of his 'science' is not 
the natural but the civil history of the world:
For since this world of nations has certainly been made by men, it is within these modifi­
cations that its principles should have been sought And human nature, so far as it is like that of 
animals, carries with it this property, that the senses are its sole way of knowing things.141
At the beginning and end of this history man appears in two states of barbarism, 
one of sense142 and the other of reflection.143 R.G. Collingwood, one of the most percep­
tive readers of Vico, explained the flow of his history this way:
Vico sometimes puts his cycle in the following way: first, the guiding principle of history 
is brute strength; then valiant or heroic strength; then valiant justice; then brilliant originality; 
then constructive reflection; and lastly a kind of spendthrift and wasteful opulence which de­
stroys what has been constructed.144
140 MS’331.
141MS 374.
142 MS 41 & 393.
143 MS 1106.
144 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea o f History [1946] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 67.
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At either end of this history, Vico’s world is terrifying, but in between the mind of 
man constructs the institutions necessary "to preserve the human race upon this earth" 
and flourish.145 Our first consideration will be to explain when, for Vico, humanity begins 
and what it is that makes us human.
The full title of Vico's magnum opus is Principles o f the New Science o f Giambat­
tista Vico Concerning the Common Nature o f the Nations. The nations in question are the 
gentile peoples which are from the seed of Adam, but who are more closely:
[M]en of the races of Ham, Japheth, and Shem, which gradually, one after the other re­
nounced the true religion of their common father Noah which alone in the family state had been 
able to hold them in human society by the bonds of matrimony and hence of the families them­
selves.146
This account of the origin of humanity, which Vico places squarely within the 
context of Biblical narrative, will be decisive for the overall explanation he gives of hu­
man nature and the development of the human mind, and it bears repeating that Vico's 
concern in the New Science is to furnish the principles of a civil and not a natural history, 
and, outside of the Biblical explanation, he never discusses the origin of man. Vico's de­
scription of early man does not match that of modern physical anthropology, although 
Vico's does compare culturally in some im portant ways, namely in the possession of lan­
guage, to the idea we have today of prehistoric man.147
145 NS1108.
146 NS 369.
147 See Michael C. Corballis, The Lopsided Ape: Evolution o f the Generative Mind (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1991]. In this work, the contemporary evolutionary psychologist Michael Corballis observes 
that: "If human uniqueness is not to be found in consciousness or the awareness of self, I have argued nev­
ertheless that there is a fundamental discontinuity between ourselves and other species. It has to do pri­
marily with GAD -  the vocabulary-based, generative assembling device". 311.
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The nature o f the beast
According to Vico, these lost races of the three sons of Noah broke off from the 
people of God, the Hebrews, after the Flood, and in the process of their wandering 
through "the great forest of the earth"148 became estranged from the true religion, lost 
their humanity, and became beasts. In this account, it is really more fitting to speak of 
the beast that became human again, rather than human for the first time. And how does 
Vico's human re- emerge from the beast? The simple answer to that question is, for Vico, 
that the beast is really man existing in a dormant state from which he is awakened by 
the sound of thunder that revives his conatus149 and which directs him back to his for­
mer self.
Although Vico's beasts had "descended to a state truly bestial and savage",150 lost 
the power of articulate speech, and lived without human customs, nevertheless they still 
possessed a latent humanity,151 as children of the Flood, in spite of their wretched state. 
This distinction is crucial, for if any sense is to be made of Vico's metaphysical concept of 
the corso-ricorso,152 the course and recourse of human nations and institutions that he 
says gentile history necessarily follows, then he must make a necessary condition of the 
beast that became human an inherent potential to re-develop its humanity, even though 
it is passive when it is at the nadir of the historical cycle. Without the presence of some­
thing that is fundamentally human in the beasts, Vico could not explain the persistence
148 NS 301.
149 The New Shorter O.E.D., V. 1 A-M, 465. (1993] Conatus [L, f. conari: endeavour] A purposive or seem­
ingly purposive force or impulse; an effort, striving.
150 NS 369.
151 Robert Miner's view hits the mark: "They must be latently human if Vico's view that a genetic continu­
ity between them and ourselves is to be plausible". Clio, Fall 2004, 34, no. 1-2,170-176.
152 This concept will be treated more fully in later chapters, but for now it would suffice to know that what 
Vico meant by it was the pattern or process of historical transitions whereby one stage, or corso, of history 
is repeated in its formal, though not material, aspects after being followed by the other two stages in his­
tory. He identifies the three stages of human history as the poetic, the heroic, and the human.
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of humanity through the cycles of his ideal eternal history, for otherwise its flow would 
be interrupted and his model would have had to be linear not cyclical.153
Vico's explanation of human development starts with Genesis, but in other re­
spects Vico's description of the beast is an animal that would not likely be confused for 
human - he has only a simian resemblance to humans, he has no language, his social 
structures are practically non-existent, and he feels but he does not think.154
The gentile nations, then, for Vico, do not appear ex nihilo in history, for they are a 
direct issue from the Hebrew nation, though separated from it by the Flood.155 This 
separation will allow Vico to stand clear of contradicting scriptural authority and 
thereby invoking the attention of the Inquisition, an ever-present threat in Naples at the 
time, and provide him with a sort of tabula rasa to construct a theory of human kind 
from the foundations. Free from this peril, he sets off in the New Science to map out a 
new meaning of the pursuit of knowledge, the res cogitans; the construction of institu­
tions as an extension of the human body, the res extensa, and language acquisition, the 
res linguistic as the link which connects them. As Vico says toward the end of the New
153 Cf. F.M. Barnard, ‘Natural Growth and Purposive Development: Vico and Herder', History and Theory, 
1979,18, no.l, 16-36: "Possibly Vico was as reluctant as Montesquieu after him to view historical devel­
opment primarily as the outcome of purposive human action, lest this would seriously impair the princi­
ple of historical continuity. To escape this danger, Vico might have found it necessary, religious considera­
tions apart, to invoke a providential design. Unfortunately, Vico never made it clear whether he identified 
Providence with (to borrow Hegel's terminology) rational necessity or natural necessity or, conceivably, 
by rationalizing nature or naturalizing reason, with both; but it seems evident that Providence assumed 
for him the divine embodiment of continuous becoming and change". 21.
154 See D. L. Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008): "The fan­
tasy that humans used to live solitary lives, like orang-utans, has an ancient lineage in the Western tradi­
tion, going back at least as far as Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Vico made this a key feature 
of his depiction of life right after the Deluge. The switch to group living was a sign of civilisation because -  
there are shades of Guizot here -  humans gave up their selfish individualism and learned to subordinate 
their own desires to the greater good. In so doing, they shed their biological status as animals and, for the 
first time, became fully human. It was civilisation that made humanity, not humanity hat made civilisa­
tion". 68.
155 According to the Biblical account (Genesis 10) all the peoples of the world descended from Noah's three 
sons -  Shem, Ham, and Japheth. From Shem's descendents issued the Semitic peoples, and from his son 
Arpachshad began the genealogy of Abraham and the Hebrew nation. The descendents of Ham and Ja­
pheth became the gentile nations.
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Science, as a reiteration of the key concept of man's identity, "a man is properly only 
mind, body, and speech, and speech stands as it were midway between mind and 
body".156
Vico's fallen man already possesses the principle of purposive action, although it 
is not active and lies buried in the bestial mind. He does not identify human nature with 
the physical process of growth and decay; rather, purposive action becomes the princi­
pal means by which the beast becomes human,157 it sets him on a path whose end will be 
to gain philosophic wisdom. Vico concludes the New Science with these thoughts:
But providence, through the order of civil institutions discussed in this work, makes itself 
palpable for us in these three feelings: the first, the marvel, the second, the veneration, hitherto 
felt by all the learned for the matchless wisdom of the ancients, and the third, the ardent desire 
with which they burned to seek and attain it. These are in fact three lights of the divine provi­
dence that aroused in them the aforesaid three beautiful and just sentiments; but these senti­
ments were later perverted by the conceit of scholars and by the conceit of nations -  conceits we 
have sought throughout this work to discredit. The uncorrupted feelings are that all the learned 
should admire, venerate, and desire to unite themselves to the infinite wisdom of God.158
The creature that became human had once possessed and then lost through dis­
use the mental powers that it was about to re-discover within the design of the ideal 
eternal history, for this reason, the beginning of the New Science can also be considered 
the end, because it opens with a description of the beast that is in the fallen state as a re ­
sult of the barbarism o f reflection, and who now slumbers in the wretched state of the 
barbarism o f the senses. But where has the human mind gone when it reverts to a state of
156 NS 1045.
157 NS 1110: "In our religion, divine grace causes virtuous action for the sake of an eternal and infinite 
good. This good cannot fall under the senses, and it is consequently the mind that, for its sake, moves the 
senses to virtuous actions".
158 NS 1111.
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sensual barbarism? Vico tells us that this is how the beasts lived at the beginning of pro­
fane universal history:
[The] entire original human race was divided into two species: the one of giants, the 
other of men of normal stature; the former gentiles, the latter Hebrews. Also that this difference 
can have come about only as the result of the bestial education of the former and the human edu­
cation of the latter. Hence that the Hebrews had a different origin from that of the gentiles.159
Vico says that the primary cause for this lapse into bestiality, in addition to man's 
impiety, was the type of education children received -  "severe, harsh, and cruel" - and 
that this neglect of their human nature was the cause of their reversion to social and 
physical animal characteristics.160 This reveals something of Vico's conception of man as 
both a product of nature and of his own making: learning and innate processes conspire 
to form man. Even in this barbaric condition, something fundamentally human lay bur­
ied in the body and was waiting to be awakened to a conscious state by the sound of 
Jove's thunder.
The first human thinking
Vico says that our study of the human mind must begin when "these creatures 
began to think humanely” and that the starting point will be "some notion of God such as 
even the most savage, wild, and monstrous men do not lack".161
To discover the way in which this first human thinking arose in the gentile world, we en­
countered exasperating difficulties which have cost us the research of a good twenty years. We
159 NS 172.
160 NS 170,195, 369, 371, 520, & 670.
161 NS 339.
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had to descend from these human and refined natures of ours to those quite wild and savage na­
tures, which we cannot at all imagine and can comprehend only with great effort.162
This same sentiment is expressed by Vico a little later on:
It is equally beyond our power to enter into the vast imagination of those first men, 
whose minds were not in the least abstract, refined, or spiritualized, because they were entirely 
immersed in the senses, buffeted by the passions, buried in the body. That is why we said above 
that we can scarcely understand, still less imagine, how those first men thought who founded gen­
tile humanity.163
Vico does not claim that we can understand the mind of primitive man in its bes­
tial state, but he does establish the point at which we can begin to recognize our human­
ity in it. This terminus post quem of uniquely human thinking is the moment that the 
beasts first heard in a clap of thunder the voice of an angry god. This event, which Vico 
describes in several places in the New Science, is the all-in-one starting point of human­
ity as we know it: self-consciousness, language, and the first institution, which he says is 
divination, all begin here. At this decisive moment, the beasts externalize their fear of 
nature and one another and transfer it to a god of their imagination whose angry nature 
they must collectively placate. The beasts' odyssey of wandering in the "great forest of 
the earth" is coming to an end:164
Moral virtue began, as it must, from conatus. For the giants, enchained under the moun­
tains by the frightful religion of the thunderbolts, learned to check their bestial habit of wander­
ing wild through the great forest of the earth, and acquired the contrary custom of remaining hid­
162 NS 338.
163 NS 378.
164 In a psychoanalytical reading, Vico's "great forest of the earth" could also be understood metaphorically 
as the deep unconscious where men have lost their way but through which they must pass before they can 
enjoy the clear vision of reason afforded by the vast river plains.
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den and settled in their fields. Hence they later became the founders of the nations and the lords 
of the first commonwealths.165
This situation may appear paradoxical, if viewed from the perspective of the ideal 
eternal history, for while the beast slowly becomes alienated from the natural environ­
ment and its animal nature in the process of founding institutions, it is also actually be­
ginning a return to its lost human nature. This decisive event represents for Vico's hu­
manity a major transition from living in an undifferentiated state of sense to the recogni­
tion that it inhabits a separate ontological reality that stands outside the world of na­
ture.166 After this moment, the exertions of its mind will gain value by 'making sense' in 
the construction of social reality, and where the mind is absent becomes identified with 
beastliness and the natural world:167
The giants were by nature of enormous build... In our view, these causes [of their stature] 
are to be traced to the bestial education of their children.168
Vico's beasts may be the descendents of fallen man but they are culturally feral 
animals due to the lack of human institutions, education in particular, and that is the 
cause of their physical monstrosity. When Vico speaks of man's development it is not of 
the epigenesis of a species, but rather of the restoration of a fallen race:
165 NS 504.
166 Vico's account of this transition is fundamentally similar to the process that some contemporary cogni­
tive scientists explain. See Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi, A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter 
Becomes Imagination (New York: Basic Books, 2000): "Higher-order consciousness (which flourishes in 
humans and presupposes the coexistence of primary consciousness) is accompanied by a sense of self and 
the ability in the waking state explicitly to construct past and future scenes. It requires, at a minimum, a 
semantic capability and, in its most developed form, a linguistic capability". 102.
167 Vico has two terms for the creatures of this state of humanity -  beasts (bestie) and giants (giganti). Al­
though his employment of the terms is not always systematic, in general he refers to earlier man as beasts 
and the later as giants.
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[For] a long period of time the impious races of the three children of Noah, having lapsed 
into a state of bestiality, went wandering like wild beasts until they were scattered and dispersed 
through the great forest of the earth, and that with their bestial education giants had sprung up 
and existed among them at the time when the heavens thundered for the first time after the 
flood.169
Vico tells us that the first human institution is divination, for all society looks to 
the oracle as the interpreter of divine will. The second human institution is marriage, for 
without it there are no lasting social bonds, upon which other institutions are based:
Mothers abandoned their children, who in time must have come to grow up without ever 
hearing a human voice, much less learning any human custom, and thus descended to a state truly 
bestial and savage. Mothers, like beasts, must merely have nursed their babies, let them wallow in 
their own filth, whose nitrous salts richly fertilized the fields, and who had to exert themselves to 
penetrate the great forest, grown extremely dense from the flood, would flex and contract their 
muscles in these exertions, and thus absorb nitrous salts into their bodies in greater abundance. 
They would be quite without fear of gods, fathers, and teachers which chills and benumbs even 
the most exuberant in childhood. They must therefore have grown robust, vigorous, excessively 
big in brawn and bone, to the point of becoming giants.170
We can look, Janus like, at the state of the beast: its ancestors abandoned their re ­
ligion, no longer practiced the institution of marriage, and were intensely self-absorbed 
in what Vico calls the barbarism o f reflection. Education was practically non-existent, and 
what of it that did exist was violent and cruel. But the Hebrews, on the contrary:
[On] account of their cleanly upbringing and their fear of God and of their fathers, contin­
ued to be of the proper stature in which God had created Adam and Noah had procreated his
169 NS 195.
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three sons; and it was perhaps in abomination of giantism that the Hebrews had so many cere­
monial laws pertaining to bodily cleanliness.171
How will the gentile beast begin to regain its humanity after having fallen so low 
from its Hebrew origins? Certainly there was no conscious awareness of embarking on a 
new course, for as Vico tells us their conscious thought began with:
[A] metaphysics not rational and abstract like that of learned men now, but felt and imag­
ined as that of these first men must have been, who, without power of ratiocination, were all ro­
bust sense and vigorous imagination.172
Vico places fear, and not wonder which he says is second,173 as the first emotion 
that stirred the mind to self-consciousness. He seems to have thought that this re­
awakening to humanity required something violent, the physiological equivalent of a Big 
Bang, to stir the animal from its slumbers, and wonder, although it is an emotion that 
can arrest the senses, requires at least some degree of reflection, which the beast did not 
yet possess. At this time, man stands on the opposite end of the spectrum from abstract 
reason, and this observation becomes one of the principles of the New Science -  "Imagi­
nation is more robust in proportion as reasoning power is weak".174
It was an act of God, the Flood, that initially provoked their fall, and it will be an­
other act of God, in this case a violent clap of thunder and flashing lightning, from which 
their humanity will re-emerge:
[A] few giants, who must have been the most robust, and who were dispersed through 
the forests on the mountain heights where the strongest beasts have their dens, were frightened 
and astonished by the great effect whose cause they did not know, and raised their eyes and be­
171 NS 371.
172 NS 375.
173 NS 377
174 NS 185.
71
came aware of the sky. And because in such a case the nature of the human mind leads it to at­
tribute its own nature to the effect, and because in that state their nature was that of men all ro- . 
bust strength, who expressed their very violent passions by shouting and grumbling, they pic­
tured the sky to themselves as a great animated body, which in that aspect they called Jove, the 
first god of the so-called greater gentes, who meant to tell them something by the hiss of his bolts 
and the clap of his thunder. And thus they began to exercise that natural curiosity which, opening 
the mind of man, gives birth to wonder.175
This is the moment, the clap of thunder, when the first human thought occurred 
and its reference in several places throughout the New Science points out Vico's position 
that all human knowledge, from the beginning of thought to an age of reason, is essen­
tially rooted in the imagination. It is also at this moment in which true human effort oc­
curs: Vico calls this conatus.
The role o f conatus in human development
The concept of conatus, whose origins extend back to the Greeks and Romans, 
was discussed by many important seventeenth-century philosophers, including Des­
cartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hobbes. There has never been universal agreement on its 
meaning as it applies to living things or to physical processes. Nevertheless, conatus for 
Vico is an innate force in living things that preserves life and pushes them to fulfil their 
potential. In the case of human beings, it is for Vico quite literally the power that breaks 
the shackles of beastliness that hold man down to the earth. Conatus is mentioned sev­
eral times in the New Science, but it is in his earlier work, On the Most Ancient Wisdom o f  
the Italians (De Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia),176 Vico's first expression of his theory 
of knowledge and metaphysics, that the elusive concept receives its fullest treatm ent. I
175 NS 377.
176 Giambattista Vico, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians [1710] (after Wisdom) (translated by L.M. 
Palmer) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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cannot do justice here to the complexity of this term, nevertheless I think it would be ill- 
advised to proceed without taking a closer look at it because much of what Vico says 
about human nature depends on what he means by it. Here are several explanations of 
conatus found in the De Antiquissima:
Nature is motion. The indefinite power to move underlying this motion is conatus. The in­
finite, and in itself motionless, mind that excites this power is God. The works of nature are 
brought into being by conatus and brought to perfection by motion. In sum, the genesis of things 
presupposes motion, motion presupposes conatus, and conatus presupposes God.177
In this sense, conatus can be understood as the vehicle that 'drives' God's will in 
the world; it is an incorporeal power that acts on a material reality. For Vico, there is a 
natural teleology intrinsic to man that operates on his being as a principle of self­
organization; nevertheless, the source of that force is external to him. This complex rela­
tionship will have need of harmonization if Vico's beast is to have free-will and its devel­
opment not simply be a product of material causality. And Vico's answer to that will be 
that the modifications o f the mind allow that freedom, while at the same time its devel­
opment will closely parallel the pattern of the ideal eternal history. Conatus, then, is the 
first of the innate principles that will constitute the foundation of mind in man:
We measure the extended, but the infinite defies measure. Indeed, it is entirely right for 
the power of extension to be contained in God "eminently," as our theologians say. Therefore, just 
as conatus is the power of motion, and in God as author of conatus, it is rest, so too primary mat­
ter is the power of extension, which in God as the founder of matter is the purest mind. There is, 
therefore, a substance in metaphysics which is the power of the indefinite division of extension.178
177 Wisdom 79.
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Vico's use of the metaphysical concept of conatus is intended to provide a solu­
tion to the problem of the connectivity of God to the world. He hoped that it could ex­
plain the way in which human development was linked to providential design, but still 
retain the power of human beings to configure their own destiny. What Vico adds to the 
purely physical concept of conatus as 'effort' or 'striving', which could be interpreted as a 
force that compromises human freedom because it seems to determine action and re­
strict choice, is another meaning closer to 'inclination' and 'tendency' that is internally 
driven, and which I think Vico believed actually served to expand its range of activity by 
controlling the bestial nature that had overtaken man and from which he would re- 
emerge. Vico's beasts are from this point on not just mindlessly surviving in nature, but 
discover a new identity in nature through an association of their own physical nature 
and that of the powers in nature. At this point, when the first thinking occurs, Vico intro­
duces his reader to the first noble giants, who represent a transitional state between the 
beasts and humans:
But these first men, who later became the princes of the gentile nations, must have done 
their thinking under the strong impulsion of violent passions, as beasts do. We must therefore 
proceed from a vulgar metaphysics... and seek by its aid that frightful thought of some divinity 
which imposed form and measure on the bestial passions of these lost men and thus transformed 
them into human passions. From this thought must have sprung the conatus proper to the human 
will, to hold in check the motions impressed on the mind by the body, so as either to quiet them 
altogether, as becomes the wise man, or at least to direct them to better use, as becomes the civil 
man. This control over the motion of their bodies is certainly an effect of the freedom of human 
choice, and thus of free will, which is the home and seat of all the virtues, and among the others of 
justice.179
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Vico says that conatus is a kind of regulatory power that is a gift to humans from 
heaven. It is a type of unself-conscious awareness that will allow the beast, who transi­
tions into a giant by possessing it, to discriminate between options available to it. Be­
cause this faculty involves choice, it entails a type of proto-morality:
[T]he metaphysics of the poet giants, who had warred against heaven in their atheism, 
vanquished them with the terror of Jove, whom they feared as the wielder of the thunderbolt. And 
it humbled not only their bodies but their minds as well, by creating in them this frightful idea of 
Jove. (The idea was of course not shaped by reasoning, for they were not yet capable of that, but 
by the senses, which, however false in the matter, were true enough in their form -  which was the 
logic conformable to such natures as theirs.) This idea, by making them god-fearing, was the 
source of their poetic morality.180
In this way conatus bestows a moral direction to human action that was previ­
ously pointless; henceforth, in order to avoid the wrath of Jove, humans will choose an 
alternative to beastliness. Implied in this concept is the notion that intentionality is pre­
sent in some shape or form.
The third aspect of conatus is that it endows the giants with an aesthetic sense. 
Vico says that man first learned to appreciate the beauty of the human form and only 
later, through extension of recognition of human-like beauty in "all sensible forms", do 
the "physicists", the Pre-Socratic philosophers, acquire an appreciation of beauty in na­
ture. Conatus leads the beast towards an appreciation of human beauty, which becomes 
personified first in Apollo and later Venus, which in their geometric symmetry and noble 
aspect become associated with the virtues of civil light and beauty. In other words, the 
aesthetic sense is founded on the human form and in so far as nature is beautiful it is a 
reflection of human attributes and dimension:
180 NS 502.
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At length the sky broke forth in thunder, and Jove thus gave a beginning to the world of 
men by arousing in them the conatus which is proper to the liberty of the mind, just as from mo­
tion, which is proper to bodies as necessary agents, he began the world of nature. For what seems 
to be conatus in bodies is but insensible motion, as we said above in the Method. From this cona­
tus came the civil light of which Apollo is the character, by which light was discerned the civil 
beauty with which the heroes were beautiful. And Venus was the character of this civil beauty, 
which the physicists later took for the beauty of nature, and even for the whole of formed nature, 
as being beautifully adorned with all sensible forms.181
Conclusion
In Vico, conatus functions as a sort of 'stem cell' of social evolution that provides a 
cognitive, moral, and aesthetic foundation for the species. It is not a biological or physi­
cal entity, but it creates the conditions necessary for man's distinctive identity in nature. 
Nature for man, in Vico, is inhospitable and alien to his true nature: it is a world that be­
longs to Hobbes, not Rousseau. In this world, the human mind in the state of barbarism 
does not entirely vanish, but it ceases to be manifested because the social institutions 
necessary for it to be revealed have disappeared. Only through the use of language and 
the construction of social institutions will the beast be restored to his true civilised iden­
tity, and the foundational thought for that to occur is Jove.
Where does the belief in Jove, a supreme being, come from? How does the sound 
of thunder become the thought of a god? When man "made” Jove, Vico means to say, he 
did not create him in order to have a god to believe in. The thought of Jove must have 
appeared spontaneously from within him. The myth of Jove, the first of man's myths for 
Vico, was not knowingly created by the beast in order to have something to believe in, 
for they could not knowingly have believed in an imaginary creation if they did not think
181NS 689.
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it was real. For poetic man the fables of his imagination are indistinguishable from the 
natural forces they are meant to mimic; it is his very lack of self-conscious reflection that 
makes these metaphorical constructions believable for him.182 But the beasts must have 
fe lt them to be true, and for them their beliefs were most likely self-evidently true. They 
still had no way to distinguish between their feelings and their beliefs. This is why when 
Vico speaks of Jove and the mind of the beast he means to say that the thought of it was 
true and only later, upon reflection, was the belief in Jove made true. The will to believe 
in Jove is a result of the interaction between human conatus, in this case the volitional 
faculty of man's ontology for Vico, and an incipient faculty of metaphor-making whereby 
the strongest of the beasts find a direct correspondence between their own power and 
that of nature.183 And because they cannot conceive of 'nature' in the abstract they natu­
rally think of that power in terms of themselves. Thus, Vico meant that the beast made 
the first transition to mindedness without knowing it: it was a fe lt response that later 
became identified with thought. And the idea of the god, likewise, is built up over time 
by the memory of previous terrifying thunderstorms that are stored in the collective un­
182 See Christopher Drew Armstrong, 'Myth and the New Science: Vico, Tiepolo, and the Language of the 
Optimates'. Art Bulletin, 87, 2005: "The ordering of sound and images into coherent meaning was not 
driven by a self-conscious aesthetic that stood apart from its utility, and poetic rhetorical devices served 
first and foremost as vehicles of communication, not of individual self-expression.... Ancient myth and 
poetry were characterized by the use of vivid imagery and a feeble grasp of reasoning similar to the con­
ceptions of children. Poetic devices such as onomatopoeia, personification, and repetition revealed a ca­
pacity to imitate and an inability to generalize or to form abstractions. The use of metered constructions 
offered a means to discipline the unformed organs of speech. Rather than the product of artifice or re­
finement, poetry constituted the earliest attempt to articulate human experience". 650.
183 See Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind in Greek Philosophy and Literature [1953] [New York: Dover 
Publications, 1982]: "The [mythical] paradigm traces its origin from the same need which is also at the 
root of the animal simile, our need for establishing our place in the world order by means of comparisons, 
in order to arrive at a tolerable degree of certainty and stability. To-day we still experience the same need, 
but we prefer to be guided by the facts of experience, or by historical parallels, rather than by legends". 
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consciousness. Thus, there is no original thought or intention to create or conceive of 
Jove: Jove is the sound of many thunders that shake and wake up the beast decisively.184
What so far is not explained by this account of the birth of human cognition is 
how representational content develops. Vico will need to explain how the beast was able 
to differentiate itself from the extended projection of itself in nature in order for its 
thoughts to be 'about something' other than itself. In the next chapter I will focus on how 
Vico attempts to answer that by his exposition of the origin of language.
184 See Donald Philip Verene, Vico’s Science o f Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981}:
"For the poetic mind poetic characters are not colourful or rhetorical embellishments of genera ab­
stracted from empirical particulars; thus the particulars are not thought of analogically, as being like, the 
ideal portraits of the generic individual of the fable.... Vico's conception of imaginative universals is not 
based on a nominalism in which a particular is raised to the level of a universal type and taken to stand for 
the nature of the class out of which it arises. Instead the reverse is true; particulars are directly conceived 
as universals". 307.
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4The giant that opened the mind of man
Introduction
In Vico's account of man he says that a race of giants followed the beasts, and that these 
creatures represented an advance toward rational man. He says that fear, which held 
man in thrall, had to be the cause of this advance to mental awakening:
Of such [frightened] natures must have been the first founders of gentile humanity when 
at last the sky fearfully rolled with thunder and flashed with lightning, as could not but follow 
from the bursting upon the air for the first time of an impression so violent... Thereupon a few gi­
ants, who must have been the most robust, and who were dispersed through the forests on the 
mountain heights where the strongest beasts have their dens, were frightened and astonished by 
the great effect whose cause they did not know, and raised their eyes and became aware of the 
sky. And because in such a state the nature of the human mind leads it to attribute its own nature 
to the effect, and because in that state their nature was that of men all robust bodily strength, who 
expressed their very violent passions by shouting and grumbling, they pictured the sky to them­
selves as a great animated body, which in that aspect they called Jove, the first god of the so-called 
greater gentes, who meant to tell them something by the hiss of his bolts and the clap of his thun­
der. And thus they began to exercise that natural curiosity which is the daughter of ignorance and 
the mother of knowledge, and which, opening the mind of man, gives birth to wonder.185
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Did Vico intend this to be taken as allegory or fact, and what does he base his 
claims on? Is he claiming to know what our distant ancestors actually thought or what 
he thinks they were capable of thinking? In framing his iconography of early man, Vico was 
not the first to conceive of man in that brutish state, Lucretius had done that long before 
in De rerum natura, and it is unlikely that the not uncommon image of the Homo sylves- 
tris, the 'wild man of the woods', would have been unknown to him.186 But in Vico's life­
time mathematical explanations of the universe, largely shaped by Newton's Principles, 
were making it increasingly difficult to reconcile the new science with a traditional 
world-picture and a religious teleology. Vico, however, hoped that science could validate 
what he thought was a universal instinct or intuition in man of a divine plan in nature by 
the evidence of the infinite variety and explanatory power of human language, which he 
considered a divine attribute.187 Vico's stated intention was that he hoped to demon­
strate in his philosophy that human development followed certain laws that could be 
understood scientifically. He sought to confirm this intuition by applying his knowledge 
of philology to the question of man's origins.
186 One such example worth speculation is whether Vico was influenced by the Neapolitan artist Giambat­
tista della Porta, who lived a hundred years before him but whose works were well known even in Vico's 
day. In the works of della Porta, as elsewhere in Western art, the corrupt moral status of man is reflected 
in his physical condition; moral degeneration is associated with beastliness. Martin Kemp writes in his The 
Human Animal in Western Art and Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007]: "In 1586, the po­
lymath Giambattista della Porta published his On Human Physiognomy, with plentiful woodcut illustra­
tions and a short, largely formulaic text The Neapolitan author had emerged precociously in his early 
twenties with the first edition of Natural Magic (1558) an eclectic compilation of science and secrets that 
retained its popularity even after the advent of more systematic analysis of natural phenomena in the next 
century. One of the legendary facts that he retails in Natural Magic, under the heading of "Sundry Copula­
tions," is mating of humans with diverse beasts". 45.
187 See Deborah Kelemen, 'Beliefs about purpose: on the origins of teleological thought’, in The Descent o f  
Mind: Psychological Perspectives on Hominid Evolution, eds. Michael C. Corballis and Stephen E.G. Lea (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), for a good summary of recent research on this topic: "One of the best 
indicators that people are compelled to reason in teleological terms is provided by the ubiquitous phe­
nomenon of religion. Adults' propensity to view objects and events as purposefully caused by intentional 
agents or gods is so prevalent that some have gone so far as to equate it to our susceptibility to disease 
(Dawkins 1993)... Research indicates that both children and adults make the fundamental assumption 
that objects exist for a purpose". 278-294.
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Imagination as a research tool
In stark contrast to Descartes, who believed that we could know only our own 
minds with certainty, Vico believed that we could understand other minds by the imagi­
nation; by this he meant the creative, but informed, reconstruction of the past through 
the study of philological and institutional artefacts. It is a meticulous and pain-staking 
process, Vico tells us, and is not the same thing as wild fantasizing or mystical revela­
tion.188 Long before Wilhelm Dilthey suggested in his theory of Verstehen that we can re­
enact historical thinking, Vico looked on the past not as an inscrutable rune but as a por­
tal to understanding our own nature. In perhaps the most-quoted passage from the New 
Science, Vico explains how he believed this was possible:
But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from our­
selves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond all question: that the 
world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be 
found within the modifications of our own mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that 
the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of nature, which, 
since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of 
nations, or civil world, which, since men had made it, men could come to know.189
Vico believed he was immune from committing what later William James would 
call "the psychologists' fallacy"190 because he thought that the psychological experiences
188 See Isaiah Berlin, 'Vico's Concept of Knowledge', in Giambattista Vico: An International Symposium, eds. 
G. Tagliacozzo & H.V. White (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969). "The identification of this 
sense of "knowing," which is neither deductive nor inductive (nor hypothetico-deductive), neither 
founded on the direct perception of the external world nor a fantasy which lays no claim to truth or coher­
ence, is Vico's achievement". 376.
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190 William James, The Principles of Psychology [1890] (New York: Dover Publications, 1950). James wrote: 
"The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact 
about which he is making his report. I shall hereafter call this the 'psychologist's fallacy' par excellence".
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of previous generations have empirical continuity that reach into our own lives in lan­
guage and society, and that, as inheritors of this evolution, we can access them to under­
stand the various stages of consciousness in which they occurred.191 But the problem 
with this approach to historical reconstruction is that while it may have a certain induc­
tive integrity when based on the span of available knowledge, it has greater difficulty in 
achieving deductive validity when the range of knowledge is less than general.192
Vico says the giants were the first to possess speech and think humanly. This is 
the moment when a conceptual threshold is passed and distinctly human thinking be­
gins, when man, through vocal language, becomes a culture-dependent species, as dis­
tinct from an instinct-directed animal. From this point on, Vico says that we can begin to 
probe the mind of early man because historical understanding is based on language, and 
from the time that mankind possessed it our own thinking has been continuous with it.
In Vico's reconstruction of early man, the phenomenon of early thinking is the product of 
both biological and cultural forces: it is neither strictly a natural faculty, nor is it solely a 
successful cultural adaptation to the environment. His account of human mind focuses 
essentially on linguistic evolution, and it is in the acquisition and development of lan­
196. This bias leads to a lack of objectivity when the observer assumes that his knowledge and experience 
of phenomena are identical or very similar to that of the observed.
191 Berlin, Concept: "...the central principle which is Vico’s ultimate claim to immortality: the principle ac­
cording to which man can understand himself because, and in the process, of understanding his past -  be­
cause he is able to reconstruct imaginatively (in Aristotle's phrase) what he did and what he suffered, his 
hopes, wishes, fears, efforts, his acts, and his works, both his own and those of his fellows". 373.
192 A similar fallacy is known as the 'historian's fallacy'. This is the mistake of assuming that thinkers in the 
past shared the same perspectives and arrived at the same conclusions based on similar premises. See 
David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1970).
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guage where Vico finds the sources of human consciousness. The poetic principle, Vico's 
“master key", is the imaginative power that forms concepts from sense-data.193
The beast begins to speak
In Vico's history, between one and two hundred years after the Flood,194 there 
appeared a discernible gap between some of the stronger, more robust beasts, who Vico 
calls 'giants' (giganti), and the less endowed 'brutes' (grossi bestioni). The giants began 
to associate thunder and lightning with a supreme being, a god who was in everything. 
They thought they were being spoken to by signs, just as they had, until now, communi­
cated to one another through sign and body language:195
The first men, who spoke by signs, naturally believed that lightning bolts and thunder­
claps were signs made to them by Jove; whence from nuo, to make a sign, came numen, the divine 
will, by an idea more than sublime and worthy to express the divine majesty. They believed that 
Jove commanded by signs, that such signs were real words, and that nature was the language of 
Jove. The science of this language the gentiles universally believed to be divination, which by the 
Greeks was called theology, meaning the science of the language of the gods.196
The first men began to associate the powers of nature with an omnipresent being 
that commanded the world. We may view this as a move forward in consciousness in 
which natural phenomena become interpreted as an abstract entity, but that would not 
be what Vico meant. When Vico says that the will of Jove was expressed everywhere in
193 NS 34.
194 NS 373.
195 The French philosopher of mind the Abbe Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780), in his account of 
the origin of language in his Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (Essai sur Torigine des connaissances 
humaines, 1746), presents an account of the sequence of language acquisition similar to Vico's: both 
thinkers held that before man used spoken language he communicated through signs and gestures. A hun­
dred years later, Charles Darwin wrote in The Descent o f Man and selection in relation to sex (London: Wil­
liam Clowes, 1871): "I cannot doubt that language owes its origins to the imitation and modifications of 
various natural sounds, and man's own distinctive cries, aided by signs and gestures".
196 NS 379 & 401.
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signs in nature, he meant that the distinction between sign and symbol was non­
existent: Jove was thunder and the thunder was Jove. Hence, Vico reminds us, the ex­
pression Jovis omnia plena came into being:
In this fashion the first theological poets created the first divine fable, the greatest they 
ever created: that of Jove, king and father of men and gods, in the act of hurling the lightning bolt; 
an image so popular, disturbing, and instructive that its creators themselves believed in it, and 
feared, revered, and worshiped it in frightful religions. And by that trait of the human mind no­
ticed by Tacitus whatever these men saw, imagined, or even made or did themselves they be­
lieved to be Jove; and to all of the universe that came within their scope, and to all its parts, they 
gave the being of animate substance. This is the civil history of the expression "All things are full 
of Jove" (Iovis omnia plena).197
How does Vico make the case that Jove is the first thought if it is an immediate re­
action to an event, the thunder, and not a proper statement, with a subject and verb, that 
is generally considered to be the minimum level of grammatical complexity necessary 
for a thought? How do they advance to a level of language that has syntax and genera­
tive capability? As a response to the fear generated by the thunder, Vico says that with a 
single utterance (Jove) thinking began. Although this may describe how the beasts re ­
acted to this event, it does not explain how from that response further meaning could be 
derived.
Vico's subject is fallen man, not the evolutionary hominoid of anthropology. This 
creature already possesses a mind (although it has been severely reduced from its for­
mer state) that is re-awakened by thunder. The importance of this account is twofold. 
One is that Vico seems to be saying that understanding exists in some form prior to ra ­
tionality, and two, that the acquisition of mental powers is connected to somatic proc­
197 NS 379.
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esses. The mind of the beast is revived through the emotions, not recollected by geomet­
ric reasoning, as in the case of the slave-boy in Plato's Meno.198 This account will have 
greater resonance when compared to rationalist versions of knowledge, because in the 
case of Vico his interpretation will lead to an appreciation of truth as socially con­
structed, while the Platonic meaning of truth is universal and social relevance plays no, 
or little, part in epistemic meaning. This first mind is the embryo of Vico's poetic mind, 
the mind that begins creating the concepts upon which the first three institutions of re­
ligion, marriage, and burial will be established, and each one of these institutions has a 
corresponding part that is related to physical aspects in human nature. In the case of re ­
ligion, it is related to the drive to externalize fear; marriage is concerned with the pro­
tection of progeny; and burial is an attem pt to sanitize the living space.
At either end of history in the New Science mankind is barely recognizable as 
such. At the beginning he is an unreasoning beast, and at the end, before his regression 
in the cycle of the ideal eternal history, he is a hyper-rational 'humanoid', devoid of emo­
tional understanding. In the giants, we can begin to recognise human traits, such as vocal 
language as a developed system of sounds having lexical and phonological syntax. They 
are distinct from Vico's earlier beasts that possess consciousness, and who have gestural 
language, but not thought and articulate speech.199 Furthermore, the giants had self- 
awareness because they possessed language. And Vico makes a further distinction be­
tween the giants:
198 See Jonathan Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation o f Man 
1670-1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): "Vico's account of the emergence of modern reason, 
indeed his whole conception of human attitudes and culture moving in stages that became progressively 
more rational, here, closely parallels Fontenelle's conception of the evolution of I'esprit humain from 
primitive imaginings, and is anchored in Spinoza's idea that ideas are an articulation of feeling and sense 
perception and, no matter how confused and inaccurate, invariably correspond to actual real things". 527
199 The distinguishing feature of human language, according to Chomsky, is that it allows us to generate a 
potentially unlimited number of messages, and not simply responses to immediate stimuli.
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Of the giants there were in turn two kinds: the first, the sons of Earth, or nobles, from 
whom, as being giants in the full sense of the term, the age of giants took its name, as we have said 
(and it is these whom sacred history defines as "strong, famous and powerful men of the age"); 
the second, less properly so called, those other giants who were subjugated [by the former].200
The humanization o f the noble giants
As Vico identifies them, these “sons of the Earth" were endowed with greater cu­
riosity of mind and refinement of body than their less-developed relatives, who they will 
come to dominate. The noble giants become the founders of the first gentile families, and 
their political legitimacy is tied to their claim to belong to the land they live on:
Such giants were scattered over the earth after the flood. We have seen them in the fabu­
lous history of the Greeks, and the Latin philologians, without being aware of it, have told us of 
their existence in the ancient history of Italy, where they say that the most ancient peoples of It­
aly, the so-called aborigines, claimed to be autochthones, which is as much as to say sons of Earth, 
which among the Greeks and Latins meant nobles. And in the fables the Greeks quite properly 
called the sons of earth giants, and the Earth mother of giants201
The human form of body and soul re-emerge from the bodies of the giants 
through education, which Vico says is based on a “fear of gods, fathers, and teachers".202
For heroic education began to bring forth in a certain way the form of the human soul 
which had been completely submerged in the huge bodies of the giants, and began likewise to 
bring forth the form of the human body itself in its just dimensions from the disproportionate gi­
ant bodies.203
200 NS 372.
201 NS 370 & 531.
202 NS 369.
203 NS 520.
Vico wants to draw our attention to his belief that the process of humanization 
involves moral,204 mental, and physical development; it is a holistic vision of man in 
which the absence of one element would undo the rest:
The metaphysics of the philosophers, by means of the idea of God, fulfils its first task that 
of clarifying the human mind, which needs logic so that with clear and distinct ideas it may shape 
its reasonings, and descend therewith to cleanse the heart of man with morality. Just so the meta­
physics of the poet giants, who had warred against heaven in their atheism, vanquished them 
with the terror of Jove, whom they feared as the wielder of the thunderbolt. And it humbled not 
only their bodies but their minds as well, by creating in them this frightful idea of Jove.205
This account of the awakening of the gentile mind makes God, or the idea of God, 
and man causally and teleologically connected from the beginning of history. Of course, 
this is also true of God's relationship to the Hebrews, but Vico is careful to point out that 
the essential characteristics of those connections are different, and it is in this way he 
can offer a new interpretation of human development that does not offend canonical 
tradition because the wanderings of "the races of Ham, Japheth, and Shem" do not figure 
into the Biblical narrative:206
The Hebrews thought God to be an infinite Mind beholding all times in one point of eter­
nity, whence God, either Himself or through the angels that are minds or through the prophets to 
whose minds God spoke, gave notice of what was in store for His people. The gentiles fancied bod­
ies to be gods, that by sensible signs they might give notice of what was in store for the peoples... 
After an interval of two centuries (as fabulous history relates), Heaven reigned on earth and be­
stowed many and great blessings on mankind, and, by uniformity of ideas among orientals, Egyp­
204 NS 504: "Moral virtue began, as it must from conatus. For the giants, enchained under the mountains by 
the frightful religion of the thunderbolts, learned to check their bestial habit of wandering wild through 
the great forest of the earth, and acquired the contrary custom of remaining hidden and settled in their 
fields".
205 NS 502.
206 NS 369.
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tians, Greeks, Latins and other gentile nations, there arose equally the religions of as many Joves. 
For at the end of this period of time after the flood, heaven must have thundered and lightened, 
and from the thunder and lightning of its Jove each nation began to take auspices.207
The nature of the gentile connection is established through a physical awakening, 
whereas the connection to the Hebrews is a metaphysical revelation that is apprehended 
through reason. In this way, Vico is suggesting that thought has a somatic foundation, 
and that no m atter how abstract thinking may become, its base remains in the emotions, 
and the emotional content of language affects perception and the expression of thought. 
Vico wants to emphasize how pivotal the effect of thunder and lightning were on the 
imaginations of men in order to illustrate the sequence of the development of emotions, 
which initially serve as survival mechanisms, and for this reason he places fear before 
wonder because the purpose it serves is more critical to protecting life.208 Vico attrib­
utes human nature to the influence of both adapted behaviour (education) and innate 
biases (emotions). Like Plato's metaphor of the tripartite soul in the Phaedrus,209 in 
which the charioteer must control the irrational elements of his nature in order to go 
forward, Vico's model of mind admits the opposite components of man's nature and 
tries to guide them together with reason.
How is this vision of early man in the New Science to be understood? First, there 
seem to be two extreme interpretations. In one reading, Vico's beasts are his imaginary
207 NS 9.
208 NS 389 & 191. In these paragraphs Vico treats the creation of gods from fear. In cognitive science, the 
negativity bias explains why fear and not wonder was the primary motivation in the construction of man's 
social development. It says that of the five primary emotions, four are negative and one, happiness, is posi­
tive. See Paul Rozin, 'About 17 (+/-2) Potential Principles about Links between the Innate Mind and Cul­
ture: Preadaptation, Predispositions, Preferences, Pathways, and Domains', in The Innate Mind Volume 2: 
Culture and Cognition, eds. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, Stephen Stich (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 2006), 45.
209 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Christopher Rowe,(London: Penguin Books, 2005).
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continuation of the biblical narrative of Genesis that he creates to fill the void left by that 
account of how errant mankind, the gentiles, comes back to God's Word (Jove). In this 
way, biblical sources are reconciled with scientific knowledge, and the life of the on­
going metaphor of sacred history is prolonged into the eighteenth century by finding 
empirical evidence for its foundational claims. In another reading, Vico is challenging the 
veracity of the Biblical account and casting the question of man's origins in a purely an­
thropological dimension. According to this interpretation, his giants are a product of 
fact, in so far as philological evidence is used to support his claims, and of his imagina­
tion, if by that is meant reasonable conjectures of the reconstruction of the past.210 Is 
there any reason not to choose between either of these interpretations? Perhaps there 
is.
The meaning of Vico's account of human origins can better be understood scientifi­
cally and metaphorically. His intention was not to revive historical chimeras of the past, 
whether Biblical or from the classical world, in order to hold them up as an anti-modern 
challenge to the science of his own age. Nor was he purposing to eviscerate historical 
mythologies of their truth value in favour of scientific reasoning. Rather, Vico's recon­
struction of the mind of early man was conducted with the belief that the influence of 
mythological reality persists in the structures of the modern psyche, and thus not only 
can they not be ignored or dismissed by science, but they have to be positively recog­
nized as essential to scientific reasoning. Within the boundaries of this perspective, it is 
in some sense infertile to ask whether he believed in Genesis or the scientific method, if 
by that is meant the accumulation of empirical evidence to support a hypothesis. Vico's
210 Today, we would say that his methodology incorporated nomothetic science, in so far as he was looking 
for general laws of human development, and ideographic science when he seeking confirmation of those 
laws in particular events. See Aviezer Tucker, Our Knowledge of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, 2004), 241, for a discussion of nomothetic and ideographic science.
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achievement was to pursue a method of inquiry that included both subjective and objec­
tive evidence, and in the case of the former verification was often no more than a m atter 
of common belief, if that held explanatory power. Undoubtedly, from the vantage point 
of today, some of Vico's arguments are indefensible, but it would be wrong to conclude 
from this that his method was not essentially sound.
In his account of man's acquisition of language, Vico anticipated some of the findings 
of contemporary research. He believed that spoken language represented the decisive 
point of discontinuity between humans and other animals, the moment when true hu­
manity began. He recognized that even though the environment was crucial in develop­
ment, it alone was not sufficient to account for the level of complexity displayed in hu­
man thinking. Vico very strongly emphasises the im portant contribution of emotions to 
thought, beginning with his account of thunder to awaken or instil in mankind the idea 
of an all-powerful divinity, and whose name is onomatopoetically related to the sound it 
is associated with.211 Nevertheless, Vico also implies, by holding on to the post-diluvium 
account of mankind, that there remains a vestige, once almost extinguished, of his for­
mer rationality. This once-considerable power of reason, which is whole in pre-diluvium 
times and again in the human age, is present in a much diminished form in the other 
stages of human history. It would appear that Vico was trying to strike a balance be­
tween a rationalist conception of cognition, in which a priori ideas lead to further ideas, 
and a view that environmental factors are primarily responsible for responses to and
211 See Bruce H. Weber, 'Emergence of Mind and the Baldwin Effect', in Evolution and Learning: The Bald­
win Effect Reconsidered, eds. Bruce H. Weber and David J. Depew (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 2003): "That behaviour and even emotions could have an influence on natural selection was ex­
plored by Darwin. 'Charles Darwin/ says Edelman, 'was the first to propose that natural selection alters 
behavior and vice versa' (Edelman, G.M. (1987. Neural Darwinism: The Theory o f Neuronal Group Selection 
(New York: Basic Books), 10. It is the "vice versa" that now needs to be included in any account of the evo­
lutionary emergence of mind". 321
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articulation of phenomena. And what this also means for the rest of the research he pur­
sues in the New Science is that Vico draws the conclusion that in a very real sense there 
is not any unknowable 'prehistory' to speak of, because understanding the present de­
pends on the past for its meaning, and understanding the past equally depends on the 
present.212 The practical consequence of the concept of corso-ricorso is that there is a 
part of every stage in human history within every other part.
212 Benedetto Croce, who was one of Vico's main interpreters, shared this belief that all history is, in the 
final analysis, contemporary.
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5The children of the human race
Introduction
The New Science addresses the universal human impulse to know the past by offering 
the reader a portal on the moment when distinctly human thinking begins. What Vico 
calls the Age of Gods, or Poets, is the threshold of a lucid world that replaces the dark­
ness of the primordial mind and represents the transition between the Vico's race of gi­
ants and humanity properly speaking. The nature of thought in this corso is character­
ized by strong images and emotions, and it is contrasted from the preceding period of 
feral wandering in which man lived like a brute without true society and vocal lan­
guage.213 In his description of these developments, Vico will establish his position that 
man's sociability is the result of the acquisition of language, and not that the possession 
of language is evidence of man's innate sociability. Vico also calls this phase the poetic 
age; for now imaginative thoughts achieve a narrative structure, the vera narratio, that 
the giants lacked. This early form of creative thought is characterized by idealized syn­
213 Vico's concept of the 'erramento ferino' (feral wandering) of early man owes much to Lucretius, De Re­
rum Natura, Book V, 925-1457. In the final edition of the Scienza nuova (1744), perhaps to avoid trouble 
with church authorities, he omits any direct reference to Lucretius which was in the earlier versions. See 
Gino Bedani, Vico Revisited: Orthodoxy, Naturalism and Science in the Scienza Nuova (Berg: Oxford, 1989), 
92-96, for more about this.
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theses of strong emotions inspired by natural phenomena; Vico calls these the imagina­
tive universals (universalifantastici).214
The imaginative universals and the common mental dictionary
[T]he first men, the children, as it were, of the human race, not being able to form intelli­
gible class concepts of things, had a natural need to create poetic characters; that is, imaginative 
class concepts or universals, to which, as to certain models or ideal portraits, to reduce all the par­
ticular species which resembled them.215
These constructs are explained as a body of myths that symbolise universal 
forces in nature, and when they are combined they operate as a body of fables, or ideal 
portraits of types, from which concepts are engendered. It is a thinking characterized by 
metaphorical tropes heavily endowed with natural references. Vico distinguishes this 
form of thought from that of the Hebrews, who were able to understand divine im pera­
tives directly through articulate speech, while the gentile nations, on the other hand, had 
to discover divine intentions through their own human actions. The imaginative univer­
sals are not directly transm itted to the gentiles in the form of ready-made concepts, but 
are painstakingly acquired by them in phase with the developmental status of their own 
customs and habits, which themselves are responses to utilitarian needs. Now, in the 
poetic phase, mute gestures that Vico says characterized the earliest human language 
combine in sequence and become vocal language:
214 Vico uses several terms for his theory of the imaginative universals: caratteri poetici (NS 34, 68, 81,
209,381,416,429, & 431]; caratteri fantastici [NS 562, 762, 772, 783, 808, 809, 816, & 818); generi fan­
tastici [NS 34,209,403, & 495]; generi poetici [NS 809 & 819]; universali fantastici (209,381,460, & 933] ; 
and universali poetici (934 & 1033]. If Vico employs them with any systematic criteria, I have not been 
able to find it  I will use imaginative universals for all the variations.
215 NS 209.
The philosophers and philologians should have all begun to treat of the origins of lan­
guages and letters from the following principles. [1) That the first men of the gentile world con­
ceived ideas of things by imaginative characters of animate and mute substances. [2) That they 
expressed themselves by means of gestures or physical objects which had natural relations with 
the ideas; for example, three ears of grain, or acting as if swinging a scythe three times, to signify 
three years. (3) That they thus expressed themselves by a language with natural significations.216
The origin of culture, for Vico, is rooted in heuristic adaptation to the environ­
ment, rather than the gradual unfolding of a divinely mandated a priori rational order, as 
would be the case if history were a pre-determined sequence of events and institu­
tions.217 He is making the case that human behaviour is not the result of an innate capacity for 
reason, but instead is the product of material conditions operating in history.
The imaginative universals, collectively, constitute what Vico calls a common 
mental dictionary (vocabolario mentale comune).218 This 'dictionary' consists of fables 
and archetypal figures that express fundamental social structures and activities - birth, 
death, burial, harvest, hunt, marriage, war, peace, etc. - common to mankind as a whole, 
although its vocabulary differs from culture to culture, according to local conditions:
Uniform ideas originating among entire peoples unknown to each other must have a 
common ground of truth.219
This axiom is a great principle which establishes the common sense of the human race as 
the criterion taught to the nations by divine providence to define what is certain in the natural 
law of the gentes. And the nations reach this certainty by recognizing the underlying agreements
216 NS 431. Also see 401.
2171 will discuss the problem that the ideal eternal history (la storia ideale eterna) presents to human free­
dom in the Conclusion. For the moment, it should suffice to say that man's history is entirely his own crea­
tion; nowhere in the New Science does God appear as an immanent being that intervenes directly in hu­
man affairs.
218 NS 161,162,482,483.
219 NS 144.
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which, despite variations of detail, obtain among them all in respect of this law. Thence issues the 
mental dictionary for assigning origins to all the diverse articulated languages. It is by means of 
this dictionary that the ideal eternal history is conceived, which gives us the histories in time of all 
nations.220
There must in the nature of human institutions be a mental language common to all na­
tions, which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life and expresses it 
with as many diverse modifications as these same things have diverse aspects. A proof of this is 
afforded by proverbs or maxims of vulgar wisdom, in which substantially the same meanings find 
as many diverse expressions as there are nations ancient and modern.221
Vico believes that all languages share similar concepts, although their forms dif­
fer from place to place, and that this provides evidence of a common human mind. His 
meaning, however, is not that there exists an innate 'essential' human language (a la 
Leibniz), rather that because people everywhere perform similar actions they create 
comparable concepts in the doing, and in that way their minds develop along similar 
paths.222 It is for this reason that Vico, reaching back to the etymology of noiia) (to make, 
create, or produce), calls the age when humans first formulate this vocabulary 'poetic', 
because man is the maker of language, and language is his tool:
The first men of the gentile nations, children of the nascent mankind, created things ac­
cording to their own ideas. But this creation was infinitely different from that of God. For God, in 
his purest intelligence, knows things, and, by knowing them, creates them; but they, in their ro­
bust ignorance, did it by virtue of a wholly corporeal imagination. And because it was quite corpo­
real, they did it with marvellous sublimity; a sublimity such and so great that it excessively per-
220 NS 145.
221 NS 161.
222 Vico says in On the Study Methods o f Our Time [De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, 1708), 40, that 
"genius is a product of language, not language of genius".
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turbed the very persons who by imagining did the creating, for which they were called "poets," 
which is Greek for "creators".223
This 'instrument', the common mental dictionary, has specific utilitarian value 
because it permits him to forge a common body of thought from which social cohesive­
ness is established. When he acquires it, man's period of feral wandering effectively 
ends. Over time, these shared notions are passed down from generation to generation 
and a cultural tradition develops within a society that allows its members to formulate a 
common identity that transcends the immediacy of their surroundings and has persis­
tence; in short, their history rests on the foundation of the acquisition of mythic arche­
types.
Popular thoughts and privileged thinking
The thought of Jove, Vico says, coincides with the beginning of man's socializa­
tion. But it is not clear if he meant that the idea of a god (and then religion) stems from a 
fear of nature and that man then creates a god in his imagination with the aim of estab­
lishing a dialogue with a 'person' in order to placate and bend it to his will, or that relig­
ion is a sort of'political stratagem' created by powerful members of society to bully or 
coerce the weaker lot. The reason his position is ambiguous is that Vico says the idea of 
Jove occurs simultaneously with the apparition of the first diviners (divinari):
Jove was born naturally in poetry as a divine character or imaginative universal, to which 
everything having to do with the auspices was referred by all the ancient gentile nations, which 
must therefore all have been poetic by nature. Their poetic wisdom began with this poetic meta­
physics, which contemplated God by the attribute of his providence; and they were called theo­
223 NS 376.
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logical poets, or sages who understood the language of the gods expressed in the auspices of Jove; 
and were properly called divine in the sense of diviners, from divinari, to divine or predict224
The poetic wisdom (sapienza poetica) can be interpreted as being the product of 
popular culture or of an elite clique, the theological poets, who foist the elements of re ­
ligion on the rest of society. This question is hard to answer because Vico has superbly 
made his intentions interpretable either way with equal reasonableness. However, for 
whatever the motivation, his position is clear that the imitation of natural forces in reli­
gious ritual is performed to take possession of those powers in nature. The humaniza­
tion of natural phenomena has the effect of enlarging man's imaginative universe, for by 
it he establishes a correspondence between his own emotional states and the powers in 
nature, and in this process of interpretation he becomes the measure by which things 
are judged. Vico says this about the birth of religion:
It is impossible that bodies should be minds, yet it was believed that the thundering sky 
was Jove. And nothing is dearer to poets than singing the marvels wrought by sorceresses by 
means of incantations. All this is to be explained by a hidden sense the nations have of the om­
nipotence of God. From this sense springs another by which all peoples are naturally led to do in­
finite honours to divinity. In this manner the poets founded religions among the gentiles.225
The establishment of the institution of religion creates a standard of legitimate 
behaviour that is of benefit to society, and proscribes other behaviour, in the form of ta­
boos, which would harm it. In this way, negative moral injunctions, in their overall appli­
cation, permit an expansion of the conditions that foster socialization:226
224 NS 381.
225 NS 383.
226 Georges Bataille, in his essay La peinture prehistorique: Lascaux ou la naissance de l’art, (Skira, Geneve, 
1955] said that sociologists and historians of religion have failed to appreciate the universal significance
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From what has been said up to this point it is concluded that divine providence, appre­
hended by such human sense as could have been possessed by rough, wild, and savage men who 
in despair of nature's succours desired something superior to nature to save them (which is the 
first principle on which we established the method of this Science), permitted them to be de­
ceived into fearing the false divinity of Jove because he could strike them with lightning. Thus, 
through the thick clouds of those first tempests, intermittently lit by those flashes, they made out 
this great truth: that divine providence watches over the welfare of all mankind. So that this Sci­
ence becomes in this principle aspect a rational civil theology of divine providence, which began 
in the vulgar wisdom of the lawgivers, who founded the nations by contemplating God under the 
attribute of providence, and which is completed by the esoteric wisdom of the philosophers, who 
give a rational demonstration of it in their natural theology.227
The theocratic class of the first lawgivers is composed of priests who exercise 
divination and 'make sense' of the world for men: in effect, they do the 'thinking' for the 
masses, and their interpretation of natural phenomena is sanctioned by the consolida­
tion of political power for its legitimacy. This strict correlation between satisfying the 
"necessities of social life" and the ideas which make that possible is tied into the over­
arching theme of the New Science as a whole:228
In search of these natures of human institutions our Science proceeds by a severe analy­
sis of human thoughts about the human necessities or utilities of social life, which are the two 
perennial springs of the natural law of the gentes. In its second principal aspect, our Science is 
therefore a history of human ideas, on which it seems the metaphysics of the human mind must 
proceed.229
of taboo in the making of humans : « Encore une fois, le sociologue et l’historien des religions n'envisagent 
chaque fois que les tabous particuliers, sans se dire avant tout que, generalement, sans interdit, il n’estpas  
de vie humaine (my italics). 31.
227 NS 385.
228 NS 34.
229 NS 347.
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Whether the fables of gods were initially popular creations or political 'lessons' 
that were imposed from on high is an open question, but Vico says that their interpreta­
tion and instrumentation were ultimately handled by the diviners. The fables fulfil the 
public need to explain the world in terms they can relate to, and because the keys to 
their meaning are held by the diviners they are held in awe and reverence:
It follows that the first science to be learned should be mythology or the interpretation of 
fables; for, as we shall see, all the histories of the gentiles have their beginnings in fables, which 
were the first histories of the gentile nations. By such a method the beginnings of the sciences as 
well as of the nations are to be discovered, for they sprang from the nations and from no other 
source. It will be shown throughout this work that they had their beginnings in the public needs or 
utilities of the peoples and that they were later perfected as acute individuals applied their reflection 
to them.230
The logic o f metaphor
Before the poetic age ‘thought’ consisted in dissociated mental images and lan­
guage was a system of mute gestures and simple imperatives.231 Vico considered the 
transition from sign to vocal language, and the use of 'poetic characters', to be the 'mas­
ter key' of the New Science. The imaginative universals are an articulation of fundamen­
tal concepts that acquire a syntax that goes beyond simple coordinated responses, how­
ever intelligent, to environmental conditions. In addition, they have the generative capa­
bility to form new concepts from previous ones by which vocabulary is expanded. Nev­
ertheless, the key to the "master key" is contained in the idea that imaginative universals
230 NS SI.
231 NS 401: "The first language in the first mute times of the nations must have begun with signs, whether 
gestures or physical objects, which had natural relations to the ideas [to be expressed]".
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have their foundation in emotional states, and that their 'logic' is rooted in natural refer­
ence:232
We find that the principle of these origins both of languages and of letters lies in the fact 
that the first gentile peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of nature, were poets who spoke in po­
etic characters. This discovery, which is the master key of this Science, has cost us the persistent 
research of almost all our literary life, because with our civilized natures we [moderns] cannot at 
all imagine and can understand only by great toil the poetic nature of these first men. The poetic 
characters of which we speak were certain imaginative genera [images for the most part of ani­
mate substances, of gods or heroes, formed by the imagination) to which they reduced all the spe­
cies or all the particulars appertaining to each genus; exactly as the fables of human times, such as 
those of late comedy, are intelligible genera reasoned out by moral philosophy...233
In spite of the enormous importance that Vico places on the imaginative univer­
s a l  to explain the genesis of poetic thought, he comes short on proffering a detailed de­
scription of why this should be so. The problem is that these archetypes cannot remain 
static images or icons but must relate to one another as ideas in such a way that a fluid­
ity of thought is engendered by them. It could be that the imaginative universals achieve 
a narrative quality through the creative interaction of coupling among the basic m eta­
phors that comprise them. The fable,234 the vera narratio, is effectively composed of a 
sequence of images that correspond to emotional states, e.g., thunder-Jove-power-fear- 
law, a combination of associations that, though based on natural relationships, later 
generate concepts which are entirely human creations, such as law. This sequence that 
moves from emotion to abstraction suggests that emotions themselves are not inde-
232 NS 494: 'The results so far reached by this poetic logic concerning the origins of languages do justice to 
their first creators. They were rightly regarded as sages in all subsequent times because they gave natural 
and proper names to things, so that among the Greeks and Latins "name" and "nature" meant the same 
thing". Also see NS 401 431 ,433,437,438,456.
233 NS 34.
234 NS 401 & 403.
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pendent states detached from one another but elements of a larger somatic 'grammar'. 
And as the structure of the fabled narrative becomes more complex with newly spawned 
concepts, it will come to shape the categories of thought that occupy the spaces of rea­
son. Vico takes great pains to emphasize that this 'poetic' logic precedes the logic of rea­
soned discourse, for its concern is not with understanding the nomological structure of 
the world; rather, it is a sense of wanting to grasp and 'manage' the phenomenal experi­
ence of nature. Curiosity, in a Heraclitean sense of wanting to see beyond or behind the 
appearances of things to understand their 'true' nature, Vico says comes later with the 
first philosophers.235 It was the necessity, a 'need to know', to produce adequate social 
institutions which he says came first in the order of mental development, and in his de­
scription of the sequence of the appearance of institutions a parallel course is run with 
the development of words and concepts: new thoughts then arise which reflect the ap­
pearance of different social structures. In a word, Vico is saying that human activity is 
both a product and a shaper of its environment.236
Vico believes that of all the poetic tropes metaphor is the most valuable in the 
construction of conceptual thinking because it alone can establish a relationship be­
tween two separate and unlike phenomena, thus allowing man to relate his own physical 
response to an event with the event itself. In other words, an association is formed be­
tween man and nature in such a way that he can begin to compare his own state of being 
with the world around him, and most importantly in this process the narration of the
235 NS 499: "For the first kind of crude philosophy used by men was autopsia, or the evidence of the 
senses".
236 This concept is now the basis of the modern theory of autopoiesis. See Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, ‘Autopoi- 
esis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency', in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, v.4, n.7, Dec. 2005, 
Springer, Netherlands, 429-452.
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sequence of natural events become the property of man as he becomes ipso facto  the 
maker of his own history:
Thus every metaphor so formed is a fable in brief. This gives a basis for judging the time 
when metaphors made their appearance in the languages. All the metaphors conveyed by like­
nesses taken from bodies to signify the operations of abstract minds must date from times when 
philosophies were taking shape. The proof of this is that in every language the terms needed for 
the refined arts and recondite sciences are of rustic origins.237
The function of the imaginative universals represents, for Vico, the first attem pt 
by man to 'make sense' of the world, in the sense of revealing 'facts' about things and 
constructing new meaning from them. Perhaps Vico's most famous philosophical insight, 
his well-known epistemological principle the verum ipsum factum  [the true is the made), 
which is first found in the De Antiquissima,238 is supported by the ''master key" of the 
New Science, the imaginative universals: for if what we can know inside and out is w hat 
we have made, then we have made sense of it. And a corollary to this is the implication 
that there is no underlying structure or meaning to the logic of relationships apart from 
the one we have created.
Poetic truth
It is not unusual to experience frustration with Vico's concept of poetic truth. It is 
elusive because it requires one to think in a way that stands diametrically opposed to 
the analytic tradition or what is normally understand by universals. Typically, w ithout 
wishing to enter into metaphysical argument, a universal is an ideal aggregate of par­
ticular qualities; it can evoke or display them in a general way, but to achieve recogni­
237 NS 404.
238 Giambattista Vico, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians [De Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia, 
1710), trans. L.M. Palmer (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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tion it does not necessarily have to conform to all of them. Overall meaning is extrapo­
lated from isolated instances when particulars are brought into a larger class. In the case 
of Vico's imaginative universals, he reverses the equation and says that the imaginative 
creation is the 'true' object of thought, not a fictional composite of ideal attributes. It is 
important to note the absence of artifice or self-consciousness that is required so that 
these 'types' can attain a reality in the minds of poetic man that they would otherwise 
not have if they were perceived as consciously constructed fables or fictions for enter­
tainment or educational purposes, to cite a few examples of their potential use in soci­
ety:
These fables are ideal truths suited to the merit of those of whom the vulgar tell them; 
and such falseness to fact as they contain consists simply in failure to give their subjects their due. 
So that, if we consider the matter well, poetic truth is metaphysical truth, and physical truth 
which is not in conformity with it should be considered false. Thence springs this important con­
sideration in poetic theory: the true war chief, for example, is the Godfrey that Torquanto Tasso 
imagines; and all the chiefs who do not conform throughout are not true chiefs of war.239
How does Vico's poetic man come to think of the myths that comprise the imagi­
native universals as real stories in an actual narrative? It is hard for modern man to un­
derstand or even imagine how the poetic imagination came to see the world through this 
prism. For at this time, Vico says, the particular is immediately perceived as the univer­
sal, with no reflective judgment to break the spell of the incantatory fables.240 He gives 
an example of how this is done by children in his own day:
239 NS 205. See Donald Phillip Verene, Vico's Science o f Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1981: 
"Vico's conception of imaginative universals is not based on a nominalism in which a particular is raised 
to the level of a universal type and taken to stand for the nature of the class out of which it arises. Instead 
the reverse is true; particulars are directly conceived as universals". 307.
240 See I. Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000): "But for Vico metaphor and the like constitute a fundamental category through which at a
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The nature of children is such that by the ideas and names of the men, women, and things 
they have known first, they afterward apprehend and name all the men, women, and things that 
bear any resemblance or relation to the first.241
Small children and Vico's poetic man share a lack of artificiality; in both, self- 
consciousness is not especially strong, yet at the same time they combine ingenuousness 
with an extraordinary degree of inventiveness and artfulness. At first, these two modes 
might seem incompatible, as reflective deliberation often plays a decisive part in the 
making and appreciation of the verbal and visual arts, while man in the childlike state of 
the poetic age seems entirely unaware of any artifice in his mythologies. Vico's poetic 
man behaves as if the fables of his imagination are indistinguishable from the natural 
forces they are meant to mimic. But it is his very lack of self-conscious reflection that 
makes these metaphorical constructions believable for him. Vico's imaginative univer­
sals are very different from allegory, in that they do not effectively try  to evoke similar­
ity to the objects they represent: they try to be them. For this reason, the creation of the 
imaginative universals is less an act of belief in the gods and heroes of fables than an in­
carnation of them in the minds of men; they are archetypes more than individuals in
given stage of development men cannot help viewing reality -  which is for them reality itself, neither mere 
embellishment, nor a repository of secret wisdom, nor the creation of a world parallel to the real world, 
nor an addition to, or distortion of, reality, harmless or dangerous, deliberate or involuntary: but it is 
natural, inevitably transient, but, at the time of its birth or growth, the only possible, way of perceiving, 
interpreting, explaining that is open to men of that particular place and time, at that particular stage of 
their culture. Such ways of speech, he supposes, only later become artificial or decorative, because men 
have by then forgotten how they came into being and the purposes for which they were originally used". 
128.
241 NS 2 0 6 .1 am reminded by this that for little children in Hungary all adults are either called bacsi (uncle) 
or nini (auntie). They do this without the slightest affectation and naturally think all adults are either one 
or the other; they could not possibly understand it being any other way.
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their own right. An 'ideal' hero is a later product of humans in which natural attributes 
are consciously compared to a fictional model.242
Conclusion
Vico's concept of the imaginative universals seeks to explain the origin of myths 
and what they meant to their creators. He says that they were inspired by powerful 
forces of nature, and because they were deeply felt reactions to strong physical events 
men were not able to distinguish between the literal and figurative meaning of the 
metaphors they created.243 The emotional space which these ideas occupied seems to 
have precluded any possibility of conscious reflection. The question, however, obviously 
arises how man was able to form these thoughts before he had a well-developed vocabu­
lary with which to think them. One answer from language theory is that man possesses 
an a priori capacity for language, and another from developmental psychology is that 
mythic archetypes are somehow deeply embedded in our cognitive faculties. After all, 
does not the ability to form the first fables strongly suggest an innate faculty of reason? 
That could be, but it is probably not what Vico meant. For in his constructivist episte- 
mology, based on the verum-factum principle, experience is fundamental to cognition, 
and the main idea of Vico's imaginative universals is that the basic concepts of thought 
stem directly from the type of body human beings possess and the m anner in which it 
interacts with the environment. The paucity of references in the New Science to the soul 
or mention of an essential human nature would seem to support this. Another question
242 One perspective of reading history is that it ultimately ossifies into myth; Vico would say the opposite 
is true. His idea is that as belief in myth degenerates, the notion that history is literal intensifies. When this 
occurs, historical interpretation loses its 'narrative' character and becomes nominally 'factual'.
243 NS 379. For poetic man Jove was in everything, hence the expression "All things are full of Jove" {Iovis 
omnia plena).
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that detains the reader is how the imaginative universals can combine to form a vocabu­
lary from which other thoughts are generated, for in order to achieve a narrative func­
tion it would appear that there must be elements of a cognitive 'grammar', whether they 
are conscious or not, that allow one to distinguish between particulars and universals, 
for there could be very little reasoning if the two were not separate. Vico explains that 
this vocabulary originates from the relationship among the fables themselves, but never 
mentions a specific cause that permits the organization of the fables into a narrative 
structure. It could be that Vico intended to say, but never quite spelled out, that the very 
nature of the human body provides this organizing principle. This might explain why so 
many of the fables he discusses are founded on metaphors inspired by the body, and 
their emotional content provides a structure from which narrative can emerge. I offer 
this interpretation because Vico never suggests that the source of the vera narratio is 
anything other than man's own imagination. For Vico, man's fables are not divinely in­
spired; rather, his fables inspire a sense of the divine. For in the age of gods, before ab­
stract thinking, imagination does not stand in opposition to rational thought, and gen­
eral terms that stand for the classes of things contained in the imaginative universals 
still do not exist.
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6The architects of reason
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the abstract concepts which Vico called the intelligible univer­
sals.244 The last chapter described the poetic archetypes that dominated thinking in the 
age of the gods; theocracies were the form of government and social institutions were 
rudimentary. In the age which followed, the heroic age, feudal institutions began to ap­
pear and dominant individuals formed families that acquired political power. It is well to 
keep in mind, though, that Vico does not draw a very distinct boundary between the two 
ages. There is a gradual transformation from one phase to the next and, as should be ex­
pected, the things which give character to one or the other are sometimes contempora­
neous. Here, will be examined the origin of these concepts, how the transition from the 
imaginative universals was accompanied by new political institutions, and the role of the 
intelligible universals in man's socialisation. Of particular concern will be the role that 
imaginative thought exercised in the making of these new ideas and concepts. It will be 
argued that the two types of thinking share common ground in natural references and 
represent an unbroken process of cognitive development, rather than a punctuated 
transformation of mind.
244 Vico's term for them includes the intelligible universals, the abstract universals (universale astratti), 
the intelligible genera, the rational universals, and the philosophic universals.
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While natural phenomena are given human expression in Vico's imaginative uni­
versals, the intelligible universals open a new door to experience by describing the sub­
jective understanding of human experience. Vico's intelligible universals are abstract 
concepts, whereas the imaginative universals render natural attributes in idealized 
form. Apart from the difference in content of the two types of universals, the most strik­
ing contrast between them is the nature of their thought processes: thought with the 
imaginative universals seems to be characterised by a series of static images which fol­
low one another in succession, while the intelligible universals appear to perm it an un­
interrupted flow of fluid images, owing to the common mental dictionary that was suffi­
ciently advanced by then to establish connections among a very large body of forms. The 
other distinguishing feature of this period is that self-conscious reflection occurs, and 
tied up with this is a greater exercise of judgment. As the type and number of institu­
tions increase, so do the decisions needed to effectively maintain them rise in complex­
ity. Vico binds the appearance of rational thought tightly to the idea of utility:
The nature of institutions is nothing but their coming into being (nascimento) at certain 
times and in certain guises. Whenever the time and guise are thus and so, such and not otherwise 
are the institutions that come into being.245
Compared to the extensive discussion devoted to the imaginative universals, Vico 
wrote but comparatively little on the intelligible universals; there are nearly twice as 
many references to the former than the latter. Does this give one reason to think he con­
sidered the imaginative universals more im portant in the shaping of the mind? Or, it 
could be that for Vico their importance was not in question, but their genesis remained
245 NS 147.
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to some extent inscrutable to him. The obscurity of his explanations of how the transi­
tion was made to abstract thinking would seem to support this idea.
The origin o f the intelligible universals
This passage describes the creation of an intelligible universal, in this case anger, 
from an image of the imaginative universals (blood boiling in the heart). The new con­
cept is a synthetic creation composed from a poetic phrase: it has a greater economy of 
expression and specificity that was not achievable in the language of poets. However, it 
should not be overlooked that Vico's example also underscores the essential objectivity 
of the metaphorical phrase, and the metaphorical basis of our 'objective' language:
From all this it appears to have been demonstrated that, by a necessity of human nature, 
poetic style arose before prose style; just as, by the same necessity, the fables, or imaginative uni­
versals, arose before the rational or philosophic universals, which were formed through the me­
dium of prose speech. For after the poets had formed poetic speech by associating particular 
ideas, as we have fully shown, the peoples went on to form prose speech by contracting into a sin­
gle word, as into a genus, the parts which poetic speech had associated. Take for example the po­
etic phrase "the blood boils in my heart," based on a property natural, eternal, and common to all 
mankind. They took the blood, the boiling, and the heart, and made of them a single word, as it 
were a genus, called in Greek stomachos, in Latin ira, and in Italian collera. Following the same 
pattern, hieroglyphs and heroic letters [or emblems] were reduced to a few vulgar letters, as gen­
era assimilating innumerable diverse articulate sounds; a feat requiring consummate genius. By 
means of these vulgar genera, both of words and letters, the minds of the peoples grew quicker 
and developed powers of abstraction, and the way was thus prepared for the coming of the phi­
losophers, who formed intelligible genera".246
246 NS 460.
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Whereas the poetic mind was largely expressive of sense perceptions (in particu­
lar sight), the heroic mind (associated with the intelligible universals) is more reflective. 
The intelligible universal represents a turn of mind wherein ideas are abstracted from 
concrete particulars. Are these minds entirely distinct, or does the heroic mind share 
characteristics of the poetic mind? The following suggests that the second interpretation 
is correct:
This axiom gives us the universal principle of etymology in all languages: words are car­
ried over from bodies and from the properties of bodies to signify the institutions of the mind and 
spirit247
Vico means that the universals, whether the imaginative or the intelligible, are ul­
timately grounded in the body, and as their universality is assured by this connection to 
the same human neurological constitution, there is a foundation on which to establish a 
science of human thought.248 And because different peoples share certain basic cultural 
characteristics,249 as they do a physiognomy, it would appear that the unveiling of men­
tal processes is coupled with the ability to understand the mental states of others: man 
acquires introspection through participation in and observation of the behaviour of oth­
ers. Of course, there are more factors than this that are needed to explain the origin of 
self-consciousness, but, as a start, it seems reasonable to suggest that without the direct 
participation in communal life it would be impossible for human beings to develop that 
sense. And it is essentially Vico's position that the mind is constituted by the accumula­
247 NS 236 & 237.
248 Another way of saying this could be 'the extent to which we share a human nature is the extent to 
which we share a body'. To counter the objection that the intelligible universals relate to abstract, and not 
physical notions, I would point out that even when we are discussing the components of institutions the 
language is often couched in physical, if not bodily, terms: "the long arm of the law", "the health of the 
body politic", "the pulse of public opinion", and "the voice of the people". Furthermore, notions judged 
nonsensical typically have no way of being expressed by bodily metaphors.
249 NS 9 ,10,11, & 12. The first institutions, divine and human, which are the principles of humanity, are 
for Vico religion, marriage, and burial.
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tion of private and public experiences in memory that are acquired in social activities: 
mind is not something that can exist separate from the sources of thought that nurture 
i t  It almost goes without saying that the Cartesian view that a faculty of mind exists that 
has “privileged access"250 to its functions, is wholly alien to Vico's thought. There is no 
'theatre of the mind' in the New Science that has introspective awareness apart from the 
phenomenal world.
The transition from the imaginative to the intelligible universals
The intelligible universals are the first abstract concepts, and by that is meant 
they are products of thought that represent the distillation, as it were, of an 'essential' or 
'universal' property that is to be found in many particular instances. The identification of 
common properties among things permitted the formation of these universal ideas, 
which opened an immaterial world for man to discover:
This axiom is the principle of poetic sentences, which are formed by feelings of passion 
and emotion, whereas philosophic sentences are formed by reflection and reasoning. The more 
the latter rise toward universals, the closer they approach the truth; the more the former descend 
to particulars, the more certain they become.251
Universals are, by definition, things that can be transferred and understood 
across time and cultures, and this is true of Vico's imaginative and intelligible universals. 
The transitivity of the first type, however, seems to be more easily explained than that of 
the second. This is because the imaginative universals rely on the metaphorical descrip­
tion of physical characteristics, which are readily apparent to people everywhere, while
250 This well-known meaningful expression is from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept o f Mind [1949] (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984].
251 NS 219.
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the intelligible universals, which illustrate abstract concepts, depend on the existence of 
institutional structures for their confirmation, and these, of course, require symbols to 
be manifested.252 Vico offers an interesting solution to how the transition from the po­
etic to the rational was accomplished by suggesting that, at the beginning of the heroic 
age, symbols mediated the transfer of meaning from signs to abstract concepts: the 
imagines in the Roman Empire, the use of monumental architecture in the ancient Near 
East, Egypt and Rome, and public insignia everywhere were designed to maintain order 
and values, create roles and positions, and inspire patriotic sentiments:
The second kind of speech, corresponding to the age of heroes, was said by the Egyptians 
to have been spoken by symbols. To these may be reduced the heroic emblems, which must have 
been the mute comparisons which Homer calls semata [the signs in which the heroes wrote). In 
consequence they must have been metaphors, images, similitudes, or comparisons, which, having 
passed into articulate speech, supplied all the resources of poetic expression.253
Even though the objects of reference are different for the two kinds of universals, 
the way in which the mind extrapolates personal meaning from them might be essen­
tially the same. For in the case of the former, a metaphor is 'completed' by the listener 
with details that relate to personal experiences, and in this way it is made relevant.254 
While for the latter, abstract concepts cannot be compared to personal experiences be­
cause their contextual reference is based on institutions, which are by their nature pub-
252 Obvious examples of this, that correspond to Vico's first three institutions, are ritual clothing and de­
vices in the case of religion and marriage, and prescribed behaviour in the observance of burial rites.
253 NS 438.
254 See A. Ortony, "Why Metaphors Are Necessary and Not Just Nice", in Educational Theory, v. 25, n. 1, Win­
ter, 1975,45-53. Ortony claims that when we understand a statement we essentially "reconstruct" the 
event in a way that relates it to our personal experiences. This process of completing a mental picture is 
called "particularization", which allows for comprehension of distant phenomena without the necessity of 
literal reference.
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lie. However, the intelligible universals are understood by individuals by virtue of their 
participation in institutional structures, because institutions provide the conceptual ref­
erence points, and at this time individuals acquire a 'public' persona that interacts with 
those institutions, in the same way that the imaginative universals are related to nature.
For Vico, civil society is the flower of philosophical reason, but it is rooted in the 
'non-rational' foundation of religion for its establishment and preservation, for Vico be­
lieves that religion is the only power strong enough to ensure civil order. That this 'non- 
rational' institution should be the grounding of social order contrasts with the thinking 
of much of the Enlightenment, in which it is easy to find a tension between man and god 
that is absent in the New Science. It might be that this is simply a case of Vico paying lip- 
service to orthodox religion, but it might also be a signal that Vico thought the main pur­
pose of religious ritual, in the age of man, was to provide an outlet for the imagination to 
operate in a controlled 'rational' environment. This would be in keeping with his stated 
beliefs that the imagination plays a strong role in shaping even rational thought, and it 
certainly makes sense in light of the absence in his writings to any Messianic reference. 
In would appear that Vico is saying that religion, especially the mystical variety, satisfies 
a human need to experience the fantastic, but at the same time it ensures that it is exer­
cised within the confines of reason. Within this context, it should not be forgotten that 
Vico was a child of the Baroque and, as the central element in Baroque aesthetics, the 
imagination is employed to persuade the intellect and direct the emotions to attain reli­
gious understanding, which, of course, is also a form of social control.
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The intelligible universals and man's socialisation
The intelligible universals are associated with new personalities that replace the 
immobility of the static types associated with the imaginative universals.255 New social 
environments, with increasingly complex roles, required something else to replace the 
worn-out formula of the previous age, in which people and animals "betray the same 
constancy of disposition" 256 The old prototypes display a single nature, usually in con­
formity with the animals they are compared to, and rarely do they exhibit more than two 
character dispositions. But now the heroes, who have semi-divine status, and from 
whom the nascent noble class will claim ascendancy, replace the gods in the minds of 
men as the arbitrators of their destinies. This new theoretic culture is marked by a stan­
dard of reasoning that values utility more than mysticism (but does not abolish it by any 
means, for the reasons given above), whereby its institutions encourage practical solu­
tions to problems rather than chiefly relying on the incantations of priests. What could 
possibly have caused this shift in priorities? For one thing, it could have been due to the 
need to live in closer proximity to others, which was a result of the new feudal-like order 
that Vico says characterizes this period, and which fostered the development of self- 
consciousness as a means to function more effectively in a social reality that had more 
restrictive physical boundaries but also a less constrictive mental environment. This 
would mean that the 'average' person could, and had to, rely on his own wits more so 
than someone who in a 'natural' environment was powerless to control the forces of na-
255 An analogy in art from the period that coincides with Vico's classical heroic age can be seen in the de­
velopment of Archaic Greek statues where the rigidity of the earlier versions of the kouroi (youths) and 
korai (maidens) give way to more naturalistic and less formalized examples of the human body. Just so, 
with the mind, there is an impulse to surpass the restrictive limits imposed by formulaic constructions.
256 This phrase, by Snell, refers to the single-aspect character traits which the Homeric heroes demon­
strate. See Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind in Greek Philosophy and Literature [1953] (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1982). 201.
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ture around him, and who depended on religion to affect it and priests to interpret its
signs.
The language that this new social reality required was based more on civic than 
natural terms. In the 'unsophisticated' social environment of the poetic mind, successful 
actions had almost exclusively utilitarian value, and natural referents provided not only 
the content but also the context of thought. The same cannot be said of the abstract 
mind, for its terms are often more normative than descriptive. This happens because the 
subjects of actions, these 'proto-individuals', themselves determine how they will be af­
fected by their environment, and that is very different from being unconsciously shaped 
by it. One of the most important effects of the employment of normative terms is that 
man acquired a personal sense of moral responsibility, as he became a maker of words 
which recognised an order in his thinking that could stand alone without nature. The 
new system was more economical and efficient, at least for the new civic and urban en­
vironments, and it reflected man's concern with his place in the world and not only the 
world he had a place in.257 Vico believed that through social constructions, institutions 
and their material artefacts, that further concepts develop; for Vico, thought does not 
exist before the language is created that allows those thoughts. How does he explain that 
this process starts? Unfortunately, he doesn't exactly. My understanding of Vico's mean­
ing on this point is that the metaphor-based thinking of the poetic age could not 'keep
257 An example of how language became more 'synthetic' is this from NS 175: "Varro had the diligence to 
collect thirty thousand names of gods -  for the Greeks counted that many. These were related to as many 
needs of the physical, moral, economic, or civil life of the earliest times". Their characteristics were later 
integrated and their number reduced to the twelve classical Olympian gods. This is an example of how the 
formation of a class concept was more economical and satisfied "fit" in an increasingly complex society. In 
evolution theory the requirement of economy of fit states that if one action or term can stand for or sym­
bolize others then its utility will be more extensive and intensive than it would otherwise have been if it 
were local and restricted.
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up' with the sheer number of new relations that a civil society engendered. Here is an 
example. When things are created they are compared to other things and their associa­
tions then become the way other things are interpreted. The metaphors of the 'course' of 
history or the 'flow' of thought could not have been employed if there had not been a 
'road' or 'fountain' to compare them to. And these are, of course, social constructs. The 
objection might be raised that the comparison could have been to a 'course' of water, 
like a river, or a 'flow', like a welling up of tears, but in these cases there would not have 
been present a goal or end, which is implicit in the idea of a road, and that of a container, 
with a fountain. So when we speak of history as a 'course' we have in some degree 
adopted the assumption that it has a goal or end, and time as a 'flow' that culminates in a 
vast pool of cosmic experience. So, it would appear correct to say that the natural and 
social-based metaphors are similar up to a point, but that later the distinctions between 
the literal aspects of their referents determine the kinds of thought one might be able to 
have: only the road, and not the river, can serve as a metaphor for a 'journey', because 
one has a purpose or direction and the other does not. Vico's primary insight into the 
origin of the abstract universals is that socially-constructed artefacts perm it concepts 
that natural ones do not.
It is unlikely that a society would have made the transition from one type of 
thinking to another if the needs of that society had not radically changed; something ad­
vantageous must have been gained. The question is what the intelligible universals of­
fered that the imaginative universals did not. It seems that they were able to condense 
many characteristics, as was shown in the example of the gods being reduced from thou­
sands to a few, into a manageable number that did not depend on intimate knowledge of
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many particulars to have meaning. In this way, it is conceivable that mutual understand­
ing of abstract concepts could transpire within a stratified society composed of indi­
viduals with widely varying experiences and backgrounds. But even though the older 
form of thought had lost its power for social organization, it still remained visible in reli­
gious structures and 'mystical' thinking and provided a context for social cohesiveness 
that the structure of abstract thinking was never to entirely replace, even today. And 
that is why it would be a mistake to think that the transition from the imaginative to the 
intelligible universals was sequential and not transitive: for though the imaginative 
mind, by itself, had functional utility, what it acquires in relation to the abstract mind is 
symbolic utility; it does not lose its importance, rather its role is changed.258 Vico shows 
that where one type of thinking ends the other begins, and that the evidence for a con­
nection between the two minds is that they share a foundation of root metaphors that 
undergo transformations.
Conclusion
The imaginative and intelligible universals are the language products of univer­
sally-shared social structures, rather than evidence of an innate capacity for language, a 
lingua mentis. The distinction is important because it underscores Vico's belief that our 
intellectual development is essentially acquired and not the expression of innate or deep 
'hard-wired' structures. Other than the primal emotions, which he mentions earlier on in
258 The distinction between utilitarian and symbolic utility is not at all neat. For example, in art trompe- 
I'osil can contribute to a pleasing effect in design or decor, and nothing more, but it can also serve the pur­
pose of establishing architectural harmony and symmetry in building that were it absent would cause the 
structure to suffer an inconclusiveness in its proportions that would render it less effective in its everyday 
workability. False doors and windows in some buildings can become just as important as "real" ones if 
they provide balance that was otherwise lacking. Their functional importance is guaranteed not by their 
structural contribution but by their representational integrity.
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the New Science in the descriptions of the beasts, there is little in Vico's account of man 
that could be considered inherent to his nature. And because of this, Vico's discussion of 
the language universals also seems to express, albeit obliquely at times, something of his 
view of human nature overall. For the belief that language and thought are acquired in 
the process of 'acting out' our roles in society, and are not innate, would seem to indicate 
that he wanted to draw attention away from the traditional Christian doctrine of a di­
vinely-created being, possessed with an eternal soul and a rational nature, and focus it 
instead on an image of man as a socially-constructed creature. Such an idea, obviously, 
would not be easy to accommodate in the church-dominated intellectual arena of early 
eighteenth-century Naples, and if his intention was to challenge this core belief of the 
church it is easy to understand why Vico would avoid arousing the ire of ecclesiastical 
authority, by being placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum (List of Prohibited Books) 
or worse, and let his reader come to his own conclusions. However, though Vico remains 
notoriously cloudy on this subject, one can surely point out that what passes for human 
nature in Vico is not a combination of ontologically necessary characteristics, even 
though they are universally present. What Vico wants to say is that the reason why peo­
ple everywhere perform the same actions, say the same things, and think the same 
thoughts is that there are similar favourable responses to meeting similar environ­
mental conditions, and not because their 'nature' requires them to comply to a certain 
law or code. From this perspective, one might rather adopt the term 'human behaviours' 
over 'human nature', or at least open the door to the possibility of'hum an natures'. Vico 
would say that those behaviours or natures, although they are not metaphysical necessi­
ties, do seem to follow a universal pattern, which he calls the ideal eternal history. He be­
lieves the identification of this pattern allows for a scientific understanding of the how
and why people behave as they do in history, but he is careful to show that it is not the 
pattern that makes people what they are, in the sense of a pre-ordained order, but that 
this pattern is replicated everywhere not by necessity but choice: in other words, people 
make the pattern, the pattern does not make people. Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that the ontology of the imaginative and intelligible universals is somehow 
insufficiently explained by Vico's account of utilitarian responses to environmental chal­
lenges, principally because it does not explain the uniformity of the content of concepts 
with the same general authority that, for example, in evolution theory natural selection 
is the cause of change in nature. Something more than what Vico expresses overtly in the 
New Science is needed to explain how the ideas contained in complex rationality achieve 
their universality. Though Vico's explanation of the ontology of the thought universals 
may need further argument, his description of them is unarguably attractive. All things 
considered, perhaps Vico's greatest achievement in his treatm ent of the imaginative and 
intelligible universals is in showing how: imaginative thinking has a role to play in ra­
tional thought; that the rational is not discontinuous with the non-rational; and that the 
non-rational is not synonymous with the irrational.
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7A practice of wisdom
The world o f nations continues the world o f nature
The focus of this chapter is Vico's account of rational humanity. The third phase of hu­
man thought comes after the poetic and heroic stages and before the 'barbarism of re­
flection' reduces humanity to its earlier beastly condition. For Vico, this stage of rational 
humanity is "the true and proper nature of man".259 In a sense, this corso represents the 
culmination of history, with the qualification, of course, that 'progress' in Vico is always 
relative to his theory of anacyclosis, the cyclical movement of history. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, rationality, for Vico, is in important ways a continuation of imagi­
native thinking, but it also shares a precision and clarity of thought not unlike Descartes' 
"clear and distinct ideas". However, Vico's idea of rationality differs in im portant ways 
from a Rationalist conception of thought. For Vico believed that the 'non-rational' ele­
ments of feelings and emotions continue to exert a powerful influence even on the shape 
of logical thinking, and that it is impossible to ever entirely separate them. Vico's term  
for the establishment of institutions in nature is the "world of nations", and the nature of 
those institutions is largely determined by the type of thinking which is dominant at a 
given time. This may appear a self-evident observation from the point of view afforded 
today by cultural anthropology, but in Vico's time belief in a golden age when humanity
259 NS 973. Vico also describes rational humanity in 326,927, and 924.
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had attained fulfilment was still a current idea in some places. What Vico wants to em­
phasise in his account of rationality is that it did not spring Athena-like fully formed 
from the head of Zeus, a discontinuous leap from pre-conceptual thought, rather that it 
has its roots in the 'world of nature', and it is there that the foundations of thought will 
be discovered:
But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from our­
selves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond all question: that the 
world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be 
found within the modifications of our own human mind.260
These modifications of the mind sustain the human race from its potentiality to 
actuality, to borrow the Aristotelian language of entelechy, which Vico seems to have 
adopted when he says that the essential nature of man is manifested in its fully realized 
state. When Vico says that the rational phase of man is mankind tutta spiegata, com­
pletely developed, this is his meaning, and he explains that this unfolding reveals "the 
true and proper nature of man":
It is true that men have themselves made this world of nations (and) we took this as the 
first incontestable principle of our Science, since we despaired of finding it from the philosophers 
and philologists, but this world without doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite 
contrary, and always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves; which 
narrow ends, made means to serve wider ends, it has always employed to preserve the human 
race upon this earth.261
In these passages, Vico's assertion that mankind is the cause of the 'world of na­
tions' means that there was never an Eden, an Arcadia, or any other such oasis that was
260 NS 331.
261 NS 1108.
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not of man's making, and this assertion is not, at least in most places, as controversial 
today as it was in his age. However, his characterisation of rational humanity as "the 
true and proper nature of man" is an idea that conflicts with the absence of teleology in 
the principles that guide developmental evolution today, as it implies that there is a 
metaphysical source of causation separate from simple adaptation to nature.
The nature o f fully developed human reason
Developed rationality is the mark of thinking in Vico's human age, which follows 
the poetic or divine and the heroic. It is distinguished from the other two by self- 
conscious reflection.262 When Vico speaks of 'reason' and 'wisdom' in the New Science it 
is often in relation to utility and compatible notions of socially appropriate behaviour, 
such as observance of ritual. In this sense, his meaning of rationality is that of a practical 
understanding of the world. He does not refer to the 'depth' of understanding, nor of an 
'essence' (either particular or general) of mind, for his interest in 'truth ' seems to have 
been fundamentally concerned with its instrumental value. From this perspective, ra­
tionality appears as a coping mechanism that ensures man's survival in the world of na­
ture: it is not an entity detached from the world with a self-serving purpose to 'know it­
self:
The natural equity offully developed human reason is a practice of wisdom in affairs of 
utility, since wisdom in its broad sense is nothing but the science of making such use of things as 
their nature dictates.263
262 When Vico refers to the thinking that belongs to any of these ages, he means that it was the most com­
mon at that time, not that only it existed then. It follows that in the human age not everyone was 'rational'.
263 NS 326.
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Vico's "practice of wisdom" is very close to an Aristotelian concept of phronesis, a 
practical wisdom of affairs in life that is intrinsically related to virtuous action and ob­
servance of ritual. It is not simply a theoretical understanding of the world, but requires 
action as well as thought for its realization.
Wisdom is the faculty which commands all the disciplines by which we acquire all the 
sciences and arts that make up humanity.... Man, in his proper being as man, consists of mind and 
spirit, or, if we prefer, of intellect and will. It is the function of wisdom to fulfil both these parts in 
man, the second by way of the first, to the end that by a mind illuminated by knowledge of the 
highest institutions, the spirit may be led to choose the best The highest institutions in the uni­
verse are those turned toward and conversant with God; the best are those which look to the 
good of all mankind.264
As previously noted, in Vico, human nature passes through three major phases -  
the divine, the heroic, and the human -  but it is to the third phase, "rational humanity, 
which is the true and proper nature of man",265 that he assigns fulfilment to the human 
journey:
The third was human nature, intelligent and hence modest, benign, and reasonable, rec­
ognizing for laws conscience, reason, and duty.266
Vico's reason for how we can speak of a common humanity, in spite of wide di­
vergences in social development and forms of reasoning, is because of the providential 
pattern that all peoples in the world follow, for this ensures that separate human identi­
ties coalesce into the same universal history. The initial impetus for human socialization, 
Vico says, was that the fear of offending an all-powerful creator led to elaborate forms of
264 NS 364.
265 NS 973.
266 NS 918.
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ritual performed in the hope of placating its wrath. But in Vico's third phase, the provi­
dential order of universal history is fulfilled through reason's appeal to virtue and jus­
tice, as ends in themselves. And as a corollary to this development, as rationality be­
comes the norm of thought, the gods themselves are imagined to behave more virtu­
ously, in contrast to their former selfish and capricious natures. It would appear, thus, 
that mankind confirms the idea he has formed of himself in the gods he imagines:
All this was ordained by providence to the end that, since virtuous actions were no longer 
prompted by religious sentiments as formerly, philosophy should make the virtues understood in 
their idea, and by dint of reflection thereon, if men were without virtue they should at least be 
ashamed of their vices.267
Vico's rationality is effective in forming beliefs and taking actions, but he also be­
lieves that shame and fear must be retained as forces in society for those who cannot be 
moved by rational persuasion. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that Vico thought 
we could possess the capacity to behave rationally, but not that we were naturally ra ­
tional creatures. The ubiquity of rational forms of thought in the human age is due to the 
presence of certain institutions (e.g. the law, political legitimacy) that inspire and nour­
ish reason, rather than the possession of an innate sense of reason. It is very much in the 
whole scheme of history in the New Science, in particular the concept of the corsi and ri- 
corsi, that when ideas and beliefs cease to serve a purpose they become redundant and 
are replaced. And if that means also having to stop behaving 'rationally', then reason it­
self is abandoned and societies adopt or revert to 'irrational' behaviour. The objection 
could be made that such 'irrational' behaviour is itself evidence of rationality because its 
purpose is to promote in some way the survivability of the species, but Vico's sense of
267 NS 1101.
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the rational was restricted to the kind of thought and behaviour that contributed to civil 
society, not mere animal survival. The defining activity of Vico's mind seems to be that of 
making continuous self-modifications in order to maintain and promote the human race. 
It is hard not to compare it, however reductive an impression that may leave, with a tool. 
If it is a 'm irror of nature' and accurately represents the world, then it does so in relation 
to its utility, not because its ability to faithfully reflect the nuances of nature has any in­
trinsic value. In keeping with William James's famous quip that "truth is what works", 
Vico seems to be saying that our 'truth' is tied into our beliefs, and that utility is the ul­
timate judge of veracity.
Knowing human nature
It is hard to know exactly what Vico meant by saying we could enter into the 
minds of others of different times and places,268 nonetheless it is unlikely that he in­
tended that intuition was enough to satisfy a standard in scientific inquiry: the standard 
of objectivity would be established by observation of universal patterns of behaviour.269 
Vico wanted to 'enter into' the minds of previous generations to understand their con­
trolling myths, intended as their social norms and belief systems, but probably not with 
the expectation of discovering detailed particulars about a culture's material or ideologi­
268 See NS 331 and Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, "Vico nowhere, 
so far as I know, fully or exactly explains the way in which men understand other men -  ‘know their 
minds’, grasp their goals, outlooks, ways of thinking, feeling, acting. He does not account for our knowl­
edge of other selves -  individual or collective, living or dead -  by invoking the language of empathy, or 
analogical reasoning, or intuition, or participation in the unity of the World Spirit. That has been left to his 
interpreters. He rests his case on his conviction that what men have made, other men, because their minds 
are those of men, can always, in principle, 'enter into'"., 47.
269 See Joseph Mali, Mythistory: The Making of Modern Historiography (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 2003), "Having duly recognized the fact that because of this [mental] distance an immediate entry 
into their alien culture by purely intuitive and merely ‘imaginative’ means, is impossible, he sought to dis­
cover in their cultural performances certain moral codes, or 'principles' of behaviour, which are still un­
derstandable to us". 6-7.
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cal artefacts. Here is a key concept of the New Science upon which Vico stakes so much of 
his claims for having achieved a 'science' of human history, the truth and certainty of 
which is attained by his method of philological reconstruction. There seem to be two 
main ways of making sense of this concept, which I shall call the 'strong' and the 'weak' 
versions; one is more speculative and the other more empirical. The strong version can 
be interpreted that we could experience the very same thought processes that our ances­
tors had by the exercise offantasia. This admittedly metaphysical interpretation, which 
sometimes borders on the mystical, closely resembles the Verstehen and simulation the­
ory traditions advanced by Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber, and R.G. Collingwood. In them, 
the imaginative skills and empathetic relationship of the philosopher of history for past 
societies are 'subjective' instruments as im portant to his research as the mastery o f'ob­
jective' tools like bibliographical detail and knowledge of the material culture. In this in­
terpretation, Vico faces the same sort of indictment that Weber faced when his critics 
alleged that he "confuses what is simply a technique for framing hypotheses with the 
logical character of the evidence for such hypotheses".270 The other way of reading 
Vico's meaning is that he thought we could enter as far as the antechamber (and not the 
salle d'honneurl) of the past and intellectually assess the underlying social structures 
and principles of causal development of civilisations not our own, but not that we could 
relive another period of history.271 In this 'weaker' interpretation we would say that the 
'mind' being entered into was a blueprint of another society's construction rather than
270 Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, Inc., 1990), 112.
271 The metaphor could be extended to the point of conceiving of the movement into the mind of the past 
as a kind of Platonic cave in reverse. Instead of the deluded prisoners receiving enlightenment by looking 
outside the cave, we have in this case a situation whereby we receive enlightenment (of our origins) by 
looking back into the darkness of the 'abyss of time'. How much we will be able to see, and how much we 
can make sense of that, will depend to a large extent on the fantasia, or imagination, we possess and the 
plausibility of our interpretations based on facts.
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an individual consciousness. Whatever interpretation is closer to the truth, it seems rea­
sonable to suppose that, even though he was not a methodical theorist, Vico intended to 
claim a place for fantasia, or the imagination, alongside more traditional methods of his­
torical analysis. While it would be a mistake to believe he was arguing that fantasia was 
superior to logical analysis as an historical tool, the importance he placed on it in the 
construction and reconstruction of thinking cannot be ignored. Vico's fervent insistence 
in planting the concept of imaginative reconstruction in knowledge seems to borrow 
freely of a Baroque aesthetic that requires the active imaginative participation of the in­
terpreter in order to fully experience the meaning of the work. We will never overcome 
an anachronistic reading of history, Vico tells us, unless we employ fan tasia to enter into 
the minds of the people who preceded us -  for we must understand w hat purpose insti­
tutions served fo r  them, not what purpose they would serve in a society like our own. 
Fantasia is aided by philology to ascertain the details of the ancient accounts and by phi­
losophy to verify the conceptual coherence of the ideas which engendered the genera­
tion of institutions.
Vico's aim in reconciling philosophy and philology seems, at least in part, to have 
been an attem pt to circumvent the kind of confrontation or dualism that obtains when 
particular and universal truths are kept apart in separate ontological realms:
Philosophy contemplates reason, whence comes knowledge of the true; philology ob­
serves that of which human choice is author, whence comes consciousness of the certain.272
This same axiom shows how the philosophers failed by half in not giving certainty to 
their reasonings by appeal to the authority of the philologians, and likewise how the latter failed 
by half in not taking care to give their authority the sanction of truth by appeal to the reasoning of
272 N S 138.
127
the philosophers. If they had done this they would have been more useful to their common­
wealths and they would have anticipated us in conceiving this Science.273
What was Vico's meaning of scienza and the co-terminus coscienza? For Vico, 
scienza was 'the true' (z7 vero], for it contains universal and eternal truths, and he associ­
ates it with philosophy. Coscienza, conversely, was 'the certain' (z7 certo), and it consists 
of facts and events that are confirmed by evidence; Vico associates it with philology. In 
Vico's epistemology, we can have true knowledge (scienza) of man's creations because 
we have made them, and thus know both their origin and how they were formed, but we 
can have only certain knowledge (coscienza) of the natural world because we have not 
made it, and we were not present at the Creation, so we lack knowledge of how it was 
formed. This, at any rate, is Vico's position, although it is by no means incontestable, for 
there are different traditions that both sustain and deny the knowability of the natural 
world. But, given this stance, how does it have, for Vico, a practical influence on the ex­
ercise of knowledge?
Vico believed that knowledge was a product of the social context in which it was 
formed. As a student of etymology, it almost certainly was not lost on him that the Latin 
word conscientia comes from 'cum' and 'scientia', or knowledge that can be shared with 
others. Consciousness retained this aspect of social wisdom until the Rationalists intro­
duced the individual focus of knowledge, whereby one acquires and possesses it for one­
self rather than building and sharing it collectively.274 For Vico, there is no privileged po­
sition, or view from nowhere, from which we can form opinions and judgments that are 
unaffected by the environment we live in. He would say that conceptual consciousness is
273 N S140.
274 For an extended discussion of this subject, see Philippe Rochat, Others in Mind: Social Origins o f Self- 
Consciousness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009], 50-51.
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the product of social activity and does not exist apart from society.275 The concepts we 
create are products of the activities we engage in, which were themselves conceptual­
ized from previous activities. In Vico's theory, knowledge is acquired through a creative 
process that involves physical activity, and is never 'passively' received, as in a contem­
plative experience. How different, on reflection, from the Platonic idea where the indi­
vidual mind is 'illuminated' by independent eternal forms or ideas which are not in debt 
for their existence to the collective efforts of people in society.
Language and human nature
In the sixth oration on humanistic education that he gave at the University of 
Naples in 1707, Vico discusses how the corrupt nature of man may be made whole by 
the study of the liberal arts and sciences. Language which is inadequate to m eet the 
needs of civilized humanity is one of the divine chastisements that man m ust suffer for 
the sin of Adam, and Vico says that the redress to this punishment is eloquence:
I have enumerated as the punishments for corrupted human nature the inadequacy of 
language, the opinions of the mind, and the passions of the soul. Therefore, the remedies are elo­
quence, knowledge, and virtue.276
Corrupted language contributes to the psychic fragmentation of man, but, Vico 
says, eloquence and rhetoric could bring clarity to our thinking and aid mankind to re­
build its identity:
275 For a similar view of the semantics of natural language, see Ray Jackendoff, Language, Consciousness, 
Culture: Essays on Mental Structure (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2007] 364, where he says 
that social cognition is a product of concepts, as concepts are the products of social relationships.
276 Vico, On Humanistic Education, Oration VI, 129.
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Finally he shows that the third age, that of common men and vernacular languages, coin­
cides with the times of the ideas of a human nature completely developed and hence recognized 
as identical in all men.277
In the third age, Vico's age of men, the human race takes command of language, 
and by mastering this 'tool' it is enabled to consciously participate in the providential 
order and establish civil society:
Human language using words agreed upon by the people, a language of which they are 
absolute lords, and which is proper to the popular commonwealths and monarchical states; a lan­
guage whereby the people may fix the meaning of the laws by which the nobles as well as the 
plebs are bound.278
Vico is saying that words gain their meaning through a communal process of 
agreement, not from individualistic ratiocination:
There is no discipline which needs reason so much less and memory so much more than 
language. In fact, language is based on the common agreement and usage of the people, "among 
whom there is the choice of the rules and norms of speech".279
His position is that the meaning of words and concepts cannot be reduced to a 
set of definitions and rules that remain fixed and unchangeable. On the contrary, he be­
lieved, as meaning holists do today, that the nature of reference is a social phenomenon 
whereby meanings are collectively constructed.280 Furthermore, as parts of a whole sys­
277 G.B. Vico, Autobiography, 171.
278 NS 3.
279 G.B. Vico, Oration VI, 135.
280 See Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988): "Meaning holism 
also runs counter to the great tendency to stress definition as the means by which the meaning of words is 
to be explained or fixed, i.e. counter to that famous stumper "Define your terms!" It has this aspect (which 
is very much stressed by Quine) because a suggestion that at once emerges from holism is that most terms 
cannot be defined -  or, at least, cannot be defined if by a "definition" one means something that is fixed 
once and for all, something that absolutely captures the meaning of the term". 9.
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tem of meanings, the reference they possess exists only in relation to that system, just as 
the meaning or purpose of a bodily part only makes sense in relation to the body as a 
whole.281 Without knowing the context in which a word is spoken, how is its meaning to 
be understood? The view that a word possesses a literal sense, intrinsic to it, supposes 
that historical factors play a negligible (or at least non-determinant) role in our interpre­
tation of statements. Against this view, ahistorical and essentialist, Vico sought to rein- 
vigorate the use of rhetoric in public discourse as a means whereby the articulation of 
concepts was approached with almost scientific precision. Although Vico nowhere di­
rectly states how political discourse should be controlled, in the same way that Plato in 
the Republic or Hobbes in the Leviathan outlined, the absence in his writings of an ap­
peal to scientific or political authority would seem to indicate that in his judgment the 
beliefs upon which the civil state was maintained were best discovered by a communal 
process rather than by dictate or decree. The finding of 'truth ' was an integral part of the 
exercise of power, and in the rhetorical tradition reason is formed from persuasion, and 
for reason to function there must be persuasive discourse.282 When Aristotle says in The 
Art o f Rhetoric that "the objective of rhetoric is judgment"283 it should arouse us to the 
importance it has in the very real dispensation of justice: it is not an innocuous self- 
serving histrionic technique. His opposition to language essentialism and his belief in
281 In the same spirit, I would point out that there's no such thing as an 'accent' for speakers of the same 
community. The distinction arises only when contact is made with speakers from outside their commu­
nity. The 'accent' only exists by virtue of the comparison; otherwise, there is nothing essential about it.
282 The same notion is strikingly similar to the idea expressed by Foucault: "Truth" is linked in a circular 
relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and 
which extend it." See Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 Michel Foucault, 
Colin Gordon (ed.), New York: Pantheon 1980,133.
283 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, trans. by H.C. Lawson-Tancred, London: Penguin Books, 2004,140.
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'meaning holism' is the cornerstone to his belief that rhetoric had an im portant part to 
play in the formation and interpretation of our epistemological concepts.284
If Vico's meaning holism applies to definitions and whole language systems, then 
it seems plausible that the principle would also extend to the political and philosophical 
concepts that belong to any given age. This is reflected in Vico's methodological postu­
late "Doctrines must take their beginning from that of the matters of which they 
treat''.285 Accordingly, as Vico stresses throughout the New Science, the hermeneutic de­
cipherment of a culture's thought and customs will take place primarily through a proc­
ess of historical philology, and this is where he has earned the title of the father of his- 
toricism.286 But if the process of assigning meaning to words and other cultural artefacts 
properly resides in the community that makes them, it would be reasonable to question 
whether even though they might achieve a specificity they would otherwise lack if 
placed within a more cosmopolitan, but also more indefinite, cultural lexicon, without a 
particular local ethos to anchor those interpretations, there might also lie crouched in 
such a methodology a latent distrust of universal philosophical concepts in general. For 
in this case, the subject of philosophical reasoning becomes less a m atter of the ontology 
of cosmopolitan constructions than the acute analysis of provincial customs and cul­
284 See Wittgenstein’s famous discussion of meaning holism in Philosophical Investigations, Part 1, sections 
1 to 36.
285 NS 314, also NS 238, "The order of ideas must follow the order of institutions". Compare this to 
Spinoza's axiom in The Ethics, Part II, Proposition VII, "The order and connection of ideas is the same as 
the order and connection of things". As Battistini noted in his comments to the Second New Science [Mon- 
dadori, 3rd edition, 2001, pp. 1533-1534], Vico, unlike Spinoza, was not a pantheist and ideas for him did 
not mean for him modes of God’s being, but rather man’s. In the English translations the Italian "cose” 
[things] is usually rendered "institutions", thereby stressing the artefactual quality of human endeavour.
286 A definition might serve here, and I find Hacking's definition of historicism as good as any: "But what's 
historicism? Something like this: the theory that social and cultural phenomena are historically deter­
mined, and that each period in history has its own values that are not directly applicable to other epochs. 
In philosophy that implies that philosophical issues find their place, importance and definitions in a spe­
cific cultural milieu." -  Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002], 
52-53.
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tures. Vico would have to address this issue to avoid triviality and narrowness in the 
New Science, and he did that by resorting to a defence of rhetoric as the logical means 
whereby a universal standard of thought and reasoning may be established among sepa­
rate communities.
The role o f rhetoric
The motto of the Royal Society of London (1660) is "Nullius in verba”, or "Take 
nobody's word for it". These words aptly sum up the new tide of intellectual inquiry that 
was sweeping the seventeenth century. Some of the prime targets of the new scientific 
movement were philosophical and ecclesiastical truth claims that were reasoned 
through figurative and intricate language. Rhetoric was a stock-in-trade for Scholastic 
philosophers and ecclesiastical bodies; for them, figurative speech and intricate lan­
guage were as much a part of the process of argumentation for veridical confirmation as 
the results of empirical experiment would become for later 'natural philosophers' (sci­
entists).287 But as the 'Century of Genius' progressed, hypotheses would increasingly be 
believed because they could be confirmed by empirical evidence, not because of elo­
quence and the power of persuasion. And if the presence of philosophy and rhetoric is 
all but absent in today's scientific institutions that is not confirmation that behind the 
scientists' experiments and instruments a multitude of philosophical positions and 
prejudices do not invisibly influence their research topics 288 Many rituals, in the broad­
287 See, for instance, S. Shapin, A Social History o f Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century Eng­
land, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). In this work, Shapin draws attention to the influence 
that social conventions and norms had in shaping the body of admissible evidence.
288 See Nelson Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
Vico's position that rhetoric is crucial in finding the subject matter of research, as well as the effective 
presentation of its findings, seems to resonate in this statement by Goodman: "Any notion of a reality con­
sisting of objects and events and kinds established independently of discourse and unaffected by how they 
are described or otherwise presented must give way to the recognition that these, too, are parts of the
133
est sense of the term, have a basis in both science and superstition, and the 'relics', or 
instruments, associated with them represent the fusion of a material and an ideal, or 
spiritual, dimension. However, not for this is their power or significance weakened, 
rather it is because they incorporate these separate ontological domains that they exer­
cise the force that they do.
What was Vico's position on rhetoric's power to control words? First, it helps to 
disabuse the question of anachronistic notions of science and art, in which there is sup­
posedly a golden standard of complete objectivity for science and a license to interpret 
nature in any way for art.289 For Vico, the use of rhetoric was not an end in itself while 
the attainment of truth was secondary; rather, rhetoric had an essential part to play in 
scientific thought, because as thinking is dependent on words so does the arrangem ent 
and tenor of those words determine the representation of the idea to be expressed. This 
is not to claim that language and thought are one and the same, although they might be, 
but it is to say that, Vico believed, without articulated language structures thought can­
not achieve the same degree of precision and nuance that it could otherwise have.
Would it not have been strange if Vico, the professor of rhetoric, had not taken on a stri­
dent defence of the epistemological value of rhetoric?290 Would it not have been incon­
sistent for him to vitiate the epistemological role of rhetoric when he was professionally 
tied to it and a successor to the Italian Humanist tradition that relied so heavily on it? In
story. If we dismiss measures of referential distance as not matters of fact because they are discourse de­
pendent, we shall have trouble finding features that are matters of fact". 67.
289 This characterisation is, admittedly, parochial or 'Victorian', nevertheless, in large measure, I think it 
reflects common notions of what can or should be expected of'science' and what domains are open to 
'art'.
290 See Joseph Mali, The Rehabilitation of Myth: Vico's 'New Science.' (New York: Cambridge University 
Press): "As a professed rhetorician Vico was more qualified than others to know that it was not enough to 
think differently about human affairs; one had to find alternative patterns of discourse, to invent better 
analogies and more adequate vocabularies with which to convey the new insights". 66.
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that tradition, facts and values did not belong to exclusive domains of the human experi­
ence, but were two parts of the same process that led to the discovery of truth.
But does this mean that for Vico the style of discourse was equivalent to the con­
tent of the meaning? Were the forms thought o f  and the form s o f thought {pace Good­
man) roughly equivalent? Was Vico insisting that rhetoric was a relative cultural product 
or a universal form of communication? He said that rhetoric allows the discovery of new 
subjects through methodical "orderings of thought”: it permitted not just a re­
arrangement of previous known subjects of study, but created new fields of inquiry 
through the judicious manipulation of topics:
Providence gave good guidance to human affairs when it aroused human minds first to 
topics rather than to criticism, for acquaintance with things must come before judgment of them. 
Topics has the function of making minds inventive, as criticism has that of making them e x a c t ... 
Thus the first peoples, who were the children of the human race, founded first the world of the 
arts; then the philosophers, who came a long time afterward and so may be regarded as the old 
men of the nations, founded the world of the sciences, thereby making humanity complete.291
Rhetoric had the power not only to articulate and adjudicate term s of reference, 
but also to create the methodology and topics of discourse. For Vico, rhetoric was not 
simply a means of obtaining agreement in society when universal standards were lack­
ing, instead it was fundamentally the means by which we acquired tru th  through inves­
tigating diverse points of view, weighing evidence, and judging probabilities:
For one can not form a sound judgment of a thing without having complete knowledge of 
it; and topics is the art of finding in anything all that is in it.292
291 NS 498.
292 Vico, Autobiography, 124.
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Even if it were possible to fix and codify scientific findings, bereft of all rhetorical 
illustration, as if they were elements unsusceptible to change, they would still have to be 
reported to and discussed among other scientists. And in order to convince them of her 
findings, a scientist needs more of language than just facts.293 Rhetorical technique can 
clarify those findings so that the interlocutors share a common point of view and have a 
precise means to discuss their observations.294 Without the level of articulation that is 
possible when using the full range of rhetorical tropes, many of a scientist's findings 
would otherwise remain undeciphered clues waiting for a voice to express them.
Vico believed that the loss of rhetoric in public life threatened not only our politi­
cal acumen but the art of reasoning itself: he feared that the body of common topics was 
becoming increasingly narrow and the subjects of scientific discourse were becoming 
opaque and inaccessible to the average 'educated' person. With the estrangement from 
familiar concepts, he feared that a lack of social grounding would begin to characterize 
the public psyche in the later half of the age of men. This is what he called the "barba­
rism of reflection". A society that has lost its common frame of reference cannot main­
293 The same idea is basic to hermeneutic methodologies. See H-G Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd revised 
edition [1960], trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall [New York: Continuum, 2000).: "Since the 
romantic period we can no longer hold the view that, in the absence of immediate understanding, inter­
pretive ideas are drawn, as needed, out of a linguistic storeroom where they are lying ready. Rather, lan­
guage is the universal medium in which understanding occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting. This 
statement does not mean that there is no special problem of expression... the fact is that the problems of 
verbal expression are themselves problems of understanding. All understanding is interpretation, and all 
interpretation takes place in the medium of a language that allows the object to come into words and yet is 
at the same time the interpreter’s own language.... The essential relation between language and under­
standing is seen primarily in the fact that the essence of tradition is to exist in the medium of language, so 
that the preferred object of interpretation is a verbal one". 388-389.
294 See Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, 
Induction and Statistical Inference, 2e (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): "Probability re­
quires probity and approbation but for demonstration we must be able to see and show what is what. The 
primary sense of the word probabilitas is not evidential support but support from respected people". 22- 
23.
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tain its cohesion. Vico believed that our understanding of the world is gained by how we 
talk about it, and if we do not hold that discussion then all we can hope for is a factual 
description of its parts, but not an interpretation, which supplies a meaning to those 
things. That was where the fight was between him and Cartesian rationalism, and that 
will be discussed, among other things, in the next chapter.
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8A deep solitude o f spirit and will
This chapter will examine the end of Vico's third course in the ideal eternal history, the 
age of men, which is distinctly human by virtue of its rationality. The focus will be on 
Vico's definition of philosophical knowledge, which he considered the acme of reason­
ing, and his fight with rationalism, which he thought threatened that knowledge because 
it limited the scope of what could be considered 'knowledge'. Lastly, I will discuss the 
degeneracy and loss of rational thinking, a process Vico called the barbarism o f reflec­
tion, and question why Vico thought that the knowledge contained in the New Science 
was not enough to save mankind from a return to barbarism.
Philosophers: The old men o f the nations
At this time, we are in a place very far from the caves and first beastly men that 
Vico described at the beginning of his history. The human journey in the New Science is 
measured not only in years from the great Flood but also in the distance traversed in 
mankind's mental development. We have seen the unthinking reactions of the bestioni 
transformed into virtuous behaviour and articulate concepts, and it is well to rem em ber 
that in Vico's philosophic-poetic narrative mankind never enjoyed the peace and com­
fort of a pastoral world, a golden age, of the kind that is commonly found in world histo­
ries before him. For Vico, the achievement of rationality was an arduous affair from the 
start, and man's ascent in history is not assured by the direct intervention of a personal
creator, as in the Abrahamic religions, but is mainly his own achievement:
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Thus the first peoples, who were the children of the human race, founded first the world 
of the arts; then the philosophers, who came a long time afterward and so may be regarded as the 
old men of the nations, founded the world of the sciences, thereby making humanity complete.295
Nevertheless, Vico does not attribute the acquisition of civilisation solely to hu­
man effort, but says the foundation of social behaviour is providential design:296
In providing for this property [being social] God so ordained and disposed human institu­
tions that men, having fallen from complete justice by original sin, and while intending almost al­
ways to do something quite different and often quite the contrary -  so that for private utility they 
would live alone like wild beasts -  have been led by this same utility and along the aforesaid dif­
ferent and contrary paths to live like men in justice and to keep themselves in society and thus to 
observe their social nature.297
The “old men of the nations", the philosophers, represent the acme of reasoning. 
How can the nature of their knowledge be defined? Vico says that wisdom is always 
grounded in natural utility:
295 NS 498.
296 The concept of conatus is unavoidable in any discussion of Vico's account of human nature. His first 
treatment of the concept is in the De Antiquissima [On the most ancient wisdom of the Italians, 1710], it is 
absent in the first New Science and reintroduced in the third New Science. It is by no means one of the easi­
est Vichian concepts to grasp, but, in essence, Vico's final position in the third New Science seems to be that 
conatus is a force in man, separate from nature and of divine origin, which assures free will. How this re­
lates to providence is neatly summarized by Robertson [John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: 
Scotland and Naples 1680-1760 [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005]: "The conato activated by 
the frightful thought of a divinity cannot, however, be effective without assistance. Corrupt as men's na­
ture is, tyrannized by amor propio, men follow principally their own utility {la propia utilita], and are un­
able by themselves to impose conato on the passions. Therefore it must be by divine providence that men 
are checked sufficiently to accept the institutions of family, civil society, and finally human society as a 
whole. Which shows that what regulates all justice among men is divine justice, which is administered by 
divine providence to preserve human society {NS 341]. In suppressing and transforming the bestial pas­
sions into human ones, in other words, the conato of human free will must be assisted by divine provi­
dence. The point is reinforced by Vico’s subsequent observation that divine providence acts without hu­
man involvement or counsel, and often against the designs of men {NS 342]. Divine providence is neither 
Epicurean accident nor Stoic fate: it is above and beyond the reach of human intention, but acts with the 
conato of the will to check men's selfish passions, and direct them to sociable ends". 244-5.
297 NS 2.
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The natural equity of fully developed human reason is a practice of wisdom in affairs of 
utility, since wisdom in its broad sense is nothing but the science of making use of things as their 
nature dictates.298
Although Vico insists utility is the basis for wisdom, the knowledge that is re­
quired for proper deliberation in civil wars is formed from a synthesis of esoteric and 
practical reasoning. For him, Plato and Tacitus individually represent models of those 
different types that the wise man must combine in himself to be complete:
[For] with an incomparable metaphysical mind Tacitus contemplates man as he is, Plato 
as he should be. And as Plato with his universal knowledge explores the parts of nobility which 
constitute the man of intellectual wisdom, so Tacitus descends into all the counsels of utility 
whereby, among the infinite irregular chances of malice and fortune, the man of practical wisdom 
brings things to good issue. Now Vico's299 admiration of these two great authors from this point of 
view was a foreshadowing of that plan on which he later worked out an ideal eternal history to be 
traversed by the universal history of all times, carrying out on it, by certain eternal properties of 
civil affairs, the development, acme and decay of all nations. From this it follows that the wise man 
should be formed both o f esoteric wisdom such as Plato's and o f common wisdom such as that of 
Tacitus [my italics].300
The importance, for Vico, of combining the two types of knowledge -  the univer­
sal (or esoteric) and the particular (or common sense) -  is that the common good will 
not suffer individual interests, and vice versa:
Plato, reflecting that in such public assemblies the minds of particular men, each passion­
ately bent on his private utility, are brought together in a dispassionate idea of common utility 
[according to the saying that men individually are swayed by their private interests but collec­
tively they seek justice), raised himself to the meditation of the highest intelligible ideas of cre-
298 NS 326.
299 Again, the reader is reminded that Vico referred to himself in the third person in his autobiography.
300 Vico, Autobiography, 138-139.
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ated minds, ideas which are distinct from these created minds and can reside only in God, and 
thus he reached the height of conceiving the philosophical hero who commands his passions at 
will.301
The philosopher's wisdom consists of understanding the concepts that are mani­
fested through the ideal eternal history [not surprisingly, the same role Vico assigned to 
himself in writing the New Science), which though guided by providence is a human 
creation. In this way they serve mankind by helping it to achieve its potential:
But because of the corruption of human nature, the generic character of men cannot 
without the help of philosophy [which can aid but few) bring it about that every individual's mind 
should command and not serve his body. Therefore divine providence ordered human institu­
tions with this eternal order: that, in commonwealths, those who use their minds should com­
mand and those who use their bodies should obey.302
Thus, Vico's philosopher is not a detached pedant, but is fully engaged in the in­
stitutions upon which commonwealths depend. As one who has learned to control the 
passions and exercise reason, she provides a model of personal liberation from the tyr­
anny of the senses which sets an example of emancipation to the people collectively:
The people had finally come to understand that the rational nature [which is the true 
human nature) is equal in all men. From this natural equality (by occasions conceived in the ideal 
eternal history and encountered exactly in Roman history) they gradually brought the heroes to 
civil equality in popular commonwealths.303
Vico was not necessarily a precursor of later secular explicators of history, like 
David Hume who in The History o f England interpreted English history as one of steady
301 NS 1041.
302 NS 18.
303 NS 29.
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progress toward freedom from authoritarian structures,304 for Vico's schema was less 
rigid in many ways than those paradigms of universal history which were to follow him, 
but he did believe, in a broad sense, that history had a direction that proceeded from 
human bondage to emancipation, and in his narrative the philosopher was chiefly re­
sponsible for this process.305 Vico continued to speak of "the corruption of human na­
ture" in rather the same way that theologians had for centuries before him, but his 
analysis of human nature becomes in large part a question of the role that institutions 
play in forming human character. While he rejected any type of determinism, w hether it 
was Stoicism's cosmic necessity or mechanistic physic's inevitability, ostensibly because 
it violated the Catholic doctrine of free will, he must have certainly realised that human 
freedom was being challenged by ascribing human nature to institutions and not the in­
dividual person. One might say, however, that in so far as institutions are human prod­
ucts they are extensions of us, and presumably under our control. Just as our in terpreta­
tion of natural history changes with the tools employed to observe it, so too does the 
content of social history reflect the institutions in place from which we observe our­
selves. New instruments increase the scientist's vision of natural history, and advanced 
institutions expand Vico's philosopher's understanding of human nature. But institu­
tions have the peculiarity of functioning simultaneously as both instruments operated 
by humans and as agents that operate on humans: we create them and are created by 
them. When institutions collapse, so do individuals, because without their support indi­
viduality ceases to exist and it is replaced by brute endeavour.
304 The same is true of Condorcet, Turgot, the Enlightenment in general and later Comte.
305 With the qualification, of course, that this movement is characteristic of a cycle of ages, and does not 
reflect the totality of the ideal eternal history, which does not culminate at any given point in time but is 
repeated endlessly.
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The quarrel with rationalism
In the seventeenth century the use of mechanical metaphors for government be­
came more common. Famously, Thomas Hobbes uses them to describe the function of 
the state.306 Today, almost unthinkingly, we refer to 'state machinery', which expresses 
our reliance on technology not only to manage the state but also to use technological 
models to understand the governing of a state.307 Our use of the metaphor is due to the 
fact that with the use of mechanical, and later electronic, computing devices the preci­
sion of computational machines became the standard for the human worker: work is 
judged by comparison to the predictability and reliability of automation. But in the early 
stages of the foundation of a civil society what is required is a high level of inter­
personal communication and decision by public consensus; for example, we can easily 
imagine a great deal of discussion and debate going into the building of town walls and 
the clearing and planting of fields. Later, once those foundational activities have been 
accomplished, the society then has greater need of the technical, or scientific, knowledge 
that can be employed to secure and maintain what has been made. To extend the exam­
ple of town building might be useful, for after the walls are put up locks are needed to 
secure them. In traditional cultures locks are usually made by the blacksmith. His spe­
cialised knowledge of metallurgy and mechanics permits a society to defend its secrets 
and valuables. Although this professional skill ensures a new element of safety to the 
community, it also exacerbates a political tension between those who can access the 
sources of a state's power, and thereby share in it, and those denied entry by virtue of 
their technical or general illiteracy. Vico says that in the human age rationality is finally
306 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651.
307 Some of the ideas here I owe to a reading of Jon Agar's, The Government Machine: A Revolutionary his­
tory of the computer [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004].
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achieved by a plurality of political subjects, due largely through their emancipation from 
the nobles, who until now have been able to restrict their access to the knowledge they 
possessed, or claimed to possess.308 And when those who have experienced the empow­
erment of reason are then cut off from it, through political oppression or social fragmen­
tation, then, Vico says, a process of individual and social disintegration begins:
Because basic human nature has been changed by original sin, assemblies of men may 
appear to be societies, but the truth is that isolation of spirits is greatest where many bodies come 
together. Even more is it like the crowded inmates of a prison where the spirits that I have men­
tioned above endure punishments, each in the cell to which it is assigned.309
It is this physical and psychic isolation of individuals which Vico believed would 
ultimately unravel a state and its institutions, and which prompted him to challenge the 
means to reason which he saw in rationalism.310
The new modes of scientific inquiry were primarily based on a mathematical and 
deductive schema of problem solving, in contrast to the humanistic process of resolving 
social issues through public deliberation. As science advanced, more and more discover­
ies were made that seemed to fly in the face of common sense and which necessitated 
explanatory theories that would strike the average person as improbable. Vico was not
308 One achievement of the New Science, which to my knowledge is rarely mentioned, is that by presenting 
history as a logical process it undermines the legitimacy of'secret histories' of the world, which authori­
tarian institutions employed to keep the people in a state of mystification and powerlessness.
309 Vico, Oration VI, 129.
310 The contemporary social epistemology research programme shares many of these same concerns with 
the disenfranchisement of language and society. See Philosophy, Rhetoric, and the End of Knowledge, Steve 
Fuller & James H. Collier [Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004): "Social epistemology's rele­
vance to rhetoric and argumentation lies in its stress on the integral role that communication, both its fa­
cilitation and impedance, plays in contemporary thinking... Free access to the communicative process 
breeds increased accountability, which in turn forces aspiring authorities to couch their claims to knowl­
edge in terms that can be understood by the largest number of people. By levelling terminology, we con­
vey the idea that we all live in the same world. Any apparent differences in the access we have to that 
world are attributed to epistemic artifice -  "ideology," if you will -  which typically masquerade as onto­
logical differences or "incommensurable worlds." These world differences restrict the number of eligible 
critics of one's claims to the class of people known as "experts" or "natives". 22.
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insensitive to science as a means to truth, but he feared that reducing inquiry, whether 
scientific or social, to a self-contained system of premise and deduction would exclude 
other human considerations that could not be neatly evaluated in this logic. In order to 
arrive at the 'clear and distinct' ideas that obtained from deductive logic, the rationalists 
needed to clear a way through the often dense forest of seventeenth-century rhetoric 
that characterised not just political but also technical or scientific thinking. But know­
ingly or not, in this process they were destroying a whole system of shared human 
meanings that represented knowledge chains many generations long.311 In the pursuit of 
technocratic organization, a new model of man would result, one that keeps character 
with Max Weber's definition of modernity: rationalization, bureaucratization and the 
disenchantment of the world.312 Vico, like social epistemologists today, rejected this 
logic in favour of one that made philosophy and science a 'social practice' with compara­
tive truth values. In simple terms, it recognises that the world is not just black and white, 
and that 'intermediate values' also have a place in truth, especially in social contexts 
where it is not uncommonly futile to demand absolute values of true or false. This is not 
to say, however, that social enquiry requires many-valued logic, but it does reflect Vico's
311 Wilfrid Sellars points out in ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’, in Metaphysics: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings, eds. Ronald C. Hoy & L. Nathan Oaklander (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 
2005): "The Platonic theory of conceptual abilities as the result of the ‘illumination’ of the mind by intelli­
gible essences limited the role of the group and, in particular, the family to that of calling these abilities 
into play -  a role which could, in principle, be performed by perceptual experience -  and to that of teach­
ing the means of giving verbal expression to these abilities. Yet the essential social character of conceptual 
thinking comes clearly to mind when we recognize that there is no thinking apart from common standards 
of correctness and relevance, which relate what I do think to what anyone ought to think. The contrast be­
tween 7' and ‘anyone’ is essential to rational thought". 612-613.
312 This is reflected in a comment by D.P. Verene: "Once the humanist ideal of self-knowledge is given up, 
there can be no real pursuit of moral philosophy. Ethics becomes either metaethics, that is, a theoretical 
enterprise, or applied, that is, reduced to discussion of special problems for particular areas of society... 
Language becomes impoverished because, when right reasoning requires only the clarity of method, we 
no longer need to use language to speak about what can barely be expressed -  what is beyond language 
and indefinite in human experience -  things human and divine. We no longer need to use language to 
bring out the ambiguous meanings of words and things". From the Introduction to Vico's, On Humanistic 
Education (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 10-11.
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openness to admit other considerations than the quantifiable in his ontology of values, 
such as preferences and beliefs, for he believed that they affect not only the means of ra­
tional judgement but also determine the subject m atter of rational consideration.
The passions and reason
For Vico, passions313 are less an impediment to reason than they are a source for 
much of our rational calculations, and, as such, he believed that non-rational factors such 
as preferences and emotions play a very strong role in forming perceptions and making 
decisions.314 This is not to say that he was endorsing 'irrational' thinking; rather, it ap­
pears that he acknowledged that the passions must be included in any rational assess­
ment and should not be dismissed as untidy and non-essential elements that are baneful 
to proper deliberation.315 Vico was quite willing to accept the role of the analytical mind 
as long as that did not exclude a place for the 'emotive' mind in our reasoning. Whereas 
the rationalists thought that the passions kept mankind a prisoner to error, Vico held 
them close as allies in the struggle to free us from the illusion of absolute certainty. As 
well as including the passions in rational deliberation and assessment, Vico recognized
313 'Passions’ is employed here to do double duty for 'feelings’ and 'emotions', where there is no need to 
emphasize the philosophical distinction between the terms, in order to simplify the notion of non­
intellectual influences on reasoning.
314 In Frank P. Ramsey's classic paper 'Truth and Probability' (1926), Philosophical Papers, D.H. Mellor, ed., 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), his discussion of the 'logic of partial belief draws conclu­
sions similar to Vico's (which I find interesting and pertinent here, as they seem to confirm the relevance 
of Vico's thoughts on logic) about how irrational values may vitiate rational decisions: "In order therefore 
to construct a theory of quantities of belief which shall be both general and more exact, I propose to take 
as a basis a general psychological theory, which is now universally discarded, but nevertheless comes, I 
think, fairly close to the truth in the sort of cases with which we are most concerned. I mean the theory 
that we act in the way we think most likely to realize the objects of our desires, so that a person's actions 
are completely determined by his desires and opinions. This theory cannot be made adequate to all the 
facts, but it seems to me a useful approximation to the truth particularly in the case of our self-conscious 
or professional life, and it is presupposed in a great deal of our thought". 69.
315 The same belief that passions, or emotions, play an integral part in our reasoning has been forcibly ar­
gued by the neuroscientist and philosopher, Antonio Damasio -  particularly in his book, Descartes' Error: 
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam Publishing, 1994).
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that the acquisition of knowledge is not a passive activity that is somehow uninfluenced 
by the environment in which it occurs; his views on this subject compare closely to a 
constructivist approach whereby knowledge is seen as a process that takes place be­
tween the thinking subject and the experiential world. The dream or idea of a dedicated 
rationalist that theoretical contemplation could equate to knowledge would have been 
utterly alien and repugnant to everything Vico thought about human rationality. This 
reduced state of man, in which he lives for and through a mental life which is separated 
from his passions, Vico calls the barbarism o f reflection. In the state of this new barba­
rism the passions count for nothing and only 'pure reason' possesses value.316 The per­
nicious effects of alienating reason from the passions for the sake of pure 'rational' ex­
pediency can be readily observed in much of the lifeless architecture, shoddy goods, and 
mindless bureaucratization that have crept into the world as a result of it.
To be sure, Vico challenged rationalism, not rationality. For Vico, conceptual 
thinking was, by its very nature, a social activity, for concepts are themselves social con­
structions. And it can only be maintained by and through the proper deliberation of real­
istic possibilities, within the context of existing institutions; in other words, it cannot ex­
ist in a vacuum, or a vat for that matter.317 By extension, I take that to mean that it would 
be highly improbable to expect the same standard of rationality to apply to disparate
316 Mali offers a relevant comment to this same point of Vico's attitude toward epistemology: "This ergetic 
or, as we would nowadays call it, 'constructivist' conception of knowledge has been often employed by the 
proponents of the vita active in their polemics against the ideal of vita contemplative, because it depicts 
knowledge as a creative, not merely a receptive, appropriation of the world". Mali 61.
317 Vico's strident anti-rationalism might possibly have been sparked by his reading of Descartes' Medita­
tions on First Philosophy, in which the French philosopher famously hypothesises that his perceptions 
might in reality be controlled by an 'evil demon', and that this possibility alone should prevent him from 
trusting any source of knowledge other than his own 'clear and distinct' ideas. However, I know of no spe­
cific reference to the Meditations in Vico, but it would be interesting to try to find one, for there could 
hardly be more diametrically opposed viewpoints on the access and acquisition to true knowledge.
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peoples in different ages and circumstances.318 Does this mean, then, that Vico thought 
there are inherent limits to human reasoning, restricted to local knowledge? I do not 
think so, but it does seem that Vico is making a distinction between mind and conscious­
ness, objective and subjective awareness, and that he wanted to show the unbroken con­
tinuity of the mind from its sensory foundations in the passions to full-blown reason; 
seen in this way, his was a fight to maintain an invited place for the indefinite and prob­
able at the table of knowledge, and by that to acknowledge the fundamental social na­
ture of conceptual thinking.
Topics and the forms o f reason
The way to defend the grounds of subjective reasoning was through maintaining 
the logical spaces created by the ars topica from the exclusive attention given by the Ra­
tionalists to the ars critica:
Providence gave good guidance to human affairs when it aroused human minds first to
topics rather than to criticism, for acquaintance with things must come before judgment of them.
Topics has the function of making minds inventive, as criticism has that of making them exact319
The subject of topics for Vico was hardly a quaint holdover from the salad days of 
rhetoric, for he saw in it a system of categories by which the validity of logical inferences 
could be judged. In his reasoning, all categories that are open to debate form a concep­
tual scheme by which other facts will be evaluated.320 As the choice of topics, or the
318 Montesquieu in The Spirit o f the Laws also emphasises the 'biosemantic' (to borrow a term from Mil- 
likan) basis of institutions when he says that regimes could be distinguished in terms of which passions 
were dominant -  fear, virtue or honour. This division coincides fairly neatly with Vico's own ages of gods, 
heroes, and men, respectively.
319 NS 498.
320 See Donald Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', in The Essential Davidson (Oxford: Ox­
ford University Press, 2006), for a contemporary view on how the categories and concepts we form (and 
accept or reject) are related to the "desires, habits, and dispositions of the agent". 197.
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'categories', one allows for adjudication will determine the outcome of an inference, Vico 
was making the case that our understanding of a reality composed of things and experi­
ences will be largely determined by the way they are described and by whom they are 
recognized.321 Rather than viewing this as an endorsement of epistemological relativism, 
it might more accurately be seen as an acknowledgement that many rules or so-called 
objective positions that have been included into formalized systems of thought first be­
gan as instinctive or emotional behaviour, passions as it were, which was later modified 
by other social influences that permitted their inclusion into larger conceptual schemes.
The great danger to knowledge, as Vico saw it, was that in ignoring the ways and 
means of discourse we lose a thorough understanding of how we have come to accept 
certain matters as fact and others as mere conjecture. The landscape of topics that forms 
our field of vision will either permit or deny access to our reason, and from that it fol­
lows that the interpretation of m atters of fact will depend on a subjective frame of refer­
ence. The purpose of topics is not to compartmentalize knowledge into isolated boxes, 
but to organize the subjects of inquiry into families, and by that to better see their inter­
connectivity as parts of life as a whole.322 Vico does not doubt the universality of truth, 
and he confirms this belief by the imaginative and intellectual universals which he offers 
as evidence of a single human mind that shares the same ideas and concepts that tran-
321 See Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study o f Early Ideas about Probability, 
Induction and Statistical Inference, 2e (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): "Probability re­
quires probity and approbation but for demonstration we must be able to see and show what is what. The 
primary sense of the word probabilitas is not evidential support but support from respected people". 22- 
23.
322 See Nelson Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984): 
"Validity of inductive inference, though a property of a relation among statements, requires truth neither 
of premises nor of conclusion; a valid inductive argument may even yield a false conclusion from true 
premises. What, then, is required for inductive validity? Certain formal relationships among the sentences 
in question plus what I shall call right categorization. Now a category or system of categories -  a way of 
sorting -  is not sentential, is not true or false; but use of wrong categories will make an induction invalid 
no matter how true the conclusion". 37
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scends particular cultures and ages. But, at the same time, he does recognize the great 
degree to which truth is accepted, rejected and influenced by the topics chosen to dis­
cuss it. There is an unmistakable connection here with the importance Vico places else­
where on the role offantasia as an integral ingredient in the formation of concepts, be­
cause both the active use of the imagination and the choice of topics involve memory 
and stand in direct contrast to the increasingly rigid norms of speech which began in the 
seventeenth century.323 In effect, he is saying that, when the imagination is active, the 
world cannot be described by reference to the five senses alone, and that to speak of ab­
solute objectivity through them is simply 'unrealistic' when applied to human affairs.
Vico's middle way
Vico's approach to the acquisition of knowledge was similar to that of Bacon's in 
that he (as Paolo Rossi wrote of the latter) attempted to unite the empirical and the ra­
tional or philosophical, and thus "open a middle way between experience and theoriz­
ing", the "via media inter experientiam et dogmata":324
Propositions XV [I]-XXII will give us the foundations of the certain. By their use we shall 
be able to see in fact this world of nations which we have studied in idea, following the best ascer­
tained method of philosophizing, that of Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, but carrying it over from 
the institutions of nature, on which he composed his book Cogitata [et] visa, to the civil institu­
tions of mankind.325
323 See I.A. Richards, ‘Lecture III - The Interinanimation of Words', in The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1965) 47-66. In this lecture, Richards discusses how the loss of rhetorical tropes 
leads to an impoverishment of language and the powers of conceptualisation.
324 Paolo Rossi, 'Bacon's idea of science', in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 25-46.
325 N S 163.
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To arrive at the certain, Vico believed, depended largely on the precision of the 
terms we use to express our ideas. His complaint was that a lack of clarity in expression 
would obscure the ideas generated from empirical discovery. His argument was not 
against the universality of empirical knowledge, but rather the overly-confident assump­
tion that findings are not affected by the means with which they are communicated. Vico 
thought that science could be impartial, but he took issue with the principle that ideas 
and concepts could remain invariable across time and space.326 For this reason, Vico was 
wary of any attem pt that sought to isolate meaning and interpretation from the social 
and historical context in which it was found.327
Vico believed, in keeping with his verum-factum epistemological principle, that when 
the object of scientific inquiry was the natural world our knowledge of it was fundamentally 
limited, or as he called it 'certain' (z7 certo). This is because, he believed, as man was not the au­
thor of being in nature he would never know the secrets of its ontology. But when the subject of 
inquiry was the human world, the 'world of nations', he believed we could have 'true' [il vero), 
absolute or universal, knowledge, because as its authors we could understand its origins 
through the imagination, which is a uniquely human faculty. Vico uses the principle of the verum- 
factum to give logical justification for the psychological method of imaginative inquiry into hu­
man affairs, for as a method of inquiry, it relies on the accuracy of the hermeneutical exercise
326 See Richard Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics: Philosophical Papers (New York: Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, 2007): "The analogy [in holism] with fitting together pieces of a puzzle is entirely appropriate 
for many areas of inquiry -  for example, palaeontology, particle physics, and epigraphy. These are all areas 
of culture in which there is enough consensus to give a use to the notion of "getting it right." The idea that 
philosophy can become such an area by being put on the secure path of a science remains plausible only as 
long as concepts and meanings are seen as isolable from social practices and from history. For only if such 
isolation were possible would we be able to identify atoms of thought or of language whose relations with 
one another would remain constant no matter what use is made of them, in the way that the relations be­
tween bits of hardware remain constant no matter what programme is being run". 181-182
327 Quine says of the "myth of meaning" that it is as if there was a "gallery of ideas", from which "each idea 
were tagged with the expression that means it". See W.V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Cambridge, MA: Har­
vard University Press, 1986) 8.
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that measures historical meanings of ideas and concepts against present day knowledge. This 
method stands against the Cartesian model that would make of language something as 
fixed and transparent as mathematics, while Vico argued that language is only as clear as 
the collective associative meanings of words. For this reason, Vico was sceptical of ra­
tionalist claims to objective truth when they were based uniquely on the subjective cer­
tainty of one's own thought, without confirmation from the community at large.328
But Vico's position was not limited to his rejection of the Cartesian 'clear and dis­
tinct' ideas, for in his repudiation of the dogmatism of Cartesian epistemology that as­
signs truth values to only the entirely true or false, Vico's partial truth values enable man 
to participate in the making of history as a continuously created social construct, rather 
than as a self-centred knower of private knowledge. It might be objected that in focusing 
on the social ontology of thinking the individual is in some way diminished, or at least 
genius is not recognised as a solitary activity. If true, the individual ego undeniably suf­
fers a loss, but at the same time the social thinker may not fall prey to the solipsism that 
can result from dismissing the cogency of the senses, which are exercised in common 
with others, and depending on a Cartesian 'theatre of the mind' for one's existential se­
curity.329
For Vico, the mind is a process, not a static thing, unlike the Cartesian res cogi- 
tans which, in theory at least, remains constant whatever the external circumstances. In 
Vico, self knowledge is arrived at by memory and imagination, which are active and par­
328 For an extended discussion of the incommensurability between subjective certainty and objective 
truth, see Ruth Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1984) 312-313.
329 The psychological price of this position does not come cheap; as Varela wrote: "By treating mind and 
world as opposed subjective and objective poles, the Cartesian anxiety oscillates endlessly between the 
two in search of a ground". See Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: 
Cognitive science and human experience (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993) 141.
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ticipate in the world, and not the product of detached reflection. By some standards of 
objectivity, this foundation for knowledge might look weak, as it implies that what we 
know of ourselves always depends upon the state of the institutions in which we are 
placed. It might be argued, then, that Vico is inadvertently making the case that there are 
inherent limits to human reasoning, as it is relative to contingent circumstances, while at 
the same time professing to have found a universal model of reasoning that is complete 
in its description of the human mind. For how could it know itself if it is in a perpetual 
state of flux? The solution that Vico gives to this problem is that all changes occur within 
the known, repeatable pattern of the ideal eternal history, which gives a perm anent 
frame of reference to the order of our thoughts.330 Nevertheless, though in principle it is 
not hard to understand how Vico could have rejected a model of the mind as a mechani­
cal apparatus that operates according to physical laws, it is more difficult to see why he 
believed we could truly know the mind while at the same time its ontology depends so 
heavily on the physical world that he believes would never reveal its secrets to man 
(again, in conformity with the verum-factum  principle, that says only God can know His 
own creation]. But the mind of man is also a product of intrinsic natural processes and, 
as such, it can be inferred that something of it m ust remain hidden to us. These two 
claims do not appear to be reconcilable.
The barbarism o f reflection
Vico tells us that when language, which contains the collective memory of a race, 
loses its transformative power to heal social divisions and impart new conceptual mod­
els for society, the root of thought itself is damaged. A new emptiness settles in public
330 Something like a variation of the unmoved mover should come to mind.
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spaces where civic life was once lived. Humanity suffers a new return to the caves, in a 
manner of speaking, as the individual psyche is now focused inward and public space 
becomes increasingly uncivil.
For such peoples, like so many beasts, have fallen into the custom of each man thinking 
only of his own private interests and have reached the extreme of delicacy, or better of pride, in 
which like wild animals they bristle and lash out at the slightest displeasure. Thus no matter how 
great the throng and press of their bodies, they live like wild beasts in a deep solitude of spirit and 
will, scarcely any two being able to agree since each follows his own pleasure or caprice. By rea­
son of all this, providence decrees that, through obstinate factions and desperate civil wars, they 
shall turn their cities into forests and the forests into dens and lairs of men. In this way, through 
long centuries of barbarism, rust will consume the misbegotten subtleties of malicious wits that 
have turned them into beasts made more inhuman by the barbarism of reflection than the first 
men had been made by the barbarism of sense.331
The barbarism o f reflection, or solipsism, that Vico names is the disjunction of 
thought from action. The 'conversation' that characterizes, and is essential to, a healthy 
society becomes a series of 'pronouncements' that are rigid and colourless, and focused 
on technical precision; specialised language becomes a means of entry into circles of 
power that are formed around specialised subjects. The voice of the educated generalist 
is drowned out by the clamour of overly-confident 'experts' whose pronouncements 
serve their own ends. This leads to a state of social paralysis which, in the Vichian sce­
nario, bereft of the regenerating power of imagination, ends in the atrophy of language 
and leads to social fragmentation. The polarization of society entails the loss of knowl­
edge, as well as the sundering of the social contract. In opposition to the barbarism o f  
reflection stands Vico's sensus communis, or common sense:
331N S 1106.
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Human choice, by its nature most uncertain, is made certain and determined by the 
common sense of men with respect to human needs or utilities, which are the two sources of the 
natural law of the gentes.
Common sense is judgment without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire people, 
an entire nation, or the entire human race.332
For Vico, common sense is indispensable to society, for without it knowledge be­
comes solipsistic and leads to hyper-rationalism, which damages the body politic. In 
Vico, this faculty is not daily practical knowledge, as the term is now used, but rather 
something closer to a 'collective imagination', which civilised humanity shares as a 
whole.333 Common sense is an intellectual faculty that also has an ethical foundation 
upon which natural law is based:334
Uniform ideas originating among entire peoples unknown to each other must have a 
common ground of truth.
This axiom is a great principle which establishes the common sense of the human race as 
the criterion taught to the nations by divine providence to define what is certain in the natural 
law of the gentes.335
Without it, shared purpose is lost, and the world of nations, which recognise uni­
versal principles, is replaced by a world of tribes who are solely motivated by narrow  
concerns. This process of'tribalism ' is accelerated by the compartmentalisation of
332 NS 141-142.
333 It also bears comparison to aspects of Aristotle's definition of common sense as that 'which is held gen­
erally or by the most'. See Aristotle, Ann. Pr. 24b 11.
334 On the discussion of sensus communis in Vico, see Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth and Method, 2e 
[1960](New York: Continuum, 2000]: "The main thing for our purposes is that sensus communis obvi­
ously does not mean only that general faculty in all men but the sense that founds community. According 
to Vico, what gives the human will its direction is not the abstract universality of reason but the concrete 
universality represented by the community of a group, a people, a nation, or the whole human race. Hence 
developing this communal sense is of decisive importance for living". 21
335 NS 144-145.
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knowledge and the loss of inter-cultural communication. Finally, even tribal societies 
disintegrate and the human being becomes once again like an exposed infant in the 
world. Vico's position on the social nature of self-consciousness brings to mind Fichte, 
who a half century later wrote that "The human being becomes a human being only 
among human beings".336
Vico hoped for a return to the "religious, truthful, and faithful" after the barba­
rism of reflection, but he never suggests how the individual trapped in his solipsism will 
find a real way out. His own Catholicism is too faintly expressed to believe that he 
thought it could offer a solution. Whereas a stoic might have found refuge in his cosmic 
city or the Christian in an eternal heaven, Vico's history holds out only the knowledge 
that the cycle will begin anew:
Hence peoples who have reached this point of premeditated malice, when they receive 
this last remedy of providence and are thus stunned and brutalized, are sensible no longer of 
comforts, delicacies, pleasures, and pomp, but only of the sheer necessities of life. And the few 
survivors in the midst of an abundance of the things necessary for life naturally become sociable 
and, returning to the primitive simplicity of the first world of peoples, are again religious, truthful, 
and faithful. Thus providence brings back among them the piety, faith, and truth which are the 
natural foundations of justice as well as the graces and beauties of the eternal order of God.337
336 J.G. Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right [1796] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): "The 
human being (like all finite beings in general) becomes a human being only among human beings; and 
since the human being can be nothing other than a human being and would not exist at all if it were not 
this -  it follows that, if there are to be human beings a t all, there must be more than one. This is not an opin­
ion that has been adopted arbitrarily, or based on previous experience or on other probable grounds; 
rather, it is a truth that can be rigorously demonstrated from the concept of the human being. As soon as 
one fully determines this concept, one is driven from the thought of an individual human being to the as­
sumption of a second one, in order to be able to explain the first. Thus the concept of the human being is 
not the concept of an individual -  for an individual human being is unthinkable -  but rather the concept of 
a species". 37-38.
337 NS 1106.
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This formulation surprises, coming from a professedly orthodox Catholic thinker; 
one would perhaps have expected coming from him the suggestion of an encounter with 
a personal deity that takes a more active role in history. But as it is, Vico's references to 
providence more closely resemble a pagan demi-urge than a Christian designer, and the 
defining doctrine of Christianity itself -  redemption through revelation -  is nowhere to 
be found in the pattern of the ideal eternal history. If God's hand could spread over his­
tory as the author of the pattern, why did He not include a chapter that would suffer man 
not a fall again into a state of barbarism? And even if He were absent from history, but 
present in the universe, why is not the knowledge of the New Science enough to save 
man from a return to that barbarism? One searches in vain to understand why Vico 
should have concluded that the return to barbarism was a necessity.
There seems to be an unexpressed conflict in Vico between the tenets of his relig­
ion and his findings as a philosopher. At the time in history when rationality supposedly 
reaches its peak, Vico describes the inevitability of its decline in almost the same breath; 
it is almost as if the most he can suggest to stave off this return to barbarism is to con­
tinue to practice, if not believe in, the rituals of religion. If that is the case, he seems to be 
saying that in these circumstances continuing to engage in the 'irrationality' of religion is 
actually a rational act, if that is a bulwark against the threat of social disintegration. He 
might be saying that in his third age of man, which is characterized by "a deep solitude of 
spirit and will", belief in a religious 'fiction' might be preferable to a profound scepticism 
that would envelop society without it. Could this have been his way of warning his age to 
reject the extremes of rationalism and thereby steer clear of the destabilization which he 
believed would follow the atrophy of religious spirit? Vico never says why he believed a 
new darkening of the mind was inescapable. Perhaps he m eant to say, quite simply, that
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the failure of God to save His people in history is really the failure of our imagination of 
Him. But, in the time he lived in, he could not have said that out loud.
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The meaning of return: 
Providence and the mind
Introduction:
The decisive sort of proof in our Science is therefore this: that, since these institutions 
have been established by divine providence, the course of the institutions of the nations had to be, 
must now be, and will have to be such as our Science demonstrates, even if infinite worlds were 
born from time to time through eternity, which is certainly not the case.338
Central to the New Science is the concept of providence, specifically the interac­
tion between human and divine mind. If Vico's ideal eternal history is the unfolding of 
divine will in the human world, then the life cycle of the mind in the universal plot of his­
tory is also the story of human fulfilment of that intention. In short, the meaning of his­
tory is mirrored in the meaning of mind, for it is human mind which is the agent for its 
realisation:
This New Science or metaphysic, studying the common nature of nations in the light of 
divine providence, discovers the origins of divine and human institutions among the gentile na­
tions, and thereby establishes a system of the natural law of the gentes, which proceeds with the
338 NS 348.
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greatest equality and constancy through the three ages which the Egyptians handed down to us as 
the three periods through which the world had passed up to their time.339
What Vico meant by 'providence' is not made any clearer by his references to in­
stitutional Catholicism, for rarely does it resemble anything like orthodox Christian­
ity,340 and when he does he studiously avoids mentioning anything that resembles a per­
sonal creator (it would not be unfair to expect) who is transcendent. This ambiguity has 
led to various interpretations of his meaning that do not include a traditional Judeo- 
Christian deity who participates actively in the creation.341 'Providence' can be read in 
Vico with almost equal legitimacy in several ways: one is as a metaphor for 'nature' it­
self, not unlike Spinoza's deussive natura (god or nature); another is as a cosmic design 
that stands outside of nature, like an Unmoved Mover which abides in an empyrean of 
its own, but whose connection to the world is somehow established by human agency; 
and it has been viewed as Vico's answer for an all-inclusive principle of unity in the uni­
verse, which is like a cosmic force that is more natural and physical than divine. In all of 
these interpretations, the reader is faced with the question of how Vico intended human 
freedom and the creative processes of the mind to be reconciled with divine order and 
participation in the world. The concerns that the concept of providence present for an 
understanding of mind are principally two-fold: one is how to read the New Science as a 
"reasoned civil theology of divine providence"342 that includes a teleological (but not es-
339 NS 31.
340 J. Samuel Preus, ‘Spinoza, Vico, and the Imagination o f Religion’, JHIv. 50, n. 1 (1989), 71-93.
341 See Jonathan I. Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation o f man 
1670-1752 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006): "[SJince Vico neither uses theological arguments 
nor refers much to Scripture, the clash between Vico's Catholic commentators and those who locate Vico 
among the anti-religious philosophical current of the Early Enlightenment in the end almost entirely 
hinges on the seeming contradiction between Vico’s 'claim that human history is the work of man’ and his 
'simultaneous and frequent insistence that it is the work of Providence". 530.
342 NS 385.
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chatological) force in nature, but which is based on the free operations of the human 
mind that lead to its own self-development,343 and the second is how to understand the 
way the shape of Vico's ideal eternal history, which is the form providence takes in time, 
affects the nature of the mind's identity in time. Even if Vico's ideal eternal history and 
human free will can be reconciled in a reading of compatibilism, the question still re ­
mains how Vico intended to resolve the paradox of a providential plan for history and 
his assertion that it is human mind that determines the course of history.344 It might be 
objected that the ideal eternal history is causally overdetermined because Vico explains 
history by God and human agency. But it could be countered that God's working through 
human agency is an indirect form of causation that does not seriously challenge the pri­
macy of human agency.
Shaping history
Penelope Corfield deftly describes how Vico's stages of history are ultimately de­
pendent on the 'hand' of providence for their sequential order:
He (Vico) borrowed the traditional imagery of historical 'ages' but yoked them into a dy­
namic model. Each great era of history, he believed, represented a significant organizing principle, 
which expresses a stage in human development Initially, there was an ancient Age of the Gods. 
Life was simple, if sometimes violent, and people were ruled over by kings. Then followed the Age 
of Heroes, when a feudal aristocracy prevailed by might, while, lastly, there prevails the Age of
343 See Gregory L. Lucente, ‘Vico's Notion o f "Divine Providence" and the Limits of Human Knowledge, Free­
dom, and Will’, MLN, v. 97, n. 1, Jan. 1982,183-191.: "Vico's inability to come to terms openly with this 
question, to find a straightforward means of reconciling human knowledge and freedom with divine inter­
vention, gives rise to the ambiguity of his notion of divine providence, which is and is not strictly divine 
(since it stems from the deity but appears only in the world of men) and is and is not strictly providential 
(since it is concerned with human destiny) but not with fortune or fate"., 184.
344 See NS 331: "But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from our­
selves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond all question: that the world of civil 
society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modi­
fications of our own human mind".
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Men, in which people develop reason and laws but also risk becoming slothful and over-civilised. 
This model was underpinned, for Vico, by divine providence but was detached from a Christian 
commentary. It was intended indeed as a global scenario, applicable to all societies. Furthermore, 
Vico warned that the Age of Men will not automatically last for ever, if people lose too much of 
their primitive simplicity. In that case, the sequence will revert to its origins and recommence, 
making a cyclical or slowly spiralling history.345
By introducing a 'shape' or prescribed pattern to his history, Vico naturally pro­
vokes the question of how free will can operate in it, and also invites speculation 
whether mankind would not have achieved a level of rationality, his 'Age of Man', with­
out the intervention of a providential source. It seems evident that the role of provi­
dence and the ideal eternal history would deprive or diminish Vico's principles of a man- 
made world of philosophical authority, unless he satisfactorily explains how human ac­
tion is not fatalistically affected by it. The shape also influences the concept, or lack 
thereof, of finality. Although it is not untypical to include a 'conclusion' when speaking of 
a plan, the ideal eternal history is not conclusive, in spite of its recognisable shape of pe­
riodic cycles. Vico's history does not repeat itself exactly, but in each cycle there are ele­
ments which persist from the previous ones and also features that differentiate it from 
them. In this spiral structure that seems to endlessly rise on modifications made in the 
past, to speak of a direction of history that culminates in an apotheosis, whether pagan 
or Christian, is meaningless: traditional eschatology is not advanced in Vico's science.
Yet Vico seemed determined to keep a theocratic view of the world while ignoring reve­
lation. It could be that he thought, as deists later did, that revealed religion was a throw ­
back to medieval metaphysics and was increasingly difficult to explain in terms of ra­
tional logic and empirical discovery. But it would not be correct to assume that in his ne-
345 Penelope J. Corfield, Time and the Shape of History [New Haven: Yale, 2008), 169.
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gleet, if not rejection, of revelation Vico then substituted 'progress' for it. Of course, reve­
lation and progress do not have to be contradictory, but in the first instance it is as­
sumed that the ultimate source and guide of mankind's development is external to it, 
while in the second, at least in a secular reading, that agency belongs to man alone. This 
quote from J.B. Bury will help to clarify the concept:
The idea of human Progress then is a theory which involves a synthesis of the past and a 
prophecy of the future. It is based on an interpretation of history which regards men as slowly 
advancing -  pedetemtim progredientes -  in a definite and desirable direction, and infers that this 
progress will continue indefinitely. And it implies that, as a condition of general happiness will ul­
timately be enjoyed, which will justify the whole process of civilisation; for otherwise the direc­
tion would not be desirable. There is also a further implication. The process must be the necessary 
outcome of the psychical and social nature of man; it must not be a t the mercy of any external will; 
otherwise there would be no guarantee of its continuance and its issue, and the idea o f Progress 
would lapse into the idea of Providence [my italics].346
In one sense, then, Vico can be read as an early advocate of 'progress', in that he 
describes the movement in history towards a high degree of rationality as essentially the 
result of man's own efforts, and not an inevitable process generated by an "external 
will".347 But in another sense, Vico's description of the historical cycles does not conform 
to the common understanding of progress in which, theoretically at least, it can continue 
indefinitely toward man's perfection, for in Vico history ends in the barbarism o f reflec­
tion and then begins all over again. The point in which it ends is not exactly from where
346 J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth [1920] [New York: Dover Publica­
tions, 1987], 5.
347 See Paolo Rossi, ‘Bacon's idea o f science’, in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon [New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 36: "The so-called faith in progress [as we find it in Condorcet, Turgot, Herbert 
Spencer, Auguste Comte) was principally supported by three beliefs: [1) there is a law in history that 
tends, through graduations or phases or steps, toward the perfection and the happiness of the human 
race; [2) such a process of perfecting is generally identified with the development and growth of scientific 
knowledge; [3) science and technology are the principle source of moral and political progress and also 
constitute the confirmation of such progress".
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it began, but it is close enough to it to negate any progress that had been made.348 What 
are the arguments for and against the belief that Vico's concept of providence was di­
vine?
The argument that Vico thought providence was divine
Towards the end of the New Science, Vico states the metaphysical necessity of his 
historical cycles is caused by providential design:
For the nations will be seen to develop in conformity with this division [of the three ages 
of the world], by a constant and uninterrupted order of causes and effects present in every nation, 
through three kinds of natures... (which] are all embraced by one general unity. This is the unity 
of the religion of a provident divinity, which is the unity of spirit that informs (informa] and gives 
life to this world of nations.349
Providence is usually interpreted as a m atter of divine concern and provision for 
human needs or as a higher necessary order, a mode of cosmic justice, to which even di­
vinity should conform. Traditional theism holds that God is a complete being, total real­
ity or actuality, even before the creation of the world, but in Vico mankind holds a cen­
tral place in the fulfillment of providence. Although there is not in Vico a ruthless dogma­
tism associated with the term  providence, as might be expected in a rigorous theologian, 
it is nevertheless questionable why Vico would have burdened himself with it if he had 
wanted to distance himself entirely from the notion. Perhaps the reason why Vico in­
sisted that providence played such a decisive role in history is that he believed without it 
history would lack foundational meaning beyond a simple account of events; for even if
348 Not all commentators agree that Vico has given sufficient justification for the necessity of'return'. See 
L. Pompa, Human Nature and Historical Knowledge: Hume, Hegel and Vico (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, 1990), 166: "It is not open to Vico to suggest that, in the fully human age, people could -  or 
must, as he claims -  lose this progressively socialized nature and revert to a kind of nature which is proper 
only to man in his original brutish and unsocialised state".
349 NS 915.
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they could be shown to be 'scientifically' established, there is nothing in the pattern of 
events itself that would justify or explain the notions of a moral order that is contained 
in providence, and which Vico says is fulfilled in the ideal eternal history.
Vico's universe is predictable because the laws of providence rest on the exis­
tence of God for their foundation. The same causes are operative in any place and time, 
and they attain a universal status because by establishing a principle for change whose 
origin is providential, and in this way the conditions for change become equivalent to 
the causes and ensure an ideal eternal history. It is not that his providence itself requires 
a return; rather that the mind, which is conditioned by nature, returns in its cycles to a 
point from which it began.
Vico often distanced himself from Spinoza and others, like Grotius, Selden and 
Pufendorf, who eschewed any providential participation, either of a Platonic or Christian 
type, in the course of human history:350
Hence Epicurus, who believes in chance, is refuted by the facts, along with his followers 
Hobbes and Machiavelli; and so are Zeno and Spinoza, who believe in fate. The evidence clearly 
confirms the contrary position of the political philosophers, whose prince is the divine Plato, who 
shows that providence directs human institutions.351
The role of providence in history is related to a tradition extending as far back as 
Plato and Plotinus in which Nous is made material -  immanent -  in the world.352 Within
350 See Opere, letter to Monsignor Filippo Maria Monti, 18 November 1724, pp. 306-307, where Vico points 
out the methodological faults in their anachronistic accounts of the origins of human development.
351 NS 1108
352 Croce had made the error of conceptual anachronism by reading Vico as a Hegelian, partly because 
Vico's theory of history is based on the contributions of the poetic mind to man's cognitive development, 
and Hegel took a position that art was ultimately a form of absolute mind. Together they agreed that no 
society can be founded without religion, and from this observation stems Vico's concept of providence and 
Hegel's cunning of reason. See Sandra R. Luft, 'A Genetic Interpretation o f Divine Providence in Vico's New 
Science', Journal of the History of Philosophy 20,18., 165: "For Vico the creative principle was mind, and 
mind, or God, was immanent in the world. Vico's use of the language of emanation to describe this imma-
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this tradition, the soul uses the body, and providence uses man as its agent Vico does 
make the distinction between direct and indirect providence, as the former pertains to 
the history of the Hebrew nation, and later Christendom, while the latter lays the foun­
dation for human societies in general. And it is particularly in the case of indirect provi­
dence that human freedom plays such an im portant role, for it is a necessary condition 
for rationality to be able to make the choices that lead to the realisation of the providen­
tial design. This point, that gentile rationality is the result of man's own efforts, as op­
posed to the 'given' rationality, by divine intervention, of the Hebrews is a crucial dis­
tinction in the New Science and explains the entirely different means by which humanity 
as a whole participates in the providential order of the world. But at the same time that 
Vico places such importance on human endeavour and rationality to fulfil this design, it 
could also be said that he also undercuts man's role and responsibility by positing an 
underlying pattern that would seem to ultimately direct those choices.
Nevertheless, it can only be conjectured what possessed Vico to say w hat he did 
about providence if for him it was just a metaphor and not a theological reality. At a cer­
tain point, the question of whether his intentions were real or veiled becomes as much a 
psychological as a philosophical issue, and of that not much can be said. It seems safe to 
assume, however, that he could more assuredly stay clear of the ecclesiastical censors by 
markedly distinguishing between Hebrew and gentile historical origins. In this way he 
could uphold the Biblical narrative while at the same time introducing new philosophi­
cal truths within a secular timeframe. But if Vico was just advancing the concept as a 
guise for something else, such as an atheistic cosmogony, that still would not explain
nence, and his characterization of his conception as Platonic, allowed for idealist interpretations of the 
role of providence in the New Science”.
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why he placed providence foursquare in all sections of the New Science. Surely he could 
have lightly, but respectfully, referred to it throughout the work when it might have 
seemed appropriate to do so, but without making the same effort that he does to con­
vince the reader of its significance to the work. And although Vico does not expressly 
promote a doctrinaire theology, the absence of one should not give reason to suppose 
that is evidence of a heretical viewpoint. His strict delineation of humanity into the two 
'nations' of the chosen people [Christians and Jews) and gentiles could be interpreted as 
a sincere attem pt to build on revealed truth by providing a 'scientific' explanation of the 
course of the rest of humanity that is left out of it. These two 'truths' do not have to be 
irreconcilable. Vico appears as a deist when discussing the gentiles, for them the creator 
is an indirect presence that lays down the laws of the universe but does not directly in­
tervene. The gentiles achieve reason not through revelation, as was given in a distinctly 
'intellectual' way for the Hebrews, who receive direct commands in articulate speech 
from their creator: they attain the same level of cognitive development and insight into 
eternal truths, but through the imaginative and later the intellectual universals. This is 
the way his science explains that the human mind mirrors and participates in the provi­
dential pattern of divine mind.
In spite of the necessary distinctions Vico makes between the two human 'na­
tions', the differences could be in the final reckoning more apparent than real, for the 
real subject m atter of the New Science is a common humanity that is united by a provi­
dential pattern that ensures that disparate peoples the world over share the same uni­
versal history. To avoid any notion that the universe was created solely on physical laws, 
and thus materially determined, Vico retained providence as an immanent power in na-
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ture. It seems likely he thought that by doing so he could explain that free will was as­
sured by divine, not natural, law.353
The argument that Vico thought providence was destiny
Vico's providence has very little, if anything, to compare it to the familiar Judeo- 
Christian idea of the apotheosis of the godhead, and this has made it vulnerable to ar­
guments that it would be more accurate to speak of it as a universal plan or a cosmogony 
rather than a true manifestation of divine will. Even the language that is normally asso­
ciated with religion is more ritualistic, for Vico, than sacred.354 And the scepticism is not 
diminished by Vico's examples of divine providence in the New Science, which are prac­
tically limited to references to "natural phenomena of thunder, lightning, and similar 
'occasions"'.355 Providence seems more like a force of destiny than the presence of a con­
cerned creator. Benedetto Croce wrote:
Vico's historical thought... belongs neither to the Protestant Reformation nor the tradi­
tions of the Catholic Church, but solely to the Renaissance. We do not have to conclude that Vico 
rejected the belief in a transcendent creator; however, he made it difficult for anyone to under­
stand how he intended to reconcile revealed and philosophic truths. If Christian revelation is not 
undermined in the New Science, its status or nature is highly problematic.356
Vico's God resembles more a general principle of nature than a theological entity, 
and this has cast doubt on the sincerity of his traditional beliefs, for while Vico refers to
353 See A. Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth 
Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 281: '"Natural law" is thus founded neither on 
social instincts nor on a computation of enlightened interests. It is rather the immanent, regular, "ideal" 
process through which civilization emerges time and again as man's acquired, collective "second nature".
354 This brings to mind Francis Bacon's comment in his essay 'On Unity in Religion': “The religion of the 
heathen consisted rather in rites and ceremonies than in constant belief'. 67.
355 J. Mali, Mythistory: The Making of Modern Historiography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 
99.
356 Benedetto Croce, History as the Story of Liberty {La storia come pensiero e come azione) [1938] (trans. 
Sylvia Sprigge, 1941) (New York: Meridian Books, 1955) 135.
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an eternal creator the only examples he gives of his attributes are those of a temporal 
being. It seems that 'worship' of such a being is more appropriately carried out in the 
practice of ritual than in the contemplation of 'constant belief. It could be, pure and sim­
ple, that Vico never thought of providence in a Christian sense:
Vico's 'providence' is essentially the outcome of nature in interaction with human aspira­
tions, customs, and concerns. Time after time Vico invokes providence as the manifesting of rea­
soning human institutions, laws, and religions, guiding men equally whether they are Christian, 
pagans, or whatever, through the pull of their belief in the divine. Vico's 'divine providence' is, 
above all, a guiding force which, however men perceive and venerate it, actually manifests noth­
ing at all that is 'divine' in a Christian or any monotheistic sense.357
It is not unreasonable to suppose, along with Israel, that the concept of provi­
dence was for Vico "merely a rhetorical device employed to smuggle in a wholly secular 
conception of the historical process",358 for other than providing a vitalistic principle 
(Vico's conatus) to history his providence as a force of nature appears less providential 
than 'progressive', if that is understood as a steady movement toward a rational defini­
tion of human nature.359 This force has also been compared to the so-called "invisible- 
hand" explanations which date from the late seventeenth century and which are most 
commonly associated with Adam Smith. What these explanations share is a description 
of a process in which self interest leads to publically-minded virtues. It is not hard to see 
that in a reading of this process, by which man is unknowingly and unintentionally par­
ticipant in the fulfillment of providential design, Vico's historical stages more closely re-
357 Jonathan I. Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670- 
1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 534.
358 Israel 534.
359 Like Aristotle, Vico thought that natural objects have a natural tendency to fulfil their nature, but in 
spite of his profession of a Judeo-Christian providential teleology, which would not seem to allow a natu­
ralistic determinism, Vico's conatus is similar to certain pre-Socratic naturalist philosophies.
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semble a description of this type than a traditional theological account of man. Vico's 
most succinct statement of the heterogeneity of ends is contained here:
It is true that men have themselves made this world of nations (and we took this as the 
first incontestable principle of our Science, since we despaired of finding it from the philosophers 
and philologists, but this world without doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite 
contrary, and always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves; which 
narrow ends, made means to serve wider ends, it has always employed to preserve the human 
race upon this earth... That which did all this was mind, for men did it with intelligence; it was not 
fate, for they did it by choice; not chance, for the results of their always so acting are perpetually 
the same".360
Here as elsewhere, Vico's practically total inattention to traditional themes of 
Christian salvation would seem to confirm suspicions about the essentially secular na­
ture of his thought. Though outwardly he professed the faith, it requires no great stretch 
of the imagination to read his writings in the key of agnosticism. After all, what better 
way would there be to throw the hounds of ecclesiastical censorship off his track?
The argument that Vico sought a middle ground
There is another way to view the problem of providence, and it is that Vico 
sought to provide a 'mediative' solution to the division that marked concepts of the di­
vine, social, and natural worlds. It could have been that his intention behind making 
providence a general principle of nature was to provide a transcendent structure to the 
phenomenal world, and by this to resolve the dichotomies between mind and matter, 
temporal and eternal, design and will, religious and philosophical. Perhaps Vico thought 
that these elements of cosmological significance should not be viewed as existing apart
360 NS 1108.
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from one another, for they are entirely co-dependent and separated they lose all mean­
ing. And so it is with human identity in the scheme of universal history, for Vico never 
states that there is a perm anent self or soul of man that exists apart from material condi­
tions; rather, he says that human identity is painstakingly constructed in the material 
world through cycles of passion and control, "moti" and "freni", and this is an inter­
dependent process from which finally emerges humanity tutta spiegata, that which has 
reached its full potential.361 It might be preferable to describe the human role in provi­
dence as a 'working out' of history rather than 'participating' in history, if the unravel­
ling of the providential pattern by mankind is to be emphasised over the mere experi­
encing of it, and it is the fundamental sociability of man that makes this process possible:
Accordingly men offer worship, sacrifices and other divine honours to God as to the Mind 
which is the free and absolute sovereign of nature, because by His eternal counsel He has given us 
existence through nature, and through nature preserves us. But the philosophers have not yet 
contemplated His providence in respect of that part of it which is most proper to men, whose na­
ture has this principal property: that of being social.362
For Collingwood, Vico's providential involvement in history does not need to in­
terfere with a coherent historiography:
Here we reach for the first time a completely modern idea of what the subject-matter of 
history is. There is no antithesis between the isolated actions of men and the divine plan that 
holds them together, as there was for the Middle Ages; and, on the other hand, there is no sugges­
tion that primitive man (in whom Vico was particularly interested) foresaw what was going to
361 Vico was not alone among thinkers of his age in his concern with reconciling these divisions. See 
Funkenstein, 282: "Hobbes... mediated between nature and society by reference to the natural aetiology of 
the state. Its origin is dictated by the sense of self-preservation. Spinoza, on the other hand, altogether re­
lativized the distinction between bodies natural and artificial; the state and its institutions, much as any 
physical compound, are nothing but a balance of forces. Vico sought the mediation between nature and 
society along a different path. He reinterpreted nature to stand for the very process through which man 
acquires a second, social nature".
362 NS 2.
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come of the developments he was initiating; the plan of history is a wholly human plan, but it does 
not pre-exist in the shape of an unrealized intention to its own gradual realization. Man is no 
mere demiurge, fashioning human society as Plato's God fashions the world on an ideal model; 
like God Himself, he is a real creator, bringing into existence both form and matter together in the 
corporate work of his own historical development. The fabric of human society is created by man 
out of nothing, and every detail of this fabric is therefore a human/actum, eminently knowable to 
the human mind as such.363
Conclusion
In light of these considerations, certain conclusions can be tentatively drawn with 
regards to providence in Vico. Providence is a manifestation of divine and human mind.
It has an order and it is manifested in nature as the ideal eternal history. In so far as his­
tory is a human creation, it follows that providence is also in some sense dependent on 
human activity, for Vico never speaks of providence without discussing the participation 
of human mind, which is the agent for its realisation in time. Because human activity is 
essential for it to unfold, providence did not incur the character of a fatalistic order for 
Vico; for him free will exists because the mind is what mediates the construction of hu­
man order in the world. As a natural phenomenon, in part, the mind undergoes changes 
that are largely due to its own efforts, and man is responsible for his own destiny.
But in his search for law in human history is it legitimate for him to conclude that 
all mankind must necessarily follow this course? How can he speak of the principles of 
mind without inconsistency (or even cultural bias) when the mind is in a constant state 
of flux between one stage and another? He intended the concept of providence to save 
his model of mind from the contingency of purely natural processes that lack any sort of 
teleology. But it does not appear compulsory for his model of mind to follow the ideal
363 Robin George Collingwood, The Idea o f History [1946] [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994], 65.
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eternal history without the pattern of providence to provide the riverbed for it to follow. 
Scientists in the seventeenth century found laws in nature and attributed their source to 
God or providence, but it was never believed that those laws depended on man for their 
existence.364 Vico's conception of human science, however, is entirely different from 
natural science because it is as much a product as a participant in providence. And, on 
the other hand, those principles of the nature of mind which he establishes likewise de­
pend on the effects environmental conditions exercise on its functioning, and in this way 
avoids making of it a hidden mechanism detached from the material world.
In Vico the flow of history is reflected in the stream of human consciousness; the 
two are as inseparable as the river is from its bed. Mind, in Vico, is not marked by a be­
ginning and end; rather it is a cycle that has points on its course but no ultimate goal. 
Vico's human mind does not lead to a conclusion in history, in a Hegelian or any other 
sense. But the significance of Vico's discovery of the co-dependency of mankind and 
providence is that it makes it hard to imagine man as an idle bystander in a cosmic plot 
whose ending is already written: Vico's human being is sublimely im portant in the un­
folding of the cosmos.
Other than historical interest, there is not much attention given today in main­
stream philosophy to an arcane concept like providence that belongs to an unobservable 
world. But it would be unfortunate if the irony of Vico's position was missed. For here, if 
with the pretensions of'science' behind him Vico truly believed in the concept of theo­
364 See Isidore Epstein, Judaism, [London: Penguin Books, 1959): "But for the fulfilment of divine purpose 
human cooperation is necessary. Developing the Biblical idea of man as co-worker with God, the Talmud 
conceives man as having been chosen by God as his shuttaf 'partner' for the fulfilment of creation. Not for 
material interests alone has man been called to his great task. He was also selected as a special agent for 
the fulfilment of a purpose that transcends the physical boundaries of the universe, though it is through 
the physical domain that the purpose can work itself out". 138.
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logical providence, while also making of mind the creative agent of history, he seems to 
have confirmed by this belief, better than any other example he gave in the New Science, 
that the beliefs of an age are interesting historically, to borrow Collingwood's phrase, 
not because they are 'true' but because they are believed in. But, in brief, the fundamen­
tal nature of return is that the world is constantly reformulated according to a providen­
tial pattern whose forms are infinite and inexhaustible but whose principles of organisa­
tion remain fixed and finite.
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Conclusion
SUMMARY
The focus of this study has been to ascertain the meaning of Vico's exposition of 
the human mind in the New Science and if it is coherent In the main, it appears that it is 
because he succeeds in finding a way to reconcile conflicting aspects of the accounts of 
mind contained in the humanistic and rationalist traditions. There are certain aspects of 
his account which if they do not directly invalidate his main conclusions, nevertheless 
present explanatory gaps that require resolution, and these will be discussed here: they 
are his concept of mental identity; the relativity of truth and knowledge; and the rela­
tionship between history and mind. But first, to recapitulate what has been said thus far.
Broadly speaking, Vico attempted to frame the existence of mind as a product of 
continuous development that is shaped by natural, social and linguistic elements, rather 
than the emergence of innate faculties or a series of punctuated processes. The chief dif­
ficulties which Vico faced in forging this account were to eschew the concept of an es­
sential human nature, on one hand, and to explain, on the other, how the mind maintains 
ontological homogeneity throughout the phases of history which he describes: both of 
these relate to his overall explanation of how the mind and history are two parts of a 
single whole. They will be discussed separately, and then the latter issue will be ad­
dressed.
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In the first instance, instead of adopting a traditional Abrahamic religious para­
digm of the self or soul as an eternal entity possessing consciousness, Vico takes a radi­
cally different approach by positing only the existence of a physical commonality among 
all men. The subsequent mental and moral developments of the human race are the re­
sult of language and social structures working together in concert, and not the result of 
divinely-endowed innate gifts or biological instincts. In the second case, that of showing 
there is persistence of the mind's identity, without positing a unique mental substance, 
Vico builds the argument that although the states of mind differ their ontological conti­
nuity and homogeneity is assured by a somatic basis of all cogitation. The effect of both 
of these fundamental principles of his model of mind is to lay a new groundwork for un­
derstanding the mind as a universally-shared structure that is the result of human activ­
ity. And it is this conception which opens the way to philosophical justification of his 
verum-factum epistemological principle upon which his knowledge claims of the New 
Science are based.
The identity o f mind
Vico does not compare the identity of the mind to a single immutable substance, 
like a Cartesian res cogitans,365 nor does he suggest that it is simply a mode of being in a 
Spinozian sense.366 Throughout the New Science, the identity of mind is realised solely 
through human effort and can never be confused with an objective substance that is
365 See Joseph Mali, The Rehabilitation of Myth: Vico's New Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992): "By positing his collective-historical mente (which is roughly synonymous with what we mean by 
mentality) over and against Descartes' solitary cogito, Vico thus forged a new epistemological model of the 
nature and growth of knowledge". 64.
366 See Antonia LoLordo, Pierre Gassendi and the Birth o f Early Modern Philosophy, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). LoLordo writes that Vico, like Gassendi, might have thought that the mind is in­
corporeal but that knowledge must have its origin in the senses. For Vico, the way we know the mind is 
through its material creations, even though he does not claim that its nature is material. Also, she writes 
that, like Gassendi, one of the dominant theories of Vico's work is his "insistence on the explanatory limits 
of natural philosophy". 283.
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separate from historical circumstances, nor as the human component of a universal 
mind in the Stoic sense of a logos. It is a uniquely human property, like cultural artefacts 
that have a human source and cause, and as such it is more a collective phenomenon 
than an individual 'possession', and by that is meant that, in Vico, the human mind more 
closely resembles a persistent activity of shared social behaviour rather than an entity or 
essence sui generis. It is quite possible, however, that Vico was struggling to make a dis­
tinction between the individual mind and collective consciousness. In the case of the 
former, consciousness is considered as a phenomenological point of fact, while the latter 
is a cultural product of ideas and concepts shared by humanity as a whole. This account 
of mind as a collective identity stands opposed to the notion of an ongoing sense of self, 
and it stresses instead that the psychological continuity of an individual self depends on 
a larger human collective consciousness.367 Vico's mind is more of an action verb than an 
vague ontological entity separate from the material conditions that surround it.
If Vico is right that thought has a somatic foundation, then all thought is to some 
extent a product of physical processes and the perceptions which they influence; con­
sciousness and higher rationality have their foundation in coordinated movement and 
social activity. From this perspective, which steers clear of the classical asymmetric 
mind-body problem, the analytical mind and the body are not mutually exclusive but are 
two parts of the same equation. Vico's answer to how the mind begins to formulate ab­
stract concepts from that somatic foundation is that the imaginative universals repre­
sent a link between the two states of human being -  the physical and the mental. The
367 This notion of'selfless' identity is strongly reminiscent of David Hume's famous statement written a 
few years later in A Treatise o f Human Nature [1739] [Dover Publications: Mineola, NY, 2003): "For my 
part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception 
or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time 
without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception". 180.
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main difficulty with this interpretation, however, is that it raises the question whether a 
prior faculty of discernment is needed to distinguish between the literal and metaphori­
cal meaning of those concepts, for psychological reflection is heavily engrossed with 
subjective feeling and guarantees neither objectivity nor universality. This point natu­
rally brings us to the logical status of the mind's judgements with respect to the relativ­
ity of truth and knowledge.
The relativity o f truth and knowledge
Vico's certitude that the world of nations was knowable is perhaps the most im­
portant conclusion of the New Science. Vico believed that the human mind could grasp 
the world made by men and comprehend the unchanging principles of the ideal eternal 
history. The basis for this knowledge is observation of the actions of men in history, and 
like the natural philosophers of his day he entirely rejects mystical or occult explana­
tions for his science. And although, like them, he leaves behind religious revelation or 
mystical inspiration, he differed from them in his belief that this wisdom was attainable 
through the powers of reason when aided by the imagination. The imagination for Vico, 
it can never be stressed too strongly, is not the same as unarticulated fantasy, but is 
rather the faculty by which philosophical and philological findings are synthesised to 
produce a comprehensive vision of the world created by men. Vico's insistence on the 
central role that imagination plays in the formation of knowledge is the most strikingly 
original element of his epistemology and it set him apart from philosophers in his day, 
and also today, for whom the ontology of mental images is considered too obscure an 
explanation. Vico considered the imagination essential to higher cognitive processes for 
two reasons. The first is that he believed thought was grounded in images and not in ab­
stract theoretical propositions, and secondly that when images combine to form stories
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or accounts of reality they form the language of thought. This is the importance of his 
explanatory principle of the imaginative universals which enable new concepts to de­
velop from simpler components.368
Contrary to the natural philosophers of the early Enlightenment who had 
adopted the thesis that scientific experiments should be conducted objectively and that 
the role or position of the enquirer should not influence the method of research, Vico 
believed this was patently impossible, for two reasons. The first was that, he held, the 
subject m atter of scientific enquiry was itself largely determined by the subjective forces 
which shape the means of perception (and in this he can be considered a precursor of 
Kant and the modern hermeneutic tradition}, and secondly because, whatever the re­
sults that may be obtained by experiment, a strictly objective position that included only 
observational data would still be lacking a mechanism that could ensure a compelling 
consensus among researchers about the interpretation of the data. It is for this second 
reason that Vico was unswerving in his conviction that rhetoric was an indispensable 
element of any scientific endeavour, for without it there was no way to establish a con­
sensus of their findings among observers. But as it is implicit in this belief that man's 
mental acuity is sharpened by the sophistication of the language he possesses, it is im­
plied also that it is dulled in the absence of the refinement which rhetorical tropes bring 
to language. Thus, Vico concluded that the mind could ultimately be a reliable and accu­
rate instrum ent for the pursuit of truth, even though the measurements of individual re­
368 The same belief in the power of images to shape thought has found amplification in the work of Su- 
sanne Langer. See S. K. Langer, Philosophical Sketches: A Study o f the Human Mind in Relation to Feeling, 
Explored through Art, Language, and Symbol (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962}: "Metaphorical 
images penetrate deeply into our common-sense ways of thinking.... We often oppose what we call "poetic 
metaphors" to "hard common sense". But common sense is built on poetic metaphors. Yet common sense 
is not poetry. The power of seeing one thing in another, which begets our metaphors and conceptual mod­
els (the oldest of which are myths of nature and human life}, leads also to a characteristically human 
thought process known as abstraction". 147-148.
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searchers are never entirely absolute and objective. Collectively, however, he believed 
that true wisdom could be grasped by the unity of evidence mediated by common sense:
The wise man should be formed both of esoteric wisdom such as Plato's and of common
wisdom such as that of Tacitus.369
Are these two concepts of rationality, the esoteric and the practical, reconciled in 
Vico so that they both retain epistemic legitimacy and not cancel each other out?370 Vico 
wanted to synthesise the two paradigms of knowledge, for each had a particular useful­
ness, according to the subject m atter which it treated, yet he adamantly insisted that 
specialised knowledge would always require the critical appraisal of common sense in 
order to save it from overly abstract theorizing.371 Nevertheless, unlike abstract think­
ing, sensus communis is based on the values and shared notions of a community, as op­
posed to the specialised scientific knowledge of a relatively small group of thinkers, and 
while its value lies in establishing boundaries for public discourse, it is still largely influ­
enced by subjective factors, like feelings and emotions, and is not a scientifically reliable 
standard. But the making of abstract systems of thought intelligible to a wider public is 
only one element of the philosophical contribution of sensus communis, the other is that 
those systems themselves achieve greater consistency and coherence by the refined ar­
ticulation and application which they receive by scrutiny in the public sphere. W hat eso­
teric reasoning contributes to sensus communis, on the other hand, is greater objectivity
369 Vico, Autobiography, 139.
370 This same acknowledgement that advanced cognition is achieved by the interaction of more than one 
distinct faculty is reflected in the conclusions of the cognitive scientist Marvin Lee Minsky. See Marvin L. 
Minsky, The Society of Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986): "What magical trick makes us intelli­
gent? The trick is that there is no trick. The power of intelligence stems from our vast diversity, not from 
any single, perfect principle". 308.
371 The same fundamental conclusion is shared by the historian Stephen Pepper in World Hypotheses: A 
Study in Evidence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970): "Common sense continually demands 
the responsible criticism of refined knowledge, and refined knowledge sooner or later requires the secu­
rity of common-sense support". 45-46.
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and inclusiveness of far-flung phenomena which are not apparently related but which 
are governed by the same general principles and this broadens the universality of popu­
lar human wisdom as a whole. As a result, when the two seemingly incompatible sys­
tems of reasoning come together, ethical and aesthetic decisions and values gain in phi­
losophical cogency and scientific descriptions of reality are less likely to overwhelm the 
ability of average people to make sense of them and thereby lose their psychological and 
social bearings. This is not to say that total transparency is inevitable when scientific 
and aesthetic and ethical propositions are scrutinised under the optic of sensus commu­
nis, however, with it, certainly much that is incomprehensible is rendered intelligible to 
a larger public in the process of its application. And perhaps most importantly, when the 
question of philosophical legitimacy is brought into the equation, Vico's point against the 
ancient prejudice against rhetorical argumentation and reasoning, as opposed to syllo­
gistic deduction of logical propositions, that it was fundamentally coercive and less than 
honest because it took aim at the emotions to convince, was precisely that at the root of 
all convictions is an emotional component without which the belief would remain an ab­
stract and ephemeral proposition.
Why should Vico have been so concerned that knowledge was becoming increas­
ing obscure, at least to the masses, and compartmentalised? He might have chosen to 
accept this tendency as an inevitable consequence of the greater technical precision 
which new scientific instrumentation permitted; instead, he unceasingly railed against it 
throughout his life because he believed that a theoretical understanding of the world 
must be combined with an active concern for the human condition overall:
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To be useful to the human race, philosophy must raise and direct weak and fallen man, 
not rend his nature or abandon him in his corruption.372
The philosopher serves an essential role in society, according to Vico, and the 
marginalisation of philosophy from public life was a threat he perceived to the health of 
society as a whole, for the philosopher alone maintains the esoteric acumen and moral 
perspective necessary to keep it from losing its cohesiveness. But it was just as impor­
tant, for Vico, that the philosopher remain socially active because he believed conceptual 
consciousness to be a social product, and estrangement from the sources of thought 
would inevitably lead to an impoverishment of thinking and ultimately solipsism, which 
he termed the barbarism o f reflection.373 This subject brings us to the third, and final, 
point: the relationship between history and mind.
The relationship between history and mind 
According to Vico, at the beginning of history mankind faces the dangers of a hos­
tile nature, and at the end he encounters the threat of psychic and spiritual disintegra­
tion. The first proposition is not hard to understand, but why does Vico say that man­
kind must necessarily regress to the barbarism o f reflection, after it has won its freedom 
through Herculean effort from the barbarism o f the senses? During this period of hyper­
rationality, the institutions which had supported higher thinking fall into disuse. With 
the collapse of those institutions begins man's estrangement from his own works and he 
reverts to a state of bestiality. Civilisation, Vico is saying, is built by man and is destroyed 
by him. Or is it? Did Vico not write that divine providence had ordained those very insti­
372 NS129.
373 See Ray Jackendoff, Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure (Cambridge, Massa­
chusetts: The MIT Press, 2007), 364, for a recent discussion of how social cognition is a product of con­
cepts, as concepts are the products of social relationships.
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tutions “universal and eternal"?374 If this is the case, who is responsible for their genesis 
and end? Does this not seem to contradict Vico's methodological postulate that “the 
world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and [that] its principles are there­
fore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind"?375 The ontology of 
institutions is either a product of the human mind or of providence working through the 
ideal eternal history. Is there any way to resolve these two claims to make sense of the 
role of the mind's agency in history?
Briefly, there are two main ways of interpreting the emergence of institutions. 
One way is that institutions are the product of man's rational nature;376 the other is that 
humanity owes its identity to institutions.377 The key to this debate about the origins of 
human socialisation and institutions can perhaps be found in an examination of Vico's 
final chapter of mankind -  the barbarism o f reflection.
When our human reason was fully developed, it reached its end in the true in the ideas 
themselves with regard to what is just, as determined by reason from the detailed circumstances 
of the facts.378
History, for Vico, is characterised by man's perm anent struggle for physical and 
emotional security; he is guided in these efforts by a powerful sense of justice which 
stems from the natural law that is instituted by divine providence, and which is heroi­
374 NS 342: "Our new Science must therefore be a demonstration, so to speak, of what providence has 
wrought in history, for it must be a history of the institutions by which, without human discernment or 
counsel, and often against the designs of men, providence has ordered this great city of the human race. 
For though this world has been created in time and particular, the institutions established therein by 
providence are universal and eternal".
375 NS 331.
376 See J. C. Morrison, 'Vico's Doctrine of the Natural Law of the Gentes', Journal o f the History o f Philosophy 
16,47-60: "Social institutions do not form man; rather, they are themselves the external formations of 
man's poetic nature -  his capacity of forming, making, and instituting". 54.
377 See Max Harold Fisch, Introduction, The New Science o f Giambattista Vico: "Humanity is not a presup­
position, but a consequence, an effect, a product of institution building". Xliv.
378 NS 1045.
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cally manifested throughout history by the people.379 It is not difficult to see here a de­
scription of man as Promethean protagonist who must continuously claim w hat has 
been denied him and is his by right, and it would not be illegitimate either to read Vico's 
ideal eternal history as a story of man's defiant struggle for liberation, from nature, tyr­
anny, and, finally, illusion and self-deception. However, one might expect continuous 
progress here, for there is no ostensive reason why there should be a necessary limit if 
man is in control of his own destiny. But this is not the case in Vico, for he says that eve­
rything that has been obtained by the human race through the mind can be, and ulti­
mately is, destroyed by him. The process of this collapse is complex, but Vico says that it 
starts with a slide into solipsism on the part of a society's hyper-rational individuals, the 
rationalist philosophers he takes to task for their insularity, and ends by infecting eve­
ryone. A loss of confidence in the permanency of institutions that before were able to 
provide psychic protection now overtakes man who suffers his self-awareness with 
acute unease. People become diffident and seek safety in their own consciousness, but 
this impoverishment of the social self is not accompanied by a greater interiority or 
depth of understanding, as might be the case if Vico thought man were endowed with a 
perm anent self or soul as the Abrahamic religions teach. Quite the opposite, for this 
bleakness is only relieved by the total loss of rationality itself, and then mankind finds 
itself once again in the guise of a beast. One cycle of the ideal eternal history is complete 
and another is set to begin.
It is interesting that more than a hundred years after Vico wrote the New Science 
another philosopher, far from the Partenopean cultural landscape, described in almost 
identical terms the state of mind pervading his own society and which Vico called the
379 NS 146.
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barbarism o f reflection. This is what John Stuart Mill wrote in his Autobiography about 
his own age:
When the philosophic minds of the world can no longer believe its religion, or can only 
believe it with modifications amounting to an essential change of its character, a transitional pe­
riod commences, of weak convictions, paralysed intellects, and growing laxity of principle, which 
cannot terminate until a renovation has been effected in the basis of their belief, leading to the 
evolution of some faith, whether religious or merely human, which they can really believe: and 
when things are in this state, all thinking or writing which does not tend to promote such a reno­
vation, is of very little value beyond the moment380
Mill's observation strongly supports Vico's thesis that when the foundations of a 
society or civilisation are shaken, in Mill's case by the paradigm shift of man's place in 
nature wrought by Darwin's theory, the effort to reconstruct psychological security is 
exhausting and debilitating, and in the process many of the institutions which the old 
belief system supported are swept away. Vico's barbarism o f reflection also represents a 
transitional period, but with even more disastrous effects than Mill's circumstances. At 
this stage, the rational mind contributes nothing further to advancing the human race, 
either because it withholds moral direction out of disinterest for others or has itself 
reached a limit to make sense of the world. In the first instance, moral decrepitude is 
provoked by a lack of will; in the second case, cognitive ability is, not w ithout tragical 
irony, overwhelmed by the complexity of the social world it has created. In either case, 
the mind's renovation will only occur through a realignment of the senses so that they 
are once again focused outward from the self-absorbed individual consciousness. This 
explanation conveys Vico's belief that humanity owes its identity to institutions, and
380 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography [1873], [London: Penguin Books: 1989}, 180.
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man freely takes responsibility for them. The New Science rests on the premise that his­
tory is made by man, not God, and that without institutions there is neither man nor his­
tory. It could fairly be said that Vico describes a religion of humanity in the New Science, 
rather than a religious interpretation of humanity.
The alternative premise that institutions are the product of man's rational nature 
would seem to be obviated by the account above. But the m atter is not that simple. Al­
though the concept of providence acquires a new, or very different, meaning from the 
Abrahamic religions' idea of God directing creation toward some good end, that does not 
mean that Vico intended to secularise the deity. In important respects, such as its uni­
versality and predictability, his providence resembles a scientist's notion of revealed ra­
tionality in nature, rather than the material manifestation of a personal god's will. How­
ever, this evidence of the logical regularity of social and mental phenomena is intended 
by Vico to establish the universal presence and justice of the Creator, not to repudiate 
His existence. Indeed, such a hypothesis would contradict the overall purpose of the 
work which is clearly stated at the beginning of the New Science:
This New Science or metaphysic, studying the common nature of nations in the light of 
divine providence, discovers the origins of divine and human institutions among the gentile na­
tions, and thereby establishes a system of the natural law of the gentes...381
But God's existence does nothing to change the conclusion that Vico's position in 
the New Science is that God does not intervene directly in history: God creates the world, 
but man makes history. In this account, Vico asserts that man is free and responsible for 
directing his own destiny, while he also maintains God's presence in the world. The
381 NS 31.
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mind is the means by which the human and the divine are united, and ultimately this is 
the meaning of mind in the New Science.
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